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Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Identity protocol observation
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Fair enough, though people still manage okay with phone numbers.  And a
decentralized naming system seems to come at great cost - with namecoin you
need the whole blockchain to resolve names without trust.  Strip out a bell
and whistle - meaningfulness and transferability of names - and you get a
simple, rudimentary (spam killing!) system that scales on any device.  I'll
only argue that it seems to be Good Enough *for the types of people who
might care about decentralized names*.  Probably a very small set :)


On Thu, Oct 3, 2013 at 8:00 AM, Mike Hearn <mike@plan99.net> wrote:

> Interesting observation, thanks.
>
> I'd think any competent implementation of such an identity scheme would
> not involve end users directly handling randomized nonsense words, however.
> I always imagined a sacrifice as being a file that you make with a GUI tool
> and load into a browser extension.
>
>
> On Thu, Oct 3, 2013 at 3:35 PM, Daniel Lidstrom <lidstrom83@gmail.com>wrote:
>
>> A couple more thoughts on this:
>>
>> 1) Both c and k can be kept if c is pronounced 'ch', giving ~10.9 bits
>> per phoneme.
>> 2) An extra phoneme (4 encode 43 bits total) gives room to put extra
>> information into the name, e.g. the first 5 bits could be input as the key
>> to a PRP that permutes the last 38 back to a standard encoding of a tx
>> location.  This would give the user 32 random names per sacrifice to choose
>> from, and 38 bits to encode its location in the blockchain, which is enough
>> for pretty large blocks.
>>
>> Sample 4 phoneme names:
>> ~milmoz-vyrnyx
>> ~mypnoz-fojzas
>> ~sawfex-bovlec
>> ~fidhut-guvgis
>> ~bobfej-jessuk
>> ~furcos-diwhuw
>> ~wokryx-wilrox
>> ~bygbyl-caggos
>> ~vewcyv-jyjsal
>> ~daxsaf-cywkul
>>
>> They're not that bad IMHO, especially if you get to pick a decent one
>> from a bunch.
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Oct 3, 2013 at 3:35 AM, Daniel Lidstrom <lidstrom83@gmail.com>wrote:
>>
>>> The location of a tx in the blockchain can be encoded in
>>> n=log2(h)+log2(t) bits, where h is the block height, and t is the number of
>>> transactions in the block.  Currently h~250,000 and t~500, so n~27.  A CVC
>>> phoneme encodes ~10.7 bits *, so a transaction today can be located in the
>>> blockchain with 3 of these, e.g. reb-mizvig.  This is reasonably short,
>>> readable and memorable.
>>>
>>> The identity protocol Jeff Garzik is working on will link a public key
>>> fingerprint to a miner sacrifice transaction.  This tx could in turn be
>>> uniquely described with a short name as above.  Associating this name with
>>> the public key becomes secure once the tx is sufficiently buried in the
>>> blockchain.  In the identity protocol, lightweight clients check the
>>> validity of a sacrifice tx by checking that its merkle path is valid.  But
>>> this path encodes, via the ordering of the hashes at each level, the
>>> location of the transaction in the block, so the lightweight client can
>>> verify the sacrifice tx's short name using only the information he already
>>> has.
>>>
>>> Some more random names:
>>> vec-halhic
>>> wom-vizpyd
>>> guv-zussof
>>> jog-copwug
>>> seg-rizges
>>> jyg-somgod
>>> pax-synjem
>>> zyg-zuxdyj
>>> gid-mutdyj
>>> rel-hyrdaj
>>>
>>> Sources of inspiration:
>>> urbit.org
>>> https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Identity_protocol_v1
>>>
>>> * This is somewhat restricted: I disallowed q for obvious reasons and k
>>> because it conflicts with c, and c looks much softer and less like
>>> Klingon.  H is allowed for the first consonant, but not the second, and x
>>> is allowed for the last one, but not the first one.  Y is a vowel, but not
>>> a consonant.  Maybe these weren't quite the right choices.  Paint away!
>>>
>>
>>
>>
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>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Fair enough, though people still manage okay with pho=
ne numbers.=A0 And a decentralized naming system seems to come at great cos=
t - with namecoin you need the whole blockchain to resolve names without tr=
ust.=A0 Strip out a bell and whistle - meaningfulness and transferability o=
f names - and you get a simple, rudimentary (spam killing!) system that sca=
les on any device.=A0 I&#39;ll only argue that it seems to be Good Enough <=
i>for the types of people who might care about=A0decentralized names</i>.=
=A0 Probably a very small set :)<br>
</div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">O=
n Thu, Oct 3, 2013 at 8:00 AM, Mike Hearn <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"=
mailto:mike@plan99.net" target=3D"_blank">mike@plan99.net</a>&gt;</span> wr=
ote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">Interesting observation, th=
anks.<div><br></div><div>I&#39;d think any competent implementation of such=
 an identity scheme would not involve end users directly handling randomize=
d nonsense words, however. I always imagined a sacrifice as being a file th=
at you make with a GUI tool and load into a browser extension.</div>

</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div><d=
iv class=3D"h5">On Thu, Oct 3, 2013 at 3:35 PM, Daniel Lidstrom <span dir=
=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:lidstrom83@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">lids=
trom83@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>

</div></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;bo=
rder-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div><div class=3D"h5"><div dir=
=3D"ltr"><div>A couple more thoughts on this:<br><br></div><div>1) Both c a=
nd k can be kept if c is pronounced &#39;ch&#39;, giving ~10.9 bits per pho=
neme.<br>

</div><div>2) An extra phoneme (4 encode 43 bits total) gives room to put e=
xtra information into the name, e.g. the first 5 bits could be input as the=
 key to a PRP that permutes the last 38 back to a standard encoding of a tx=
 location.=A0 This would give the user 32 random names per sacrifice to cho=
ose from, and 38 bits to encode its location in the blockchain, which is en=
ough for pretty large blocks.<br>


<br></div><div>Sample 4 phoneme names:<br>~milmoz-vyrnyx<br>~mypnoz-fojzas<=
br>~sawfex-bovlec<br>~fidhut-guvgis<br>~bobfej-jessuk<br>~furcos-diwhuw<br>=
~wokryx-wilrox<br>~bygbyl-caggos<br>~vewcyv-jyjsal<br>~daxsaf-cywkul<br>


<br></div><div>They&#39;re not that bad IMHO, especially if you get to pick=
 a decent one from a bunch.<br></div></div><div><div><div class=3D"gmail_ex=
tra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu, Oct 3, 2013 at 3:35 AM, Dan=
iel Lidstrom <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:lidstrom83@gmail.com" =
target=3D"_blank">lidstrom83@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>


<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">The location of a tx in the=
 blockchain can be encoded in n=3Dlog2(h)+log2(t) bits, where h is the bloc=
k height, and t is the number of transactions in the block.=A0 Currently h~=
250,000 and t~500, so n~27.=A0 A CVC phoneme encodes ~10.7 bits *, so a tra=
nsaction today can be located in the blockchain with 3 of these, e.g. reb-m=
izvig.=A0 This is reasonably short, readable and memorable.<br>



<br>The identity protocol Jeff Garzik is working on will link a public key =
fingerprint to a miner sacrifice transaction.=A0 This tx could in turn be u=
niquely described with a short name as above.=A0 Associating this name with=
 the public key becomes secure once the tx is sufficiently buried in the bl=
ockchain.=A0 In the identity protocol, lightweight clients check the validi=
ty of a sacrifice tx by checking that its merkle path is valid.=A0 But this=
 path encodes, via the ordering of the hashes at each level, the location o=
f the transaction in the block, so the lightweight client can verify the sa=
crifice tx&#39;s short name using only the information he already has.<br>



<br>Some more random names:<br>vec-halhic<br>wom-vizpyd<br>guv-zussof<br>jo=
g-copwug<br>seg-rizges<br>jyg-somgod<br>pax-synjem<br>zyg-zuxdyj<br>gid-mut=
dyj<br>rel-hyrdaj<br><br>Sources of inspiration:<br><a href=3D"http://urbit=
.org" target=3D"_blank">urbit.org</a><br>



<a href=3D"https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Identity_protocol_v1" target=3D"_blan=
k">https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Identity_protocol_v1</a><br><br>* This is som=
ewhat restricted: I disallowed q for obvious reasons and k because it confl=
icts with c, and c looks much softer and less like Klingon.=A0 H is allowed=
 for the first consonant, but not the second, and x is allowed for the last=
 one, but not the first one.=A0 Y is a vowel, but not a consonant.=A0 Maybe=
 these weren&#39;t quite the right choices.=A0 Paint away!<br>



</div>
</blockquote></div><br></div>
</div></div><br></div></div>-----------------------------------------------=
-------------------------------<br>
October Webinars: Code for Performance<br>
Free Intel webinars can help you accelerate application performance.<br>
Explore tips for MPI, OpenMP, advanced profiling, and more. Get the most fr=
om<br>
the latest Intel processors and coprocessors. See abstracts and register &g=
t;<br>
<a href=3D"http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=3D60134791&amp;iu=
=3D/4140/ostg.clktrk" target=3D"_blank">http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gam=
pad/clk?id=3D60134791&amp;iu=3D/4140/ostg.clktrk</a><br>___________________=
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<br></blockquote></div><br></div>
</blockquote></div><br></div>

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