From: J. R. Molloy (jr@shasta.com)
Date: Sun Dec 19 1999 - 20:28:55 MST
From: hal@finney.org <hal@finney.org>
>How would we approach the problem of whether our guts have qualia? And
>if they did, who would "I" be? Would I have two minds, or would I be
>my brain and my gut would be someone else?
Fascinating questions, Hal. Perhaps the discussion of "Descartes Error" belongs
here. After all, we feel more with our guts than with our brains. (Antonio
teaches that Rene's famous quote should read, "I feel, therefore I am.") Maybe
our heads don't want us to know that we have brains in our butts (or guts)?
>How about Dennett, what does he say about the question of whether systems
>like the gut are conscious and/or have qualia? Is this a meaningful
>question in his ontology?
Hmmm... let me sit on that for a while.
<Tick, tick, tick>
Okay, I feel that the perceptions of the enteric nervous system probably have
perceptions related to protein values. To digest or not to digest... that could
constitute the question.
A meaningful question in his ontology? In the irritable bowels of philosophy,
one should expect meaning on every stool.
Cheers,
--J. R. Molloy
http://www.shasta.com/jr
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