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Date: Wed, 12 Mar 2014 16:15:01 -0500
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Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] [RFC] Proposal: Base58 encoded HD Wallet
root key with optional encryption
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--089e015371dc6e1b0a04f46f54d1
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On Wed, Mar 12, 2014 at 4:08 PM, Jean-Paul Kogelman <jeanpaulkogelman@me.com
> wrote:
>
> Agreed, this is a valid concern. This could possibly allow a 3rd party to
> crack the password, but then again, they would not gain access to any key
> material. So yes, you could expose your password, but your key would still
> be safe.
>
> If people feel strongly about this vulnerability, we can revisit step 4
> and adjust it to make password recovery more expensive.
>
>
Just to clarify on J.P.'s comments:
*If* you choose to outsource StrongH calculation, and *If* that machine is
compromised, then the security of your password is reduced to a single
round of salted PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512. Your private key remains on the trusted
device, no matter what.
Regrettable, but not catastrophic.
Will
--089e015371dc6e1b0a04f46f54d1
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
<div dir=3D"ltr">On Wed, Mar 12, 2014 at 4:08 PM, Jean-Paul Kogelman <span =
dir=3D"ltr"><<a href=3D"mailto:jeanpaulkogelman@me.com" target=3D"_blank=
">jeanpaulkogelman@me.com</a>></span> wrote:<br><div class=3D"gmail_extr=
a"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class=3D""><div><br></div></div><div>Ag=
reed, this is a valid concern. This could possibly allow a 3rd party to cra=
ck the password, but then again, they would not gain access to any key mate=
rial. So yes, you could expose your password, but your key would still be s=
afe.</div>
<div><span style=3D"line-height:1.5"><br></span></div><div><span style=3D"l=
ine-height:1.5">If people feel strongly about this vulnerability, we can re=
visit step 4 and adjust it to make password recovery more expensive.</span>=
</div>
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><div><br></div></font></span=
></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Just to clarify on J.P.'s comments:</=
div><div><br></div><div>*If* you choose to outsource StrongH calculation, a=
nd *If* that machine is compromised, then the security of your password is =
reduced to a single round of salted PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512. Your private key re=
mains on the trusted device, no matter what.</div>
<div><br></div><div>Regrettable, but not catastrophic.</div><div><br></div>=
<div>Will</div></div></div></div>
--089e015371dc6e1b0a04f46f54d1--
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