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Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Proposal: Demonstration of Phase in Full Network
	Upgrade Activated by Miners
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Seems functional as a way for the economy to signal, but signaling is only a=
n expression of intent to participate, not actual participation. One can sig=
nal and then not participate, as we see with hash rate signaling.

Today we see people complaining about miner control, because hash rate is ce=
ntralized. Tomorrow we are likely to see people complaining about economic c=
ontrol, as its centralization continues.

So imagine a few web wallets/APIs signaling based on their ownership of the m=
ajor fraction of value. Can potential splitters safely rely on these signals=
? The wallets have a voice because they participate.

Consider also that user activated soft forks are not followed by unmodified n=
odes (on the presumption of minority hash rate support that necessitated the=
 economic activation). In other words, they exhibit the categorical behavior=
 of hard forks (incompatibility). So to the extent that the economy has cont=
rol, it is only over the ability to hard fork (split the chain).

e

> On Jun 15, 2017, at 9:38 PM, Erik Aronesty <erik@q32.com> wrote:
>=20
> > How does the users show their opinion? They can fork away and leave. But=
 what remains will be united. Are you afraid of the united users or the fork=
?
>=20
> I had proposed earlier and maintain that "UTXO bits" can be used to allow c=
oordinated user participation activation thresholds akin to other hashpower t=
hresholds.  =20
>=20
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-May/014251.ht=
ml
>=20
> While I'm not certain that my implementation was correct (or was just too c=
omplicated and concerned with compression at the expense of readability), I a=
m fairly certain that this mechanism - or a similar one - would be a reasona=
ble way for users to coordinate changes independently of miners and with ver=
y high consensus levels.
>=20
>=20
>> On Thu, Jun 15, 2017 at 1:04 AM, Eric Voskuil via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-de=
v@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>>=20
>>=20
>>> On Jun 14, 2017, at 9:55 PM, Jameson Lopp via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@l=
ists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>> On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 11:29 AM, Zheming Lin <heater@gmail.com> wrote:=

>>>> Hi Jameson:
>>>>=20
>>>>> =E5=9C=A8 2017=E5=B9=B46=E6=9C=8815=E6=97=A5=EF=BC=8C01:20=EF=BC=8CJam=
eson Lopp <jameson.lopp@gmail.com> =E5=86=99=E9=81=93=EF=BC=9A
>>>>>=20
>>>>>=20
>>>>>=20
>>>>> On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 9:39 AM, Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-=
dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> > =E5=9C=A8 2017=E5=B9=B46=E6=9C=8814=E6=97=A5=EF=BC=8C02:11=EF=BC=8C=
Gregory Maxwell <greg@xiph.org> =E5=86=99=E9=81=93=EF=BC=9A
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 2:23 AM, Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
>>>>>> > <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> > The enforcement of the system's rules by users broadly, and not jus=
t
>>>>>> > miners, is specifically described in the white paper (section 8,
>>>>>> > paragraph 2, it especially clear in the last sentence).  This is
>>>>>> > critical for the security of Bitcoin especially with the current
>>>>>> > degree of centralization in pools.  Without it, Bitcoin's security
>>>>>> > would look a lot more like the Ripple system.
>>>>>> >
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> =E6=98=AF=E7=9A=84=EF=BC=8C=E7=94=A8=E6=88=B7=E6=B0=B8=E8=BF=9C=E9=83=
=BD=E6=9C=89=E9=80=89=E6=8B=A9=EF=BC=8C=E5=B9=B6=E5=8F=AF=E4=BB=A5=E6=8A=9B=E5=
=BC=83=E9=82=A3=E4=BA=9B=E8=8A=82=E7=82=B9=E3=80=82=E8=BF=99=E4=B8=AA BIP =E5=
=B9=B6=E6=B2=A1=E6=9C=89=E5=8F=8D=E5=AF=B9=E8=BF=99=E4=BA=9B=E7=94=A8=E6=88=B7=
=E8=BF=99=E4=B9=88=E5=81=9A=E3=80=82=E5=8F=AA=E6=9C=89=E9=82=A3=E4=BA=9B=E8=A2=
=AB=E5=8A=A8=E7=9A=84=E9=92=B1=E5=8C=85=E7=94=A8=E6=88=B7=EF=BC=8C=E4=BB=96=E4=
=BB=AC=E9=9C=80=E8=A6=81=E7=9F=A5=E9=81=93=E5=BF=85=E9=A1=BB=E5=81=9A=E5=87=BA=
=E4=B8=80=E4=B8=AA=E9=80=89=E6=8B=A9=E3=80=82=EF=BC=88=E8=80=8C=E4=B8=8D=E6=98=
=AF=E8=A2=AB=E5=8A=A8=E7=9A=84=E8=B7=9F=E9=9A=8F=E9=BB=98=E8=AE=A4=E7=9A=84=E7=
=AD=96=E7=95=A5=EF=BC=89
>>>>>> Yes, users always have choice that they can abandon the nodes. This B=
IP does=E2=80=99t go against them. I mean only the one(especially wallets) t=
hat=E2=80=99s passive, they need to know there=E2=80=99s a choice and pick o=
ne.
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> =E8=BF=99=E4=B8=AA BIP =E5=8F=AF=E4=BB=A5=E8=A2=AB=E5=BA=94=E7=94=A8=E4=
=BA=8E=E5=87=A0=E4=B9=8E=E4=BB=BB=E4=BD=95=E7=9A=84=E5=8D=87=E7=BA=A7=E4=B8=8A=
=EF=BC=8C=E5=8C=85=E6=8B=AC=E9=9A=94=E7=A6=BB=E8=A7=81=E8=AF=81=EF=BC=8C=E4=B8=
=A4=E5=85=86=E7=9A=84=E9=9A=94=E7=A6=BB=E8=A7=81=E8=AF=81=EF=BC=8C=E4=B8=A4=E5=
=85=86=E6=89=A9=E5=AE=B9=EF=BC=8C=E6=B6=8C=E7=8E=B0=E5=85=B1=E8=AF=86=EF=BC=8C=
=E5=85=AB=E5=85=86=E6=89=A9=E5=AE=B9=E7=AD=89=E3=80=82=E4=BD=86=E8=BF=99=E4=BA=
=9B=E5=8D=87=E7=BA=A7=E5=B9=B6=E4=B8=8D=E6=98=AF=E9=87=8D=E7=82=B9=E3=80=82
>>>>>> This BIP can be applied to almost any upgrade, including Segwit, Segw=
it2x, 2m, ec, 8m=E2=80=A6 but the upgrade is not the key point.
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> =E5=88=B0=E5=BA=95=E6=88=91=E4=BB=AC=E7=9A=84=E7=94=A8=E6=88=B7=E6=98=
=AF=E5=90=A6=E7=9C=9F=E7=9A=84=E6=8B=A5=E6=9C=89=E9=80=89=E6=8B=A9=EF=BC=9F
>>>>>> Did the users have any real choice?
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> =E6=88=91=E5=B9=B6=E4=B8=8D=E8=83=BD=E7=90=86=E8=A7=A3=E4=BB=96=E4=BB=
=AC=E7=9B=B8=E4=BF=A1=E5=A4=A7=E9=83=A8=E5=88=86=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=EF=BC=88=E5=
=B0=B1=E5=83=8F=E5=BD=93=E5=89=8D=E4=B8=80=E6=A0=B7=EF=BC=89=EF=BC=8C=E4=BD=86=
=E6=8B=92=E7=BB=9D=E8=BF=99=E4=BA=9B=E5=A4=9A=E6=95=B0=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=E5=AF=
=B9=E5=8D=8F=E8=AE=AE=E6=94=B9=E5=8F=98=E7=9A=84=E6=8A=95=E7=A5=A8=E7=BB=93=E6=
=9E=9C=E3=80=82
>>>>>> I don=E2=80=99t see the reason they trust the majority miners(as they=
 do today) but refuse the vote for upcoming protocol upgrade.
>>>>>=20
>>>>> To be clear, Bitcoin is not a democracy - if you find yourself using t=
he term "voting" then you may be misunderstanding how consensus forms. Once a=
 feature has been vetted and the code is deployed, miners may signal that th=
ey are ready to enforce new rules. If for some reason miners are too "passiv=
e or lazy" or wish to "veto" the activation of the new rules, users may choo=
se to circumvent said veto by refusing to accept blocks that do not show rea=
diness for enforcing the new rules.
>>>>=20
>>>> How does the users show their opinion? They can fork away and leave. Bu=
t what remains will be united. Are you afraid of the united users or the for=
k?
>>>>=20
>>>> I agree with you that the =E2=80=9Cvote=E2=80=9D is not accurate. Could=
 you kindly suggest an other word for that?
>>>>=20
>>>> I think users should have choice to follow the miners or not. Do you ag=
ree with this or not?
>>>>=20
>>> Regarding consensus changes, users can voice their opinion on any number=
 of communication platforms. Though if you're looking for a way for users to=
 signal their intentions at the protocol level, every proposal for doing tha=
t to date has been arguably flawed.
>>=20
>> There is exactly one way to express one's opinion on consensus at the pro=
tocol level - participation. The method is neither flawed nor inequitable in=
 the context of Bitcoin.
>>=20
>> The only "problem" with it is that people are not satisfied with having a=
 voice limited to their participation. People are used to political systems i=
n which they vote using their existence as power, not their participation, a=
nd they expect some subset of existing human bodies to control all others. T=
his is the concept of some ruling over others, which gives the rulers a more=
 powerful voice than either their proportional existence or individual parti=
cipation would allow.
>>=20
>> Bitcoin exists in defiance of political models. It is a market, not a sta=
te. The only choice you have is to participate or leave. If you are satisfie=
d with others participating in your stead, you have left the consensus - you=
 have no say.
>>=20
>> Most people who think they are participating in Bitcoin have either never=
 participated or long ago left the consensus. Having surrendered it, these p=
eople now grope for a way to have their say. You can always reclaim your say=
 on consensus, but you cannot take it away from others.
>>=20
>> To have your say regarding hard forks, you must validate Bitcoin received=
 in exchange for something else of economic value. To have your say regardin=
g soft forks you must mine. Everyone has these options. Hard forks cannot co=
ntrol miners' selection of transactions and miners cannot control the econom=
y's determination of what is valid. If one wants a say in either one must pa=
rticipate in the respective operation.
>>=20
>> e
>>=20
>>> Measuring meatspace consensus is pretty tricky if not completely impossi=
ble, especially given the fact that the vast majority of Bitcoin users do no=
t voice any opinions on the matter of consensus rules.
>>>=20
>>> Most attempts at measuring user consensus would probably be best describ=
ed as signaling rather than voting given that the act of doing so has no act=
ual power to affect consensus. Every user who runs a fully validating node i=
s free to enforce the rules with which the agree regardless of what rules ot=
her entities are enforcing.=20
>>>>> =20
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> =E5=AF=B9=E9=92=B1=E5=8C=85=E7=94=A8=E6=88=B7=E7=9A=84=E9=80=89=E6=8B=
=A9=EF=BC=8C=E6=98=AF=E4=BB=96=E4=BB=AC=E6=98=AF=E5=90=A6=E7=9B=B8=E4=BF=A1=E5=
=A4=9A=E6=95=B0=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=E3=80=82=E5=A6=82=E6=9E=9C=E4=BB=96=E4=BB=AC=
=E4=B8=8D=E7=9B=B8=E4=BF=A1=EF=BC=8C=E5=8F=AF=E4=BB=A5=E9=80=9A=E8=BF=87=E5=88=
=86=E5=8F=89=E6=9D=A5=E6=B6=88=E9=99=A4=E6=8E=89=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=E3=80=82
>>>>>> This choice for wallet users right now, is wether to follow the 51% m=
ajority miners. If they don=E2=80=99t, they can have their fork that get rid=
 of miners.
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> =E5=A6=82=E6=9E=9C=E4=BB=96=E4=BB=AC=E4=BB=8D=E6=97=A7=E7=9B=B8=E4=BF=
=A1=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=EF=BC=8C=E9=82=A3=E4=B9=88=E5=8F=AF=E4=BB=A5=E7=95=99=E4=
=B8=8B=E6=9D=A5=E5=B9=B6=E8=B7=9F=E9=9A=8F=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=E5=B0=86=E6=9D=A5=
=E7=9A=84=E5=8D=8F=E8=AE=AE=E6=94=B9=E5=8F=98=E3=80=82
>>>>>> If they do trust the majority miners, they stay and follow the vote f=
or upcoming protocol upgrade.
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> =E6=89=80=E4=BB=A5=E9=97=AE=E9=A2=98=E5=9C=A8=E4=BA=8E=EF=BC=9A=E6=AF=
=94=E7=89=B9=E5=B8=81=E7=9A=84=E5=BC=80=E5=8F=91=E8=80=85=E3=80=81=E7=94=A8=E6=
=88=B7=E3=80=81=E6=8B=A5=E6=9C=89=E8=80=85=E3=80=81=E6=9C=8D=E5=8A=A1=E6=8F=90=
=E4=BE=9B=E8=80=85=E3=80=81=E7=94=9A=E8=87=B3=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=EF=BC=8C=E6=98=
=AF=E5=90=A6=EF=BC=88=E4=BB=8D=E7=84=B6=EF=BC=89=E5=A6=82=E7=99=BD=E7=9A=AE=E4=
=B9=A6=E4=B8=AD=E6=8F=8F=E8=BF=B0=E7=9A=84=E5=AF=B9=E5=A4=A7=E5=A4=9A=E6=95=B0=
=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=E6=8B=A5=E6=9C=89=E4=BF=A1=E4=BB=BB=E3=80=82
>>>>>> So the questions is: Do the bitcoin developers, users, holders, servi=
ce provides, even miners, (still) have faith in the majority of miners as de=
signed in the white paper?
>>>>>>=20
>>>>> =20
>>>>> There is a fundamental misconception regarding this point - the white p=
aper refers to majority hashpower needing to be honest with regard to determ=
ining the correct chain within the context of many possible /valid/ chain fo=
rks. It is not referring to using hashpower to determine the correct chain a=
mongst an infinitely variable number of currently invalid chain forks. Bitco=
in ecosystem participants should not have faith in miners (or any other enti=
ty) when it comes to choosing the consensus rules they wish to enforce.
>>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>> Arrrgh. I think in the BIP, the miners just invalids tx version 1 tempo=
rarily. That=E2=80=99s a =E2=80=9Csoft fork=E2=80=9D right? If they dislike t=
he idea, they can leave as always.
>>>>=20
>>> =46rom my understanding, if the only change miners make is to stop confi=
rming transactions that have a version less than X then it should be a soft f=
ork, yes.=20
>>>>=20
>>>> Regards
>>>>=20
>>>> LIN Zheming
>>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
>>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>>=20
>=20

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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"content-type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3D=
utf-8"></head><body dir=3D"auto"><div></div><div>Seems functional as a way f=
or the economy to signal, but signaling is only an expression of intent to p=
articipate, not actual participation. One can signal and then not participat=
e, as we see with hash rate signaling.</div><div><br></div><div>Today we see=
 people complaining about miner control, because hash rate is centralized. T=
omorrow we are likely to see people complaining about economic control, as i=
ts centralization continues.</div><div><br></div><div>So imagine a few web w=
allets/APIs signaling based on their ownership of the major fraction of valu=
e. Can potential splitters safely rely on these signals? The wallets have a v=
oice because they participate.</div><div><br></div><div>Consider also that u=
ser activated soft forks are not followed by unmodified nodes (on the presum=
ption of minority hash rate support that necessitated the economic activatio=
n). In other words, they exhibit the categorical behavior of hard forks (inc=
ompatibility). So to the extent that the economy has control, it is only ove=
r the ability to hard fork (split the chain).</div><div><br></div><div>e</di=
v><div><br>On Jun 15, 2017, at 9:38 PM, Erik Aronesty &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:=
erik@q32.com">erik@q32.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br><br></div><blockquote type=3D"c=
ite"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>&gt; How does the users show their opinion? T=
hey can fork away and=20
leave. But what remains will be united. Are you afraid of the united=20
users or the fork?<br><br></div><div>I had proposed earlier and maintain tha=
t "UTXO bits" can be used to allow coordinated user participation activation=
 thresholds akin to other hashpower thresholds.&nbsp;&nbsp; <br><br><a href=3D=
"https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-May/014251.htm=
l">https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-May/014251.h=
tml</a><br><br>While I'm not certain that my implementation was correct (or w=
as just too complicated and concerned with compression at the expense of rea=
dability), I am fairly certain that this mechanism - or a similar one - woul=
d be a reasonable way for users to coordinate changes independently of miner=
s and with very high consensus levels.<br><br></div></div><div class=3D"gmai=
l_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu, Jun 15, 2017 at 1:04 AM, Eri=
c Voskuil via bitcoin-dev <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-de=
v@lists.linuxfoundation.org" target=3D"_blank">bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfounda=
tion.org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D=
"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"=
auto"><div><div class=3D"h5"><div></div><div><br></div><div><br>On Jun 14, 2=
017, at 9:55 PM, Jameson Lopp via bitcoin-dev &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-=
dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org" target=3D"_blank">bitcoin-dev@lists.<wbr>linu=
xfoundation.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br><br></div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div><=
div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote=
">On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 11:29 AM, Zheming Lin <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a hre=
f=3D"mailto:heater@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">heater@gmail.com</a>&gt;</sp=
an> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;b=
order-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style=3D"word-wrap:break-wo=
rd;line-break:after-white-space"><div style=3D"word-wrap:break-word;line-bre=
ak:after-white-space">Hi Jameson:<br><div><br><blockquote type=3D"cite"><spa=
n><div>=E5=9C=A8 2017=E5=B9=B46=E6=9C=8815=E6=97=A5=EF=BC=8C01:20=EF=BC=8CJa=
meson Lopp &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:jameson.lopp@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">j=
ameson.lopp@gmail.com</a>&gt; =E5=86=99=E9=81=93=EF=BC=9A</div><br class=3D"=
m_1442751185230761362m_4937264445905329853Apple-interchange-newline"></span>=
<div><br class=3D"m_1442751185230761362m_4937264445905329853Apple-interchang=
e-newline"><br style=3D"font-family:Helvetica;font-size:12px;font-style:norm=
al;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:normal;letter-spacing:normal;text-al=
ign:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacin=
g:0px"><div class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"font-family:Helvetica;font-size:1=
2px;font-style:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:normal;letter-spa=
cing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space=
:normal;word-spacing:0px"><span>On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 9:39 AM, Zheming Lin=
 via bitcoin-dev<span class=3D"m_1442751185230761362m_4937264445905329853App=
le-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bit=
coin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org" target=3D"_blank">bitcoin-dev@lists<wbr>=
.linuxfoundation.org</a>&gt;</span><span class=3D"m_1442751185230761362m_493=
7264445905329853Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>wrote:<br></span><blockq=
uote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-wid=
th:1px;border-left-style:solid;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);padding-le=
ft:1ex"><span><span><br><br>&gt; =E5=9C=A8 2017=E5=B9=B46=E6=9C=8814=E6=97=A5=
=EF=BC=8C02:11=EF=BC=8CGregory Maxwell &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:greg@xiph.org" t=
arget=3D"_blank">greg@xiph.org</a>&gt; =E5=86=99=E9=81=93=EF=BC=9A<br>&gt;<b=
r>&gt; On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 2:23 AM, Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev<br>&gt; &=
lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org" target=3D"_blank=
">bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfounda<wbr>tion.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></span></span=
><span><span><br>&gt; The enforcement of the system's rules by users broadly=
, and not just<br>&gt; miners, is specifically described in the white paper (=
section 8,<br>&gt; paragraph 2, it especially clear in the last sentence).&n=
bsp; This is<br>&gt; critical for the security of Bitcoin especially with th=
e current<br>&gt; degree of centralization in pools.&nbsp; Without it, Bitco=
in's security<br>&gt; would look a lot more like the Ripple system.<br>&gt;<=
br><br></span>=E6=98=AF=E7=9A=84=EF=BC=8C=E7=94=A8=E6=88=B7=E6=B0=B8=E8=BF=9C=
=E9=83=BD=E6=9C=89=E9=80=89=E6=8B=A9=EF=BC=8C=E5=B9=B6=E5=8F=AF=E4=BB=A5=E6=8A=
=9B=E5=BC=83=E9=82=A3=E4=BA=9B=E8=8A=82=E7=82=B9=E3=80=82=E8=BF=99=E4=B8=AA B=
IP =E5=B9=B6=E6=B2=A1=E6=9C=89=E5=8F=8D=E5=AF=B9=E8=BF=99=E4=BA=9B=E7=94=A8=E6=
=88=B7=E8=BF=99=E4=B9=88=E5=81=9A=E3=80=82=E5=8F=AA=E6=9C=89=E9=82=A3=E4=BA=9B=
=E8=A2=AB=E5=8A=A8=E7=9A=84=E9=92=B1=E5=8C=85=E7=94=A8=E6=88=B7=EF=BC=8C=E4=BB=
=96=E4=BB=AC=E9=9C=80=E8=A6=81=E7=9F=A5<wbr>=E9=81=93=E5=BF=85=E9=A1=BB=E5=81=
=9A=E5=87=BA=E4=B8=80=E4=B8=AA=E9=80=89=E6=8B=A9=E3=80=82=EF=BC=88=E8=80=8C=E4=
=B8=8D=E6=98=AF=E8=A2=AB=E5=8A=A8=E7=9A=84=E8=B7=9F=E9=9A=8F=E9=BB=98=E8=AE=A4=
=E7=9A=84=E7=AD=96=E7=95=A5=EF=BC=89<br>Yes, users always have choice that t=
hey can abandon the nodes. This BIP does=E2=80=99t go against them. I mean o=
nly the one(especially wallets) that=E2=80=99s passive, they need to know th=
ere=E2=80=99s a choice and pick one.<br><br>=E8=BF=99=E4=B8=AA BIP =E5=8F=AF=
=E4=BB=A5=E8=A2=AB=E5=BA=94=E7=94=A8=E4=BA=8E=E5=87=A0=E4=B9=8E=E4=BB=BB=E4=BD=
=95=E7=9A=84=E5=8D=87=E7=BA=A7=E4=B8=8A=EF=BC=8C=E5=8C=85=E6=8B=AC=E9=9A=94=E7=
=A6=BB=E8=A7=81=E8=AF=81=EF=BC=8C=E4=B8=A4=E5=85=86=E7=9A=84=E9=9A=94=E7=A6=BB=
=E8=A7=81=E8=AF=81=EF=BC=8C<wbr>=E4=B8=A4=E5=85=86=E6=89=A9=E5=AE=B9=EF=BC=8C=
=E6=B6=8C=E7=8E=B0=E5=85=B1=E8=AF=86=EF=BC=8C=E5=85=AB=E5=85=86=E6=89=A9=E5=AE=
=B9=E7=AD=89=E3=80=82=E4=BD=86=E8=BF=99=E4=BA=9B=E5=8D=87=E7=BA=A7=E5=B9=B6=E4=
=B8=8D=E6=98=AF=E9=87=8D=E7=82=B9=E3=80=82<br>This BIP can be applied to alm=
ost any upgrade, including Segwit, Segwit2x, 2m, ec, 8m=E2=80=A6 but the upg=
rade is not the key point.<br><br>=E5=88=B0=E5=BA=95=E6=88=91=E4=BB=AC=E7=9A=
=84=E7=94=A8=E6=88=B7=E6=98=AF=E5=90=A6=E7=9C=9F=E7=9A=84=E6=8B=A5=E6=9C=89=E9=
=80=89=E6=8B=A9=EF=BC=9F<br>Did the users have any real choice?<br><br>=E6=88=
=91=E5=B9=B6=E4=B8=8D=E8=83=BD=E7=90=86=E8=A7=A3=E4=BB=96=E4=BB=AC=E7=9B=B8=E4=
=BF=A1=E5=A4=A7=E9=83=A8=E5=88=86=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=EF=BC=88=E5=B0=B1=E5=83=8F=
=E5=BD=93=E5=89=8D=E4=B8=80=E6=A0=B7=EF=BC=89=EF=BC=8C=E4=BD=86=E6=8B=92=E7=BB=
=9D=E8=BF=99=E4=BA=9B=E5=A4=9A<wbr>=E6=95=B0=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=E5=AF=B9=E5=8D=
=8F=E8=AE=AE=E6=94=B9=E5=8F=98=E7=9A=84=E6=8A=95=E7=A5=A8=E7=BB=93=E6=9E=9C=E3=
=80=82<br>I don=E2=80=99t see the reason they trust the majority miners(as t=
hey do today) but refuse the vote for upcoming protocol upgrade.<br></span><=
/blockquote><span><div><br></div><div>To be clear, Bitcoin is not a democrac=
y - if you find yourself using the term "voting" then you may be misundersta=
nding how consensus forms. Once a feature has been vetted and the code is de=
ployed, miners may signal that they are ready to enforce new rules. If for s=
ome reason miners are too "passive or lazy" or wish to "veto" the activation=
 of the new rules, users may choose to circumvent said veto by refusing to a=
ccept blocks that do not show readiness for enforcing the new rules.</div></=
span></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>How does the users show th=
eir opinion? They can fork away and leave. But what remains will be united. A=
re you afraid of the united users or the fork?</div><div><br></div><div>I ag=
ree with you that the =E2=80=9Cvote=E2=80=9D is not accurate. Could you kind=
ly suggest an other word for that?</div><div><br></div><div>I think users sh=
ould have choice to follow the miners or not. Do you agree with this or not?=
</div><span><br></span></div></div></div></blockquote><div>Regarding consens=
us changes, users can voice their opinion on any number of communication pla=
tforms. Though if you're looking for a way for users to signal their intenti=
ons at the protocol level, every proposal for doing that to date has been ar=
guably flawed.</div></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div></di=
v></div><div>There is exactly one way to express one's opinion on consensus a=
t the protocol level - participation. The method is neither flawed nor inequ=
itable in the context of Bitcoin.</div><div><br></div><div>The only "problem=
" with it is that people are not satisfied with having a voice limited to th=
eir participation. People are used to political systems in which they vote u=
sing their existence as power, not their participation, and they expect some=
 subset of existing human bodies to control all others. This is the concept o=
f some ruling over others, which gives the rulers a more powerful voice than=
 either their proportional existence or individual participation would allow=
.</div><div><br></div><div>Bitcoin exists in defiance of political models. I=
t is a market, not a state. The only choice you have is to participate or le=
ave. If you are satisfied with others participating in your stead, you have l=
eft the consensus - you have no say.</div><div><br></div><div>Most people wh=
o think they are participating in Bitcoin have either never participated or l=
ong ago left the consensus. Having surrendered it, these people now grope fo=
r a way to have their say. You can always reclaim your say on consensus, but=
 you cannot take it away from others.</div><div><br></div><div>To have your s=
ay regarding hard forks, you must validate Bitcoin received in exchange for s=
omething else of economic value. To have your say regarding soft forks you m=
ust mine. Everyone has these options. Hard forks cannot control miners' sele=
ction of transactions and miners cannot control the economy's determination o=
f what is valid. If one wants a say in either one must participate in the re=
spective operation.</div><div><br></div><div>e</div><span class=3D""><br><bl=
ockquote type=3D"cite"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div=
 class=3D"gmail_quote"><div>Measuring meatspace consensus is pretty tricky i=
f not completely impossible, especially given the fact that the vast majorit=
y of Bitcoin users do not voice any opinions on the matter of consensus rule=
s.</div><div><br></div><div>Most attempts at measuring user consensus would p=
robably be best described as signaling rather than voting given that the act=
 of doing so has no actual power to affect consensus. Every user who runs a f=
ully validating node is free to enforce the rules with which the agree regar=
dless of what rules other entities are enforcing.&nbsp;</div><blockquote cla=
ss=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;pad=
ding-left:1ex"><div style=3D"word-wrap:break-word;line-break:after-white-spa=
ce"><div style=3D"word-wrap:break-word;line-break:after-white-space"><div><s=
pan><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div><div class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"font-=
family:Helvetica;font-size:12px;font-style:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;f=
ont-weight:normal;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;tex=
t-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px"><div>&nbsp;</div><bloc=
kquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-w=
idth:1px;border-left-style:solid;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);padding-=
left:1ex"><br>=E5=AF=B9=E9=92=B1=E5=8C=85=E7=94=A8=E6=88=B7=E7=9A=84=E9=80=89=
=E6=8B=A9=EF=BC=8C=E6=98=AF=E4=BB=96=E4=BB=AC=E6=98=AF=E5=90=A6=E7=9B=B8=E4=BF=
=A1=E5=A4=9A=E6=95=B0=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=E3=80=82=E5=A6=82=E6=9E=9C=E4=BB=96=E4=
=BB=AC=E4=B8=8D=E7=9B=B8=E4=BF=A1=EF=BC=8C=E5=8F=AF<wbr>=E4=BB=A5=E9=80=9A=E8=
=BF=87=E5=88=86=E5=8F=89=E6=9D=A5=E6=B6=88=E9=99=A4=E6=8E=89=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=
=E3=80=82<br>This choice for wallet users right now, is wether to follow the=
 51% majority miners. If they don=E2=80=99t, they can have their fork that g=
et rid of miners.<br><br>=E5=A6=82=E6=9E=9C=E4=BB=96=E4=BB=AC=E4=BB=8D=E6=97=
=A7=E7=9B=B8=E4=BF=A1=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=EF=BC=8C=E9=82=A3=E4=B9=88=E5=8F=AF=E4=
=BB=A5=E7=95=99=E4=B8=8B=E6=9D=A5=E5=B9=B6=E8=B7=9F=E9=9A=8F=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=
=E5=B0=86=E6=9D=A5=E7=9A=84=E5=8D=8F=E8=AE=AE=E6=94=B9=E5=8F=98<wbr>=E3=80=82=
<br>If they do trust the majority miners, they stay and follow the vote for u=
pcoming protocol upgrade.<br><br>=E6=89=80=E4=BB=A5=E9=97=AE=E9=A2=98=E5=9C=A8=
=E4=BA=8E=EF=BC=9A=E6=AF=94=E7=89=B9=E5=B8=81=E7=9A=84=E5=BC=80=E5=8F=91=E8=80=
=85=E3=80=81=E7=94=A8=E6=88=B7=E3=80=81=E6=8B=A5=E6=9C=89=E8=80=85=E3=80=81=E6=
=9C=8D=E5=8A=A1=E6=8F=90=E4=BE=9B=E8=80=85=E3=80=81=E7=94=9A=E8=87=B3<wbr>=E7=
=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=EF=BC=8C=E6=98=AF=E5=90=A6=EF=BC=88=E4=BB=8D=E7=84=B6=EF=BC=89=
=E5=A6=82=E7=99=BD=E7=9A=AE=E4=B9=A6=E4=B8=AD=E6=8F=8F=E8=BF=B0=E7=9A=84=E5=AF=
=B9=E5=A4=A7=E5=A4=9A=E6=95=B0=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=E6=8B=A5=E6=9C=89=E4=BF=A1=E4=
=BB=BB=E3=80=82<br>So the questions is: Do the bitcoin developers, users, ho=
lders, service provides, even miners, (still) have faith in the majority of m=
iners as designed in the white paper?<br><span><br></span></blockquote><div>=
&nbsp;</div><div>There is a fundamental misconception regarding this point -=
 the white paper refers to majority hashpower needing to be honest with rega=
rd to determining the correct chain within the context of many possible /val=
id/ chain forks. It is not referring to using hashpower to determine the cor=
rect chain amongst an infinitely variable number of currently invalid chain f=
orks. Bitcoin ecosystem participants should not have faith in miners (or any=
 other entity) when it comes to choosing the consensus rules they wish to en=
force.</div><div><br></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div></span><d=
iv>Arrrgh. I think in the BIP, the miners just invalids tx version 1 tempora=
rily. That=E2=80=99s a =E2=80=9Csoft fork=E2=80=9D right? If they dislike th=
e idea, they can leave as always.</div><div><br></div></div></div></div></bl=
ockquote><div>=46rom my understanding, if the only change miners make is to s=
top confirming transactions that have a version less than X then it should b=
e a soft fork, yes.&nbsp;</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"ma=
rgin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style=3D"w=
ord-wrap:break-word;line-break:after-white-space"><div style=3D"word-wrap:br=
eak-word;line-break:after-white-space"><div><div></div><div><br></div><div>R=
egards</div><span class=3D"m_1442751185230761362HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#8888=
88"><div><br></div><div>LIN Zheming</div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div><div=
 class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"font-family:Helvetica;font-size:12px;font-st=
yle:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:normal;letter-spacing:normal=
;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;wor=
d-spacing:0px"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px=
 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;border-left-color:rgb(2=
04,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div class=3D"m_1442751185230761362m_493726444=
5905329853HOEnZb"><div class=3D"m_1442751185230761362m_4937264445905329853h5=
"></div></div></blockquote></div></div></blockquote></font></span></div><br>=
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div></div>
</div></blockquote></span><span class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div><s=
pan>______________________________<wbr>_________________</span><br><span>bit=
coin-dev mailing list</span><br><span><a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.li=
nuxfoundation.org" target=3D"_blank">bitcoin-dev@lists.<wbr>linuxfoundation.=
org</a></span><br><span><a href=3D"https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman=
/listinfo/bitcoin-dev" target=3D"_blank">https://lists.linuxfoundation.<wbr>=
org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-<wbr>dev</a></span><br></div></blockquote></spa=
n></div><br>______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
bitcoin-dev mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org">bitcoin-dev@lists.<=
wbr>linuxfoundation.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev" r=
el=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://lists.linuxfoundation.<wbr>org/m=
ailman/listinfo/bitcoin-<wbr>dev</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>
</div></blockquote></body></html>=

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