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 <026701d76d90$b4095e30$1c1c1a90$@voskuil.org>
In-Reply-To: <026701d76d90$b4095e30$1c1c1a90$@voskuil.org>
From: Zac Greenwood <zachgrw@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 30 Jun 2021 13:33:38 +0200
Message-ID: <CAJ4-pEBcKJPNAKNQ-i4gBNFUuFFPYfxyWuzWHpZwO_kCp0wFQA@mail.gmail.com>
To: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>,
 eric@voskuil.org
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Cc: Prayank <prayank@tutanota.de>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Trinary Version Signaling for softfork
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--000000000000a5a08d05c5fa1870
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Hi Eric,

> A node (software) doesn=E2=80=99t enforce anything. Merchants enforce con=
sensus
rules

=E2=80=A6 by running a node which they believe to enforce the rules of Bitc=
oin.

A node definitely enforces consensus rules and defines what is Bitcoin. I
am quite disturbed that this is even being debated here.

Zac


On Wed, 30 Jun 2021 at 11:17, Eric Voskuil via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> Hi Prayank,
>
>
>
> > So majority hash power not following the consensus rules can result in
> chain split?
>
>
>
> Any two people on different rules implies a chain split. That=E2=80=99s p=
resumably
> why rule changes are called forks. There is no actual concept of =E2=80=
=9Cthe
> rules=E2=80=9D just one set of rules or another.
>
>
>
> > Why would majority of miners decide to mine a chain that nobody wants t=
o
> use?
>
>
>
> I don=E2=80=99t presume to know why people prefer one thing over another,=
 or what
> people want to use, nor does economics.
>
>
>
> > What are different things possible in this case based on game theory?
>
>
>
> I=E2=80=99ve seen no actual demonstration of the relevance of game theory=
 to
> Bitcoin. People throw the words around quite a bit, but I can=E2=80=99t g=
ive you an
> answer because I have found no evidence of a valid game theoretic model
> applicable to Bitcoin. It=E2=80=99s not a game, it=E2=80=99s a market.
>
>
>
> > Do miners and mining pools participate in discussions before signaling
> for a soft fork begins?
>
>
>
> Who knows, I don=E2=80=99t get invited to round table meetings.
>
>
>
> > Can they still mine something else post activation even if signaling
> readiness for soft fork?
>
>
>
> A person can mine whatever they want. Signaling does not compel a miner t=
o
> enforce. Each block mined is anonymous. But each miner seeing the signals
> of others, unless they are coordinating, would presumably assume that
> others will enforce.
>
>
>
> > Who enforces consensus rules technically in Bitcoin? Full nodes or
> Miners?
>
>
>
> A node (software) doesn=E2=80=99t enforce anything. Merchants enforce con=
sensus
> rules when they reject trading for something that they don=E2=80=99t cons=
ider
> money. Every time two people trade both party validates what they receive
> (not what they trade away). Those receiving Bitcoin are economically
> relevant and their power is a function of how much they are doing so.
>
>
>
> Miners censor, which is inconsequential unless enforced. Majority miners
> can enforce censorship by simply not building on any non-censoring blocks=
.
> This is what soft fork enforcement is.
>
>
>
> > Is soft fork signaling same as voting?
>
>
>
> I don=E2=80=99t see that it needs a label apart from signaling. There are=
 many
> kinds of voting. It would be hard to equate signaling with any of them.
> It=E2=80=99s a public signal that the miner who mined a given block miner=
 intends
> to censor, that=E2=80=99s all.
>
>
>
> > According to my understanding, miners follow the consensus rules
> enforced by full nodes and get (subsidy + fees) for their work.
>
>
>
> Miners mine a chain, which ever one they want. There are many. They earn
> the block reward.
>
>
>
> > Signaling is not voting although lot of people consider it voting
> including some mining pools and exchanges.
>
>
>
> What people consider it is inconsequential. It has clearly defined
> behavior.
>
>
>
> e
>
>
>
> *From:* Prayank <prayank@tutanota.de>
> *Sent:* Sunday, June 27, 2021 5:01 AM
> *To:* eric@voskuil.org
> *Cc:* Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
> *Subject:* Re: [bitcoin-dev] Trinary Version Signaling for softfork
>
>
>
> Hello Eric,
>
>
>
> I have few questions:
>
>
>
> > Without majority hash power support, activation simply means you are of=
f
> on a chain split.
>
>
>
> So majority hash power not following the consensus rules can result in
> chain split? Why would majority of miners decide to mine a chain that
> nobody wants to use? What are different things possible in this case base=
d
> on game theory?
>
>
>
> > And activation without majority hash power certainly does not =E2=80=9C=
ensure=E2=80=9D
> this.
>
>
>
> Do miners and mining pools participate in discussions before signaling fo=
r
> a soft fork begins? Can they still mine something else post activation ev=
en
> if signaling readiness for soft fork?
>
>
>
> > If one wants to enforce a soft fork (or otherwise censor) this is
> accomplished by mining (or paying others to do so). Anyone can mine, so
> everyone gets a say. Mining is trading capital now for more later. If
> enough people want to do that, they can enforce a soft fork. It=E2=80=99s=
 time
> Bitcoiners stop thinking of miners as other people. Anyone can mine, and
> that=E2=80=99s your vote.
>
>
>
> Who enforces consensus rules technically in Bitcoin? Full nodes or Miners=
?
>
>
>
> Is soft fork signaling same as voting?
>
>
>
> According to my understanding, miners follow the consensus rules enforced
> by full nodes and get (subsidy + fees) for their work. Signaling is not
> voting although lot of people consider it voting including some mining
> pools and exchanges.
>
>
>
>
>
> --
>
> Prayank
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>

--000000000000a5a08d05c5fa1870
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"auto">Hi Eric,</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"aut=
o"><span style=3D"border-color:rgb(0,0,0);color:rgb(0,0,0)">&gt; A node (so=
ftware) doesn=E2=80=99t enforce anything. Merchants enforce consensus rules=
</span><br></div><div dir=3D"auto"><span style=3D"border-color:rgb(0,0,0);c=
olor:rgb(0,0,0)"><br></span></div><div style=3D"background-color:rgba(0,0,0=
,0)!important;border-color:rgb(255,255,255)!important;color:rgb(255,255,255=
)!important" dir=3D"auto"><font style=3D"border-color:rgb(0,0,0);color:rgb(=
0,0,0)">=E2=80=A6 by running a node which they believe to enforce the rules=
 of Bitcoin.</font></div><div dir=3D"auto"><span style=3D"border-color:rgb(=
0,0,0);color:rgb(0,0,0)"><br></span></div><div style=3D"background-color:rg=
ba(0,0,0,0)!important;border-color:rgb(255,255,255)!important;color:rgb(255=
,255,255)!important" dir=3D"auto"><font style=3D"border-color:rgb(0,0,0);co=
lor:rgb(0,0,0)">A node definitely enforces consensus rules and defines what=
 is Bitcoin. I am quite disturbed that</font><span style=3D"border-color:rg=
b(0,0,0);color:rgb(0,0,0)">=C2=A0this is even being debated here.</span></d=
iv><div dir=3D"auto"><span style=3D"border-color:rgb(0,0,0);color:rgb(0,0,0=
)"><br></span></div><div dir=3D"auto"><span style=3D"border-color:rgb(0,0,0=
);color:rgb(0,0,0)">Zac</span></div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div><br><d=
iv class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Wed, 30 J=
un 2021 at 11:17, Eric Voskuil via bitcoin-dev &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoi=
n-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org">bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a>&=
gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0=
px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex=
;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><div lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"#0563C1" v=
link=3D"#954F72" style=3D"word-wrap:break-word"><div class=3D"m_47319466642=
80896658WordSection1"><p class=3D"MsoNormal">Hi Prayank,<u></u><u></u></p><=
p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">&gt; S=
o majority hash power not following the consensus rules can result in chain=
 split?<u></u><u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal">Any two people on different rules implies a chain split=
. That=E2=80=99s presumably why rule changes are called forks. There is no =
actual concept of =E2=80=9Cthe rules=E2=80=9D just one set of rules or anot=
her.<u></u><u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><p cla=
ss=3D"MsoNormal">&gt; Why would majority of miners decide to mine a chain t=
hat nobody wants to use?<u></u><u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=
=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">I don=E2=80=99t presume to know why pe=
ople prefer one thing over another, or what people want to use, nor does ec=
onomics.<u></u><u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><p=
 class=3D"MsoNormal">&gt; What are different things possible in this case b=
ased on game theory?<u></u><u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<=
u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">I=E2=80=99ve seen no actual demonstration =
of the relevance of game theory to Bitcoin. People throw the words around q=
uite a bit, but I can=E2=80=99t give you an answer because I have found no =
evidence of a valid game theoretic model applicable to Bitcoin. It=E2=80=99=
s not a game, it=E2=80=99s a market.<u></u><u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal=
"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">&gt; Do miners and mining =
pools participate in discussions before signaling for a soft fork begins?<u=
></u><u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"=
MsoNormal">Who knows, I don=E2=80=99t get invited to round table meetings.<=
u></u><u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D=
"MsoNormal">&gt; Can they still mine something else post activation even if=
 signaling readiness for soft fork?=C2=A0<u></u><u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoN=
ormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">A person can mine wha=
tever they want. Signaling does not compel a miner to enforce. Each block m=
ined is anonymous. But each miner seeing the signals of others, unless they=
 are coordinating, would presumably assume that others will enforce.<u></u>=
<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNo=
rmal">&gt; Who enforces consensus rules technically in Bitcoin? Full nodes =
or Miners?<u></u><u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>=
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">A node (software) doesn=E2=80=99t enforce anything. =
Merchants enforce consensus rules when they reject trading for something th=
at they don=E2=80=99t consider money. Every time two people trade both part=
y validates what they receive (not what they trade away). Those receiving B=
itcoin are economically relevant and their power is a function of how much =
they are doing so.<u></u><u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u>=
</u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">Miners censor, which is inconsequential unle=
ss enforced. Majority miners can enforce censorship by simply not building =
on any non-censoring blocks. This is what soft fork enforcement is.<u></u><=
u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNor=
mal">&gt; Is soft fork signaling same as voting?<u></u><u></u></p><p class=
=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">I don=E2=80=
=99t see that it needs a label apart from signaling. There are many kinds o=
f voting. It would be hard to equate signaling with any of them. It=E2=80=
=99s a public signal that the miner who mined a given block miner intends t=
o censor, that=E2=80=99s all.<u></u><u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></=
u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">&gt; According to my understandin=
g, miners follow the consensus rules enforced by full nodes and get (subsid=
y + fees) for their work.<u></u><u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=
=C2=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">Miners mine a chain, which ever one=
 they want. There are many. They earn the block reward.<u></u><u></u></p><p=
 class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">&gt; Si=
gnaling is not voting although lot of people consider it voting including s=
ome mining pools and exchanges.<u></u><u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u>=
</u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">What people consider it is inco=
nsequential. It has clearly defined behavior.</p></div></div><div lang=3D"E=
N-US" link=3D"#0563C1" vlink=3D"#954F72" style=3D"word-wrap:break-word"><di=
v class=3D"m_4731946664280896658WordSection1"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u=
><u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoN=
ormal">e<u></u><u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><d=
iv><div style=3D"border-style:solid none none;border-top-width:1pt;padding:=
3pt 0in 0in;border-top-color:rgb(225,225,225)"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b>Fr=
om:</b> Prayank &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:prayank@tutanota.de" target=3D"_blank=
">prayank@tutanota.de</a>&gt; <br><b>Sent:</b> Sunday, June 27, 2021 5:01 A=
M<br><b>To:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:eric@voskuil.org" target=3D"_blank">eric@=
voskuil.org</a><br><b>Cc:</b> Bitcoin Dev &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev=
@lists.linuxfoundation.org" target=3D"_blank">bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfounda=
tion.org</a>&gt;<br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [bitcoin-dev] Trinary Version Signa=
ling for softfork<u></u><u></u></p></div></div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></=
u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">Hello Eric,<u></u><u></u></p=
></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p cl=
ass=3D"MsoNormal">I have few questions:<u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p clas=
s=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">&=
gt;=C2=A0Without majority hash power support, activation simply means you a=
re off on a chain split. <u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal=
"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">So majority has=
h power not following the consensus rules can result in chain split? Why wo=
uld majority of miners decide to mine a chain that nobody wants to use? Wha=
t are different things possible in this case based on game theory?=C2=A0<u>=
</u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></=
div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">&gt;=C2=A0And activation without majority h=
ash power certainly does not =E2=80=9Censure=E2=80=9D this.<u></u><u></u></=
p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p c=
lass=3D"MsoNormal">Do miners and mining pools participate in discussions be=
fore signaling for a soft fork begins? Can they still mine something else p=
ost activation even if signaling readiness for soft fork?=C2=A0<u></u><u></=
u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div>=
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&gt;=C2=A0If one wants to enforce a soft fork (or ot=
herwise censor) this is accomplished by mining (or paying others to do so).=
 Anyone can mine, so everyone gets a say. Mining is trading capital now for=
 more later. If enough people want to do that, they can enforce a soft fork=
. It=E2=80=99s time Bitcoiners stop thinking of miners as other people. Any=
one can mine, and that=E2=80=99s your vote.<u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNorma=
l">Who enforces consensus rules technically in Bitcoin? Full nodes or Miner=
s?<u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u><=
/p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">Is soft fork signaling same as voting?=
<u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p=
></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">According to my understanding, miners fo=
llow the consensus rules enforced by full nodes and get (subsidy + fees) fo=
r their work. Signaling is not voting although lot of people consider it vo=
ting including some mining pools and exchanges.<u></u><u></u></p></div><div=
><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoN=
ormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">-- <u></u>=
<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">Prayank<u></u><u></u></p></div=
></div></div>_______________________________________________<br>
bitcoin-dev mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org" target=3D"_blank">=
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev" =
rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail=
man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div>

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