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Date: Wed, 20 Aug 2014 07:40:49 +0200
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Cc: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Proposal: Encrypt bitcoin messages
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We should aim to use perfect forward secrecy between all nodes by default.
This forces the attacker to do a MITM attack that is far more expensive on
the large scale.
I don't see why this is seen as so controversial. It is relatively cheap
to implement on our side, and has a dramatic increase of cost for any
attackers.
Cam.
On 20/08/2014 5:49 am, "Un Ix" <slashdevnull@hotmail.com> wrote:
> Excuse the ignorance, but there is something I=E2=80=99m not getting in =
this
> discussion.
>
> Given it=E2=80=99s a published protocol, with available source code runni=
ng on an
> open P2P network, why would any messages between nodes benefit from being
> encrypted? Surely all the data being processed by the network is known to
> any persistent client node(s)?
>
> Seems like that solution is orthogonal to the root problem, where
> attackers could monitor the network and deduce IP addresses by e.g. mappi=
ng
> senders of transactions.
>
> *From:* Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org>
> *Sent:* =E2=80=8EWednesday=E2=80=8E, =E2=80=8EAugust=E2=80=8E =E2=80=8E20=
=E2=80=8E, =E2=80=8E2014 =E2=80=8E9=E2=80=8E:=E2=80=8E28=E2=80=8E =E2=80=8E=
AM
> *To:* William Yager <will.yager@gmail.com>,
> bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
>
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA256
>
>
>
> On 19 August 2014 21:19:43 GMT-04:00, William Yager <will.yager@gmail.com=
>
> wrote:
> >On Tue, Aug 19, 2014 at 8:14 PM, Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org> wrote:
> >> In any case, my suggestion of enabling hidden service support by
> >default
> >> adds both encryption and reasonably good authentication.
> >
> >
> >Enabling hidden service support by default would introduce an insanely
> >huge
> >attack surface.
>
> Hence my suggestion of separating that surface by using the standalone To=
r
> binary, which runs under a different user to the Bitcoin Core binary.
>
> >And you're conflating two different things; using Tor is valuable to
> >Bitcoin because it would provide some anonymity. The encryption aspect
> >is
> >pretty much useless for us.
>
> First of all, without encryption we're leaking significant amounts of
> information to any passive attacker trying to trace the origin of Bitcoin
> transactions, a significant privacy risk.
>
> Secondly the upcoming v0.10's fee estimation implementation is quite
> vulnerable to Sybil attacks. Authentication and encryption are needed to
> make it secure from ISP-level targeting to ensure that your view of the
> network is representative. Tor support used in parallel with native
> connection is ideal here, as neither the Tor network nor your ISP alone c=
an
> Sybil attack you. It's notable that Bitcoinj has already implemented Tor
> support for these same reasons.
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--001a11c38366ebd3b20501090b01
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
<p dir=3D"ltr"><br>
We should aim to use perfect forward secrecy between all nodes by default.<=
/p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">This forces the attacker to do a MITM attack that is far mor=
e expensive on the large scale.</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">I don't see why this is seen as so controversial.=C2=A0 =
It is relatively cheap to implement on our side,=C2=A0 and has a dramatic i=
ncrease of cost for any attackers.</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">Cam.<br></p>
<div class=3D"gmail_quote">On 20/08/2014 5:49 am, "Un Ix" <<a =
href=3D"mailto:slashdevnull@hotmail.com">slashdevnull@hotmail.com</a>> w=
rote:<br type=3D"attribution"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"ma=
rgin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"font-family:'Calibri','Segoe UI',=
'Meiryo','Microsoft YaHei UI','Microsoft JhengHei UI=
9;,'Malgun Gothic','sans-serif';font-size:12pt"><div>Excuse=
the ignorance, but there is something I=E2=80=99m not getting in this disc=
ussion.</div>
<div><br></div><div>Given it=E2=80=99s a published protocol, with available=
source code running on an open P2P network, why would any messages between=
nodes benefit from=C2=A0being encrypted? Surely all the data being process=
ed by the network is known to any persistent client node(s)? </div>
<div><br></div><div>Seems like that solution is orthogonal to the root prob=
lem, where attackers could=C2=A0monitor the network and deduce IP addresses=
by=C2=A0e.g. mapping senders of transactions.</div><div>=C2=A0=C2=A0<br></=
div><div style=3D"padding-top:5px;border-top-color:rgb(229,229,229);border-=
top-width:1px;border-top-style:solid">
<div><font face=3D" 'Calibri', 'Segoe UI', 'Meiryo'=
, 'Microsoft YaHei UI', 'Microsoft JhengHei UI', 'Malgu=
n Gothic', 'sans-serif'" style=3D"line-height:15pt;letter-spaci=
ng:0.02em;font-family:"Calibri","Segoe UI","Meiryo=
","Microsoft YaHei UI","Microsoft JhengHei UI",&qu=
ot;Malgun Gothic","sans-serif";font-size:12pt"><b>From:</b>=
=C2=A0<a href=3D"mailto:pete@petertodd.org" target=3D"_blank">Peter Todd</a=
><br>
<b>Sent:</b>=C2=A0=E2=80=8EWednesday=E2=80=8E, =E2=80=8EAugust=E2=80=8E =E2=
=80=8E20=E2=80=8E, =E2=80=8E2014 =E2=80=8E9=E2=80=8E:=E2=80=8E28=E2=80=8E =
=E2=80=8EAM<br><b>To:</b>=C2=A0<a href=3D"mailto:will.yager@gmail.com" targ=
et=3D"_blank">William Yager</a>, <a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-development@list=
s.sourceforge.net" target=3D"_blank">bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.=
net</a></font></div>
</div><div><br></div><div dir=3D"">
<div>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----<br>
Hash: SHA256<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
On 19 August 2014 21:19:43 GMT-04:00, William Yager <<a href=3D"mailto:w=
ill.yager@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">will.yager@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<=
br>
>On Tue, Aug 19, 2014 at 8:14 PM, Peter Todd <<a href=3D"mailto:pete@=
petertodd.org" target=3D"_blank">pete@petertodd.org</a>> wrote:<br>
>> In any case, my suggestion of enabling hidden service support by<b=
r>
>default<br>
>> adds both encryption and reasonably good authentication.<br>
><br>
><br>
>Enabling hidden service support by default would introduce an insanely<=
br>
>huge<br>
>attack surface.<br>
<br>
Hence my suggestion of separating that surface by using the standalone Tor =
binary, which runs under a different user to the Bitcoin Core binary.<br>
<br>
>And you're conflating two different things; using Tor is valuable t=
o<br>
>Bitcoin because it would provide some anonymity. The encryption aspect<=
br>
>is<br>
>pretty much useless for us.<br>
<br>
First of all, without encryption we're leaking significant amounts of i=
nformation to any passive attacker trying to trace the origin of Bitcoin tr=
ansactions, a significant privacy risk.<br>
<br>
Secondly the upcoming v0.10's fee estimation implementation is quite vu=
lnerable to Sybil attacks. Authentication and encryption are needed to make=
it secure from ISP-level targeting to ensure that your view of the network=
is representative. Tor support used in parallel with native connection is =
ideal here, as neither the Tor network nor your ISP alone can Sybil attack =
you. It's notable that Bitcoinj has already implemented Tor support for=
these same reasons.<br>
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<br></blockquote></div>
--001a11c38366ebd3b20501090b01--
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