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From: Eric Voskuil <eric@voskuil.org>
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To: Jonas Schnelli <dev@jonasschnelli.ch>
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Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP 151
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> On Jun 30, 2016, at 2:20 PM, Jonas Schnelli <dev@jonasschnelli.ch> wrote:
>=20
>=20
>> Yes, this is exactly what I meant. The complexity of the proposed constru=
ction is comparable to that of Bitcoin itself. This is not itself prohibitiv=
e, but it is clearly worthy of consideration.
>>=20
>> A question we should ask is whether decentralized anonymous credentials i=
s applicable to the authentication problem posed by BIP151. I propose that i=
t is not.
>>=20
>> The core problem posed by BIP151 is a MITM attack. The implied solution (=
BIP151 + authentication) requires that a peer trusts that another is not an a=
ttacker.
>=20
> BIP151 would increase the risks for MITM attackers.
> What are the benefits for Mallory of he can't be sure Alice and Bob may
> know that he is intercepting the channel?

It is not clear to me why you believe an attack on privacy by an anonymous p=
eer is detectable.

> MITM is possible today, it would still be possible (though under higher
> costs) with BIP151.
>=20
> With BIP151 we would have the basic tool-set to effectively reduce the
> risks of being MITMled.
>=20
> IMO we should focus on the risks and benefits of BIP151 and not drag
> this discussion into the realm of authentication. This can and should be
> done once we have proposals for authentication (and I'm sure this will
> be a heated debate).
>=20
> The only valid risk I have on my list from you, Eric, is the false sense
> of security.
>=20
> My countermeasure for that would be...
> - deploy BIP151 together with the simplest form of authentication
> (know_hosts / authorized_keys file, no TOFU only editable "by hand")
> - make it more clear (in the BIP151 MOTIVATION text) that it won't solve
> the privacy/MITM problem without additional authentication.
>=20
> Or could you elaborate again =E2=80=93 without stepping into the realm of
> authentication/MITM (which is not part of the BIP or possible already
> today) =E2=80=93 why BIP151 would make things worse?
>=20
> </jonas>
>=20