path: root/transcripts/open-science-summit-2010/ed-you.mdwn

I can't see a better lead-in to my talk than that presentation. I just wanted
to start off by introducing myself. My name is Edward You, WMD directorate. I
want to set the tone. But the takls throughout the day, we really are looking
into the future both on the high-end of science, and open source science as
well. Why I am here is the biosecurity aspect of it. To start off, I do want
to start off with why the FBI is here. Well, let me say what the FBI is not.
The FBI for more than 100 years has been a law enforcement reactive response
task force. Also for futher characterization, we are also not- we are not a
regulatory body either. We are a law enforcement agency. So why are we here?

Well, the post-9/11 and especially the Anthrax mailings, the WMD directorate
was setup in 2006 so we're just over 4 years old now. The stance now is that
because of the threat of WMDs we need to be more proactive, we can't come in
after the fact. By setting this up, we consolidated these three operational
parts. I am part of the bioterrorism prevention program. I have highlighted
some of the mission priorities- protection and prevention of a bioterrorism
incident. But here's the most important aspect: enhancing the outreach to all
of the communities, including industry and academia, classifying as Big Bio,
and the open science movement and amateur communities.

Why is that? We are dealing with- and I had this conversation- we are dealing
with biologics. We have things that are already living in the environment.
These are not like nukes or chemicals that are somewhat easy to track, but
these are self-reproducing orgasnism. Our WMD coordinators, and each of the 56
field offices, we have 1 special agent dedicated to WMD matters, these are the
laison to communities, to local state and public health and law enforcenemtn,
businesses and academia. By conducting their outreach and liason development,
they are the bridge from the community to FBI HQ where I sit, and we have our
own subject matter experts and so on. The FBI does not work in a vacuum. We
have partenrship with other federal deparmtents- CDC, Commerce Department,
state and local authorities. If there ever is an incident from the community,
these are the __ that go back, say you had a public health question, we can be
a rollodex for you so that you can figure out who to talk with. The FBI- where
aer you operating in? This is a group that intends to do us hard.. Al-Qaeda
has expressed an interest in weapons of mass destruction and bioterrorism.

We also have people like this- puffer fish toxin collection because he wanted
to kill his wife. What is our outreach fold into? When it comes to synthetic
biology, in 2006 in the UK, there was a reporter that ordered 60bp on
smallpox, it was absolutely harmless but it was enough that it caused a huge
public stir, and the synthetic DNA was then caused to implement due diligence
and best practices to ensure that sequences encoding dangerous substances or
pathogesn don't fall into the wrong hands. Most recently in the realm of
synthetic biology we had the J. Craig Venter Institute of the first successful
development of an "artificial cell".

With all of that, the risks and threats, there's also this- a congressional
commission looked at the government's status or preparedness to respond to a
bioterrorism incident. The government failed miserably. We are highly
sensitized to this shortcoming. So what dose that mean? So this was queued up-
what if there is an accident, or an act of mischief or deliberate use to
conduct harm? In the environment we're dealing with, there's more legislation
and regulation and increased restriction in work, more oversight, but because
of this knee-jerk reaction, it could be potentially ill-informed and might as
well have a negative impact on research activities. I can tell you right now
that this is unnteable to the FBI.. this is representing a national security
risk, because if you inhibit research, you are stifling potential
developments, medicine and counter-measures, and as well, the stiffling the
entrepreneurial spirit; it could expand the economy, jobs, new discoveries
from the open science forum. And there is evidence that this is happening.

I don't know how many of you know, but there are two pieces of legislation
that is looking at the regulation of select agents- pathogens and toxins, and
in the Senate and in the House, and coming straight out of the whitehouse,
there has been government activity looking at biosecurity, how this shakes out
and how the trickle down impacts the researchers, remains to be seen. This is
happening and this is the climate we're in. So what is the answer to
biosecurity, from the FBI's perspective, it really is up to the community
because you are the ones actually doing the work, and know what the state of
the art is, and the FBI and subject matter experts, it's just not way of
keeping pace. Policy, the way things are advancing, policy can't keep up with
that. So one of the things we're doing with outreach- to DIYbio, academia, and
industry, is be aware. Be aware of situational awareness of the bad actors
that want to conduct harm, but also to be aware of the fact that there are
pieces of legislation that could impact you. Take action. From the more
practical side, obviously if you see criminal activity or suspicious behavior,
you can contact the FBI. But also to take action, but also know yuor
congressmen, if there's legislation that is going ton egatively impact you,
you need to take charge and contact them. This movement in open science, about
intellectual property, property rights, publishing, one of the fundamental
pieces of action shuold be contacting your representativessss.

This all boils down to a culture of ersponsibility. The FBI conduccts this not
to keep tabs on youu, but becausse twe want to give you a glimpse of what we
have to ddddeal with. Wee want the ccommmunities to conduct their business in
a safe and secuure manner. What iis our gggaol?? There aare some threats
uotttttttttttttt thhere. Some that have been identified and some that have yet
to be identtified.. The FFBI whiile adddressiiing a threat and countering a
threat, that's our prio.. primary duty. In the context of the research
community, it's our job to reach out to them and make them aware of the risks
of the work that they areconducting, that there is the poetntial for
exploitation, and really to educate the communities to take charge of their
own destinies. There's also af eedback mechanism to the FBI, and it's beyond
just the 911 FBI call, but we rely heavily on you, you help us by
understanding what the threat raelly is. If we really re-allocated our
rseources to address certain risky areas, it is the practicioners and the
experts, help us identify if we've got it wrong. Maybe we have to reallocate
our resources, maybe there's something on the horizon that we haven't noticed
yet, and the communities have to advise us and help us do our job better. By
conducting our outreach, it's the development of partnership, and there's
information sharing between the two communities but also information sharing
and I can't stress this enough, one of the things that could obviate potential
legislative oversight, if we display, certain research communities, with
agencies like the FBI, and show that there's biosafety/biosecurity questions
being dealt with, then we can display to the policy makers that things are
well in hand, and potential legislature is not needed that might restrict you.
That's what we're hoping to achieve, by incorporating everyone into addressing
some of the risks, and mostly coming up with strategies to mitigate the risk
that makes sense to everyone is the goal. With that, I thank you.