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From: Daniel Lipshitz <daniel@gap600.com>
Date: Sun, 18 Dec 2022 10:06:15 +0200
Message-ID: <CACkWPs_6z7UyXzejTqjy=i+SkSz-76VdzZ20K1DzcVJxan_HZg@mail.gmail.com>
To: Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org>
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Cc: bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>,
 John Carvalho <john@synonym.to>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] A proposal for Full RBF to not exclude Zero Conf
 use case
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GAP600 is not a trxs processor or liquidity provider we service merchants,
payment processors & non-custodial liquidity providers - our service is
purely the 0-conf enabling our clients to accept 0-conf. Clients access our
service via API - sending us the Trx hash & output address. Our service is
not based on AML/KYC it is purely an analysis of the Bitcoin network.

I am not at liberty to share names of other services which have developed
their own 0-conf service - they include a payment processor on a gambling
platform which services multiple gambling operators, a standalone gaming
payment processor, and a payment processor recently I have come across. We
also do not have a significant presence in Asia - so I don't have
visibility there.

I see from the Wallet of Satoshis website that they are a custodial wallet
provider.

I don't see it being necessarily an either/or approach here. The risk
looking to be mitigated with FullRBF seems to be able to be mitigated with
FullRBF but with a swop limitation of at least the Inputs of Trx1 being in
Trx2 - no flagging required. Added to this all these trxs always have the
OptinRBF so if these platforms need to be able to recreate completely their
trxs they have that option as well. The option to Swop out or bump up trxs
seems to be well covered under those two options.

The case of creating multiple wallets with the same seeds seems to be an
edge case - and to do that and then recreate accidental double spends as a
result sounds like an extreme edge case which I would not think should be a
protocol consideration.

________________________________

Daniel Lipshitz
GAP600| www.gap600.com
Phone: +44 113 4900 117
Skype: daniellipshitz123
Twitter: @daniellipshitz


On Fri, Dec 16, 2022 at 11:14 PM Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org> wrote:

> On Tue, Dec 13, 2022 at 11:58:31PM +0200, Daniel Lipshitz wrote:
> > > With multi-party transactions such as coinjoins and multi-party
> lightning
> > > channels, we want full-rbf behavior because it avoids accidental
> > > double-spends
> > > holding up progress in these protocols.
> >
> > what is meant by accidental double spends ? And do you have any data as
> to
> > how often these occur and would cause harm?
>
> A double-spend of an input to a multiparty transaction that isn't maximal=
ly
> trying to exploit transaction pinning. For example, Wasabi has found many
> cases
> of users imported the same seed into different wallets. This is quite har=
d
> to
> avoid in decentralized wallets.
>
> > Second, for intentional DoS attacks, it
> > > makes those attacks much more expensive by forcing the attacker to us=
e
> > > tx-pinning.
> >
> > how are these Dos attacks mitigated today if Full RBF is not in place ?
>
> They aren't. During congested mempool conditions an attacker could cause
> significant delays to multi-party transactions without full-rbf.
> Fortunately,
> the mempool regularly empties right now. But that has not been true in th=
e
> past, we can not guarantee that, and for Bitcoin to remain secure without
> inflation or demmurage in the future, we have to operate under
> full-mempools
> with significant backlogs of transactions.
>
> > > Thus we have a political tradeoff between a handful of centralized
> services
> > > such as yours that benefit from the first-seen status quo, and the mu=
ch
> > > larger
> > > group of users that use Lightning and coinjoins.
> >
> > How many users are currently using Lightning and coinjoins today ?
>
> Wallet of Satoshi, one of many Lightning wallets, claims to be performing
> 12,500 transactions/day:
> https://twitter.com/kerooke/status/1603812141966016520
>
> Bitcoin as a whole currently does about 300,000 transactions per day(1).
> So that
> one single Lightning wallet represents roughly 4% of the total payment
> volume
> of Bitcoin. Wallet of Satoshi, BlueWallet, and SBW all have 100K+
> downloads on
> the Google Play store. So a reasonable guess is they're equally popular.
> Which
> means they collectively represent 12% of the total number of transactions
> on
> Bitcoin. You claimed GAP600 was queried for 900,000 unique tx hashes per
> month(2), or about 10% of total transactions.
>
>
> I don't have statistics for number of coinjoin transactions per day, or t=
he
> blockspace used. But Wasabi have published (reproducable) data showing th=
at
> currently about 750BTC/day are entering Wasabi 2.0 coinjoins:
> https://mobile.twitter.com/wasabiwallet/status/1603366008437325828
>
> You claimed GAP600 was responsible for USD $220 million of transaction
> volume(2), significantly less than the ~$400 million / month that Wasabi
> coinjoins alone represent. And of course, Wasabi is just one of three mai=
n
> coinjoin implementations.
>
> > > We've already been through
> > > such a political tradeoff before with the blocksize debate - again, t=
he
> > > centralized payment providers lost the debate.
> >
> > I don=E2=80=99t think this has anything to do with block size debate or
> > decentralisation just looking to protect a significant use case that ha=
s
> > been in place - GAP600 is by no means the only service provider is this
> > place there are many merchants who do 0-conf on there own.
>
> You claimed that GAP600 handled about 10% of all transactions. Obviously,
> if
> that is true, that indicates a very high degree of centralization. It is
> extremely undesirable for Bitcoin for one single entity with, as I
> understand
> it, AML/KYC to handle 10% of all transactions. Probably an even higher
> percentage when you take into account that only a minority of transaction=
s
> are
> merchant payment-type transactions where unconfirmed transactions would
> have
> any relevance at all.
>
> You claim that there are "many merchants" who do 0-conf on their own. Can
> you
> list more examples of those merchants? Surely if there are "many" of them=
,
> you
> could easily give us four or five more examples so this list can evaluate
> what
> kinds of security guarantees they're actually relying on.
>
> 1) https://ycharts.com/indicators/bitcoin_transactions_per_day
> 2)
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2022-December/021=
239.html
>
> --
> https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
>

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Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">GAP600 is not a trxs processor or liquidi=
ty provider we service merchants, payment processors &amp; non-custodial li=
quidity providers - our service is purely the 0-conf enabling our clients t=
o accept 0-conf. Clients access=C2=A0our service via API - sending us the T=
rx hash &amp; output address. Our service=C2=A0is not based on AML/KYC it i=
s purely=C2=A0an analysis of the Bitcoin network.=C2=A0</div><div dir=3D"lt=
r"><br><div>I am not at liberty to share names of other services which have=
 developed their own 0-conf service - they include a payment processor=C2=
=A0on a gambling platform which services multiple gambling operators, a sta=
ndalone gaming payment processor, and a payment processor recently I have c=
ome across. We also do not have a significant presence in Asia - so I don&#=
39;t have visibility there.</div><div><br></div><div>I see from the Wallet =
of Satoshis website that they are a custodial wallet provider.</div><div><b=
r></div><div>I don&#39;t=C2=A0see it being necessarily an either/or approac=
h here. The risk looking to be mitigated with FullRBF seems to be able to b=
e mitigated with FullRBF but with a swop limitation of at least=C2=A0the=C2=
=A0Inputs of Trx1 being in Trx2 - no flagging required. Added to this all t=
hese trxs always have the OptinRBF=C2=A0so if these platforms need to be ab=
le to recreate completely their trxs they have that option as well. The opt=
ion to Swop out or bump up trxs seems to be well covered under those two op=
tions.</div><div><br></div><div>The case of creating multiple wallets with =
the same seeds seems to be an edge case - and to do that and then recreate =
accidental double spends as a result sounds like an extreme edge case which=
 I would not think should be a protocol consideration.</div><div><br></div>=
<div><div><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>=
<div dir=3D"ltr"><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px">__________________________=
______</div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px"><br></div><div style=3D"font-si=
ze:12.8px"><font face=3D"tahoma, sans-serif">Daniel Lipshitz</font></div><d=
iv style=3D"font-size:12.8px;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><font face=3D"tahoma, sans-s=
erif">GAP600|=C2=A0<a href=3D"http://www.gap600.com/" target=3D"_blank">www=
.gap600.com</a></font></div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px;color:rgb(0,0,0)=
"><font face=3D"tahoma, sans-serif">Phone:=C2=A0</font><span style=3D"font-=
family:tahoma,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px">+44 113 4900 117</span></div><di=
v style=3D"font-size:12.8px;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><font face=3D"tahoma, sans-se=
rif">Skype: daniellipshitz123</font></div><div style=3D"font-size:12.8px;co=
lor:rgb(0,0,0)"><font face=3D"tahoma, sans-serif">Twitter: @daniellipshitz<=
/font></div></div></div></div></div></div><br></div></div><br><div class=3D=
"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Fri, Dec 16, 2022 at=
 11:14 PM Peter Todd &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pete@petertodd.org">pete@peterto=
dd.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"m=
argin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left=
:1ex">On Tue, Dec 13, 2022 at 11:58:31PM +0200, Daniel Lipshitz wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt; With multi-party transactions such as coinjoins and multi-party l=
ightning<br>
&gt; &gt; channels, we want full-rbf behavior because it avoids accidental<=
br>
&gt; &gt; double-spends<br>
&gt; &gt; holding up progress in these protocols.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; what is meant by accidental double spends ? And do you have any data a=
s to<br>
&gt; how often these occur and would cause harm?<br>
<br>
A double-spend of an input to a multiparty transaction that isn&#39;t maxim=
ally<br>
trying to exploit transaction pinning. For example, Wasabi has found many c=
ases<br>
of users imported the same seed into different wallets. This is quite hard =
to<br>
avoid in decentralized wallets.<br>
<br>
&gt; Second, for intentional DoS attacks, it<br>
&gt; &gt; makes those attacks much more expensive by forcing the attacker t=
o use<br>
&gt; &gt; tx-pinning.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; how are these Dos attacks mitigated today if Full RBF is not in place =
?<br>
<br>
They aren&#39;t. During congested mempool conditions an attacker could caus=
e<br>
significant delays to multi-party transactions without full-rbf. Fortunatel=
y,<br>
the mempool regularly empties right now. But that has not been true in the<=
br>
past, we can not guarantee that, and for Bitcoin to remain secure without<b=
r>
inflation or demmurage in the future, we have to operate under full-mempool=
s<br>
with significant backlogs of transactions.<br>
<br>
&gt; &gt; Thus we have a political tradeoff between a handful of centralize=
d services<br>
&gt; &gt; such as yours that benefit from the first-seen status quo, and th=
e much<br>
&gt; &gt; larger<br>
&gt; &gt; group of users that use Lightning and coinjoins.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; How many users are currently using Lightning and coinjoins today ?<br>
<br>
Wallet of Satoshi, one of many Lightning wallets, claims to be performing<b=
r>
12,500 transactions/day: <a href=3D"https://twitter.com/kerooke/status/1603=
812141966016520" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://twitter.com/k=
erooke/status/1603812141966016520</a><br>
<br>
Bitcoin as a whole currently does about 300,000 transactions per day(1). So=
 that<br>
one single Lightning wallet represents roughly 4% of the total payment volu=
me<br>
of Bitcoin. Wallet of Satoshi, BlueWallet, and SBW all have 100K+ downloads=
 on<br>
the Google Play store. So a reasonable guess is they&#39;re equally popular=
. Which<br>
means they collectively represent 12% of the total number of transactions o=
n<br>
Bitcoin. You claimed GAP600 was queried for 900,000 unique tx hashes per<br=
>
month(2), or about 10% of total transactions.<br>
<br>
<br>
I don&#39;t have statistics for number of coinjoin transactions per day, or=
 the<br>
blockspace used. But Wasabi have published (reproducable) data showing that=
<br>
currently about 750BTC/day are entering Wasabi 2.0 coinjoins:<br>
<a href=3D"https://mobile.twitter.com/wasabiwallet/status/16033660084373258=
28" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://mobile.twitter.com/wasabiw=
allet/status/1603366008437325828</a><br>
<br>
You claimed GAP600 was responsible for USD $220 million of transaction<br>
volume(2), significantly less than the ~$400 million / month that Wasabi<br=
>
coinjoins alone represent. And of course, Wasabi is just one of three main<=
br>
coinjoin implementations.<br>
<br>
&gt; &gt; We&#39;ve already been through<br>
&gt; &gt; such a political tradeoff before with the blocksize debate - agai=
n, the<br>
&gt; &gt; centralized payment providers lost the debate.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; I don=E2=80=99t think this has anything to do with block size debate o=
r<br>
&gt; decentralisation just looking to protect a significant use case that h=
as<br>
&gt; been in place - GAP600 is by no means the only service provider is thi=
s<br>
&gt; place there are many merchants who do 0-conf on there own.<br>
<br>
You claimed that GAP600 handled about 10% of all transactions. Obviously, i=
f<br>
that is true, that indicates a very high degree of centralization. It is<br=
>
extremely undesirable for Bitcoin for one single entity with, as I understa=
nd<br>
it, AML/KYC to handle 10% of all transactions. Probably an even higher<br>
percentage when you take into account that only a minority of transactions =
are<br>
merchant payment-type transactions where unconfirmed transactions would hav=
e<br>
any relevance at all.<br>
<br>
You claim that there are &quot;many merchants&quot; who do 0-conf on their =
own. Can you<br>
list more examples of those merchants? Surely if there are &quot;many&quot;=
 of them, you<br>
could easily give us four or five more examples so this list can evaluate w=
hat<br>
kinds of security guarantees they&#39;re actually relying on.<br>
<br>
1) <a href=3D"https://ycharts.com/indicators/bitcoin_transactions_per_day" =
rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://ycharts.com/indicators/bitcoin=
_transactions_per_day</a><br>
2) <a href=3D"https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2022-=
December/021239.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://lists.li=
nuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2022-December/021239.html</a><br>
<br>
-- <br>
<a href=3D"https://petertodd.org" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">http=
s://petertodd.org</a> &#39;peter&#39;[:-1]@<a href=3D"http://petertodd.org"=
 rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">petertodd.org</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div>

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