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From: vjudeu <vjudeu@gazeta.pl>
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Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] An alternative to BIP 32?
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So, things have to be complicated to be secure? By definition, using some p=
rivate key, calculating some public key from it and incrementing that key i=
s secure (it is definitely no worse than address reuse). The only problem w=
ith using "privKey", "(privKey+1) mod n", "(privKey+2) mod n" and so on is =
that all of those public keys could be easily linked together. If that is t=
he only problem, then by making offset deterministic but less predictable, =
it should be secure enough, right? So, instead of simple incrementation, we=
would have "privKey" (parent), "(privKey+firstOffset) mod n" (first child)=
, "(privKey+secondOffset) mod n" (second child) and so on. And as long as t=
his offset is not guessed by the attacker, it is impossible to link all of =
those keys together, right?
> On 2021-03-20 11:08:30 user Tim Ruffing <crypto@timruffing.de> wrote:
> > On Fri, 2021-03-19 at 20:46 +0100, vjudeu via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> > > is it safe enough to implement it and use in practice?
> > =
> > This may be harsh but I can assure you that a HD wallet scheme that can
> > be specified in 3 lines (without even specifying what the security
> > goals are) should not be assumed safe to implement.
> > =
> > Tim =
> > =
> > =
> =
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