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From: Luke Dashjr <luke@dashjr.org>
To: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org,
Mark Friedenbach <mark@friedenbach.org>
Date: Sat, 30 Sep 2017 23:23:32 +0000
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Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Merkle branch verification & tail-call semantics
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On Thursday 07 September 2017 12:38:55 AM Mark Friedenbach via bitcoin-dev
wrote:
> Tail-call execution semantics
> BIP: https://gist.github.com/maaku/f7b2e710c53f601279549aa74eeb5368
> Code: https://github.com/maaku/bitcoin/tree/tail-call-semantics
Just noticed this doesn't count sigops toward the block sigop limit.
Is that really safe? How long would it take, to verify a malicious block with
only inputs such that there is nearly 4 MB of sigops?
(I do already understand the difficulty in supporting the sigop limit.)
Luke
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