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authorJared Lee Richardson <jaredr26@gmail.com>2017-06-07 14:43:14 -0700
committerbitcoindev <bitcoindev@gnusha.org>2017-06-07 21:43:17 +0000
commit284457eaebea129050729947e22e6d0455e65cdb (patch)
tree4c8b22cd26ed1ed6d3d0e21561998f0f9c2d0487 /6c
parent3c7388f0c2b11054bf8ff3fc001fc5b10496c946 (diff)
downloadpi-bitcoindev-284457eaebea129050729947e22e6d0455e65cdb.tar.gz
pi-bitcoindev-284457eaebea129050729947e22e6d0455e65cdb.zip
Re: [bitcoin-dev] User Activated Soft Fork Split Protection
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+References: <CADvTj4qpH-t5Gx6qyn3yToyUE_GFaBE989=AWNHLKMpMNW3R+w@mail.gmail.com>
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+From: Jared Lee Richardson <jaredr26@gmail.com>
+Date: Wed, 7 Jun 2017 14:43:14 -0700
+Message-ID: <CAD1TkXsrV3hmyEcpNXFdfWfTp3yLA4iKNCkp7FzjaATkXrmVnw@mail.gmail.com>
+To: James Hilliard <james.hilliard1@gmail.com>
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+Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
+Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] User Activated Soft Fork Split Protection
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+
+> Keep in mind that this is only temporary until segwit has locked in,
+after that happens it becomes optional for miners again.
+
+I missed that, that does effectively address that concern. It appears
+that BIP148 implements the same rule as would be required to prevent a
+later chainsplit as well, no?
+
+This comment did bring to mind another concern about BIP148/91 though,
+which I'll raise in the pull request discussion. Feel free to respond
+to it there.
+
+Jared
+
+On Wed, Jun 7, 2017 at 2:21 PM, James Hilliard
+<james.hilliard1@gmail.com> wrote:
+> Keep in mind that this is only temporary until segwit has locked in,
+> after that happens it becomes optional for miners again.
+>
+> On Wed, Jun 7, 2017 at 4:09 PM, Jared Lee Richardson <jaredr26@gmail.com>=
+ wrote:
+>>> This is, by far, the safest way for miners to quickly defend against a =
+chain split, much better than a -bip148 option. This allows miners to def=
+end themselves, with very little risk, since the defense is only activated =
+if the majority of miners do so. I would move for a very rapid deployment. =
+ Only miners would need to upgrade. Regular users would not have to conc=
+ern themselves with this release.
+>>
+>> FYI, even if very successful, this deployment and change may have a
+>> severe negative impact on a small group of miners. Any miners/pools
+>> who are not actively following the forums, news, or these discussions
+>> may be difficult to reach and communicate with in time, particularly
+>> with language barriers. Of those, any who are also either not
+>> signaling segwit currently or are running an older software version
+>> will have their blocks continuously and constantly orphaned, but may
+>> not have any alarms or notifications set up for such an unexpected
+>> failure. That may or may not be a worthy consideration, but it is
+>> definitely brusque and a harsh price to pay. Considering the
+>> opposition mentioned against transaction limits for the rare cases
+>> where a very large transaction has already been signed, it seems that
+>> this would be worthy of consideration. For the few miners in that
+>> situation, it does turn segwit from an optional softfork into a
+>> punishing hardfork.
+>>
+>> I don't think that's a sufficient reason alone to kill the idea, but
+>> it should be a concern.
+>>
+>> Jared
+>>
+>> On Wed, Jun 7, 2017 at 7:10 AM, Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev
+>> <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
+>>> This is, by far, the safest way for miners to quickly defend against a =
+chain
+>>> split, much better than a -bip148 option. This allows miners to defen=
+d
+>>> themselves, with very little risk, since the defense is only activated =
+if
+>>> the majority of miners do so. I would move for a very rapid deployment.
+>>> Only miners would need to upgrade. Regular users would not have to co=
+ncern
+>>> themselves with this release.
+>>>
+>>> On Wed, Jun 7, 2017 at 6:13 AM, James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
+>>> <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
+>>>>
+>>>> I think even 55% would probably work out fine simply due to incentive
+>>>> structures, once signalling is over 51% it's then clear to miners that
+>>>> non-signalling blocks will be orphaned and the rest will rapidly
+>>>> update to splitprotection/BIP148. The purpose of this BIP is to reduce
+>>>> chain split risk for BIP148 since it's looking like BIP148 is going to
+>>>> be run by a non-insignificant percentage of the economy at a minimum.
+>>>>
+>>>> On Wed, Jun 7, 2017 at 12:20 AM, Tao Effect <contact@taoeffect.com> wr=
+ote:
+>>>> > See thread on replay attacks for why activating regardless of thresh=
+old
+>>>> > is a
+>>>> > bad idea [1].
+>>>> >
+>>>> > BIP91 OTOH seems perfectly reasonable. 80% instead of 95% makes it m=
+ore
+>>>> > difficult for miners to hold together in opposition to Core. It give=
+s
+>>>> > Core
+>>>> > more leverage in negotiations.
+>>>> >
+>>>> > If they don't activate with 80%, Core can release another BIP to red=
+uce
+>>>> > it
+>>>> > to 75%.
+>>>> >
+>>>> > Each threshold reduction makes it both more likely to succeed, but a=
+lso
+>>>> > increases the likelihood of harm to the ecosystem.
+>>>> >
+>>>> > Cheers,
+>>>> > Greg
+>>>> >
+>>>> > [1]
+>>>> >
+>>>> > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-June/01=
+4497.html
+>>>> >
+>>>> > --
+>>>> > Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also
+>>>> > sharing
+>>>> > with the NSA.
+>>>> >
+>>>> > On Jun 6, 2017, at 6:54 PM, James Hilliard <james.hilliard1@gmail.co=
+m>
+>>>> > wrote:
+>>>> >
+>>>> > This is a BIP8 style soft fork so mandatory signalling will be activ=
+e
+>>>> > after Aug 1st regardless.
+>>>> >
+>>>> > On Tue, Jun 6, 2017 at 8:51 PM, Tao Effect <contact@taoeffect.com>
+>>>> > wrote:
+>>>> >
+>>>> > What is the probability that a 65% threshold is too low and can allo=
+w a
+>>>> > "surprise miner attack", whereby miners are kept offline before the
+>>>> > deadline, and brought online immediately after, creating potential
+>>>> > havoc?
+>>>> >
+>>>> > (Nit: "simple majority" usually refers to >50%, I think, might cause
+>>>> > confusion.)
+>>>> >
+>>>> > -Greg Slepak
+>>>> >
+>>>> > --
+>>>> > Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also
+>>>> > sharing
+>>>> > with the NSA.
+>>>> >
+>>>> > On Jun 6, 2017, at 5:56 PM, James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
+>>>> > <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
+>>>> >
+>>>> > Due to the proposed calendar(https://segwit2x.github.io/) for the
+>>>> > SegWit2x agreement being too slow to activate SegWit mandatory
+>>>> > signalling ahead of BIP148 using BIP91 I would like to propose anoth=
+er
+>>>> > option that miners can use to prevent a chain split ahead of the Aug
+>>>> > 1st BIP148 activation date.
+>>>> >
+>>>> > The splitprotection soft fork is essentially BIP91 but using BIP8
+>>>> > instead of BIP9 with a lower activation threshold and immediate
+>>>> > mandatory signalling lock-in. This allows for a majority of miners t=
+o
+>>>> > activate mandatory SegWit signalling and prevent a potential chain
+>>>> > split ahead of BIP148 activation.
+>>>> >
+>>>> > This BIP allows for miners to respond to market forces quickly ahead
+>>>> > of BIP148 activation by signalling for splitprotection. Any miners
+>>>> > already running BIP148 should be encouraged to use splitprotection.
+>>>> >
+>>>> > <pre>
+>>>> > BIP: splitprotection
+>>>> > Layer: Consensus (soft fork)
+>>>> > Title: User Activated Soft Fork Split Protection
+>>>> > Author: James Hilliard <james.hilliard1@gmail.com>
+>>>> > Comments-Summary: No comments yet.
+>>>> > Comments-URI:
+>>>> > Status: Draft
+>>>> > Type: Standards Track
+>>>> > Created: 2017-05-22
+>>>> > License: BSD-3-Clause
+>>>> > CC0-1.0
+>>>> > </pre>
+>>>> >
+>>>> > =3D=3DAbstract=3D=3D
+>>>> >
+>>>> > This document specifies a coordination mechanism for a simple majori=
+ty
+>>>> > of miners to prevent a chain split ahead of BIP148 activation.
+>>>> >
+>>>> > =3D=3DDefinitions=3D=3D
+>>>> >
+>>>> > "existing segwit deployment" refer to the BIP9 "segwit" deployment
+>>>> > using bit 1, between November 15th 2016 and November 15th 2017 to
+>>>> > activate BIP141, BIP143 and BIP147.
+>>>> >
+>>>> > =3D=3DMotivation=3D=3D
+>>>> >
+>>>> > The biggest risk of BIP148 is an extended chain split, this BIP
+>>>> > provides a way for a simple majority of miners to eliminate that ris=
+k.
+>>>> >
+>>>> > This BIP provides a way for a simple majority of miners to coordinat=
+e
+>>>> > activation of the existing segwit deployment with less than 95%
+>>>> > hashpower before BIP148 activation. Due to time constraints unless
+>>>> > immediately deployed BIP91 will likely not be able to enforce
+>>>> > mandatory signalling of segwit before the Aug 1st activation of
+>>>> > BIP148. This BIP provides a method for rapid miner activation of
+>>>> > SegWit mandatory signalling ahead of the BIP148 activation date. Sin=
+ce
+>>>> > the primary goal of this BIP is to reduce the chance of an extended
+>>>> > chain split as much as possible we activate using a simple miner
+>>>> > majority of 65% over a 504 block interval rather than a higher
+>>>> > percentage. This BIP also allows miners to signal their intention to
+>>>> > run BIP148 in order to prevent a chain split.
+>>>> >
+>>>> > =3D=3DSpecification=3D=3D
+>>>> >
+>>>> > While this BIP is active, all blocks must set the nVersion header to=
+p
+>>>> > 3 bits to 001 together with bit field (1<<1) (according to the
+>>>> > existing segwit deployment). Blocks that do not signal as required
+>>>> > will be rejected.
+>>>> >
+>>>> > =3D=3DDeployment=3D=3D
+>>>> >
+>>>> > This BIP will be deployed by "version bits" with a 65%(this can be
+>>>> > adjusted if desired) activation threshold BIP9 with the name
+>>>> > "splitprotecion" and using bit 2.
+>>>> >
+>>>> > This BIP starts immediately and is a BIP8 style soft fork since
+>>>> > mandatory signalling will start on midnight August 1st 2017 (epoch
+>>>> > time 1501545600) regardless of whether or not this BIP has reached i=
+ts
+>>>> > own signalling threshold. This BIP will cease to be active when segw=
+it
+>>>> > is locked-in.
+>>>> >
+>>>> > =3D=3D=3D Reference implementation =3D=3D=3D
+>>>> >
+>>>> > <pre>
+>>>> > // Check if Segregated Witness is Locked In
+>>>> > bool IsWitnessLockedIn(const CBlockIndex* pindexPrev, const
+>>>> > Consensus::Params& params)
+>>>> > {
+>>>> > LOCK(cs_main);
+>>>> > return (VersionBitsState(pindexPrev, params,
+>>>> > Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_SEGWIT, versionbitscache) =3D=3D
+>>>> > THRESHOLD_LOCKED_IN);
+>>>> > }
+>>>> >
+>>>> > // SPLITPROTECTION mandatory segwit signalling.
+>>>> > if ( VersionBitsState(pindex->pprev, chainparams.GetConsensus(),
+>>>> > Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_SPLITPROTECTION, versionbitscache) =3D=3D
+>>>> > THRESHOLD_LOCKED_IN &&
+>>>> > !IsWitnessLockedIn(pindex->pprev, chainparams.GetConsensus()) &&
+>>>> > // Segwit is not locked in
+>>>> > !IsWitnessEnabled(pindex->pprev, chainparams.GetConsensus()) ) //
+>>>> > and is not active.
+>>>> > {
+>>>> > bool fVersionBits =3D (pindex->nVersion & VERSIONBITS_TOP_MASK) =
+=3D=3D
+>>>> > VERSIONBITS_TOP_BITS;
+>>>> > bool fSegbit =3D (pindex->nVersion &
+>>>> > VersionBitsMask(chainparams.GetConsensus(),
+>>>> > Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_SEGWIT)) !=3D 0;
+>>>> > if (!(fVersionBits && fSegbit)) {
+>>>> > return state.DoS(0, error("ConnectBlock(): relayed block must
+>>>> > signal for segwit, please upgrade"), REJECT_INVALID, "bad-no-segwit"=
+);
+>>>> > }
+>>>> > }
+>>>> >
+>>>> > // BIP148 mandatory segwit signalling.
+>>>> > int64_t nMedianTimePast =3D pindex->GetMedianTimePast();
+>>>> > if ( (nMedianTimePast >=3D 1501545600) && // Tue 01 Aug 2017 00:00:=
+00 UTC
+>>>> > (nMedianTimePast <=3D 1510704000) && // Wed 15 Nov 2017 00:00:00=
+ UTC
+>>>> > (!IsWitnessLockedIn(pindex->pprev, chainparams.GetConsensus()) &&
+>>>> > // Segwit is not locked in
+>>>> > !IsWitnessEnabled(pindex->pprev, chainparams.GetConsensus())) )
+>>>> > // and is not active.
+>>>> > {
+>>>> > bool fVersionBits =3D (pindex->nVersion & VERSIONBITS_TOP_MASK) =
+=3D=3D
+>>>> > VERSIONBITS_TOP_BITS;
+>>>> > bool fSegbit =3D (pindex->nVersion &
+>>>> > VersionBitsMask(chainparams.GetConsensus(),
+>>>> > Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_SEGWIT)) !=3D 0;
+>>>> > if (!(fVersionBits && fSegbit)) {
+>>>> > return state.DoS(0, error("ConnectBlock(): relayed block must
+>>>> > signal for segwit, please upgrade"), REJECT_INVALID, "bad-no-segwit"=
+);
+>>>> > }
+>>>> > }
+>>>> > </pre>
+>>>> >
+>>>> >
+>>>> > https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/compare/0.14...jameshilliard:spli=
+tprotection-v0.14.1
+>>>> >
+>>>> > =3D=3DBackwards Compatibility=3D=3D
+>>>> >
+>>>> > This deployment is compatible with the existing "segwit" bit 1
+>>>> > deployment scheduled between midnight November 15th, 2016 and midnig=
+ht
+>>>> > November 15th, 2017. This deployment is also compatible with the
+>>>> > existing BIP148 deployment. This BIP is compatible with BIP91 only i=
+f
+>>>> > BIP91 activates before it and before BIP148. Miners will need to
+>>>> > upgrade their nodes to support splitprotection otherwise they may
+>>>> > build on top of an invalid block. While this bip is active users
+>>>> > should either upgrade to splitprotection or wait for additional
+>>>> > confirmations when accepting payments.
+>>>> >
+>>>> > =3D=3DRationale=3D=3D
+>>>> >
+>>>> > Historically we have used IsSuperMajority() to activate soft forks
+>>>> > such as BIP66 which has a mandatory signalling requirement for miner=
+s
+>>>> > once activated, this ensures that miners are aware of new rules bein=
+g
+>>>> > enforced. This technique can be leveraged to lower the signalling
+>>>> > threshold of a soft fork while it is in the process of being deploye=
+d
+>>>> > in a backwards compatible way. We also use a BIP8 style timeout to
+>>>> > ensure that this BIP is compatible with BIP148 and that BIP148
+>>>> > compatible mandatory signalling activates regardless of miner
+>>>> > signalling levels.
+>>>> >
+>>>> > By orphaning non-signalling blocks during the BIP9 bit 1 "segwit"
+>>>> > deployment, this BIP can cause the existing "segwit" deployment to
+>>>> > activate without needing to release a new deployment. As we approach
+>>>> > BIP148 activation it may be desirable for a majority of miners to ha=
+ve
+>>>> > a method that will ensure that there is no chain split.
+>>>> >
+>>>> > =3D=3DReferences=3D=3D
+>>>> >
+>>>> >
+>>>> > *[https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-March=
+/013714.html
+>>>> > Mailing list discussion]
+>>>> >
+>>>> > *[https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/v0.6.0/src/main.cpp#L1281-=
+L1283
+>>>> > P2SH flag day activation]
+>>>> > *[[bip-0009.mediawiki|BIP9 Version bits with timeout and delay]]
+>>>> > *[[bip-0016.mediawiki|BIP16 Pay to Script Hash]]
+>>>> > *[[bip-0091.mediawiki|BIP91 Reduced threshold Segwit MASF]]
+>>>> > *[[bip-0141.mediawiki|BIP141 Segregated Witness (Consensus layer)]]
+>>>> > *[[bip-0143.mediawiki|BIP143 Transaction Signature Verification for
+>>>> > Version 0 Witness Program]]
+>>>> > *[[bip-0147.mediawiki|BIP147 Dealing with dummy stack element
+>>>> > malleability]]
+>>>> > *[[bip-0148.mediawiki|BIP148 Mandatory activation of segwit deployme=
+nt]]
+>>>> > *[[bip-0149.mediawiki|BIP149 Segregated Witness (second deployment)]=
+]
+>>>> > *[https://bitcoincore.org/en/2016/01/26/segwit-benefits/ Segwit
+>>>> > benefits]
+>>>> >
+>>>> > =3D=3DCopyright=3D=3D
+>>>> >
+>>>> > This document is dual licensed as BSD 3-clause, and Creative Commons
+>>>> > CC0 1.0 Universal.
+>>>> > _______________________________________________
+>>>> > bitcoin-dev mailing list
+>>>> > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
+>>>> > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
+>>>> >
+>>>> >
+>>>> >
+>>>> _______________________________________________
+>>>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
+>>>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
+>>>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
+>>>
+>>>
+>>>
+>>> _______________________________________________
+>>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
+>>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
+>>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
+>>>
+
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