1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
|
Received: from sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.194]
helo=mx.sourceforge.net)
by sfs-ml-2.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76)
(envelope-from <laanwj@gmail.com>) id 1XSj5R-0000yk-1v
for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net;
Sat, 13 Sep 2014 08:53:41 +0000
Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com
designates 209.85.213.176 as permitted sender)
client-ip=209.85.213.176; envelope-from=laanwj@gmail.com;
helo=mail-ig0-f176.google.com;
Received: from mail-ig0-f176.google.com ([209.85.213.176])
by sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128)
(Exim 4.76) id 1XSj5P-00050C-Qz
for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net;
Sat, 13 Sep 2014 08:53:40 +0000
Received: by mail-ig0-f176.google.com with SMTP id hn15so1732945igb.9
for <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>;
Sat, 13 Sep 2014 01:53:34 -0700 (PDT)
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-Received: by 10.50.22.101 with SMTP id c5mr8236382igf.29.1410598414152; Sat,
13 Sep 2014 01:53:34 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by 10.64.1.209 with HTTP; Sat, 13 Sep 2014 01:53:34 -0700 (PDT)
In-Reply-To: <06D9FBBD-30DB-4591-A932-B5A19F1D6543@coinqy.com>
References: <mailman.342174.1410547421.2163.bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
<06D9FBBD-30DB-4591-A932-B5A19F1D6543@coinqy.com>
Date: Sat, 13 Sep 2014 10:53:34 +0200
Message-ID: <CA+s+GJBWTji2JfTF+8+zb+9LWV2mK7inqVakdMhoXQYi4_a-Jw@mail.gmail.com>
From: Wladimir <laanwj@gmail.com>
To: Mark van Cuijk <mark@coinqy.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
X-Spam-Score: -1.6 (-)
X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net.
See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details.
-1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for
sender-domain
0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider
(laanwj[at]gmail.com)
-0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record
-0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from
author's domain
0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature,
not necessarily valid
-0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature
X-Headers-End: 1XSj5P-00050C-Qz
Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] BIP72 amendment proposal
X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: <bitcoin-development.lists.sourceforge.net>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development>,
<mailto:bitcoin-development-request@lists.sourceforge.net?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://sourceforge.net/mailarchive/forum.php?forum_name=bitcoin-development>
List-Post: <mailto:bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
List-Help: <mailto:bitcoin-development-request@lists.sourceforge.net?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development>,
<mailto:bitcoin-development-request@lists.sourceforge.net?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 13 Sep 2014 08:53:41 -0000
On Fri, Sep 12, 2014 at 10:59 PM, Mark van Cuijk <mark@coinqy.com> wrote:
> If you do so, please make sure the length of the hash is included in the =
PaymentDetails/PaymentRequest. If someone parses the URI and doesn=E2=80=99=
t have an authenticated way of knowing the expected length of the hash, a M=
ITM attacker can just truncate the hash to lower security.
But if they can truncate they can just as well pass a completely
different hash that matches their payment request. If an attacker can
change the bitcoin: URI, this scheme is broken.
The point of the proposal is to make sure that the payment request
matches the URI. So *if* you communicate the URI by secure means, this
authenticates the associated payment request as well, even if fetched
by insecure means (such as http:...) itself.
Wladimir
|
