From: m (mt_2@yahoo.com)
Date: Fri Jun 25 1999 - 03:17:52 MDT
--- Harvey Newstrom <newstrom@newstaffinc.com> wrote:
> Emlyn,
%<snip>%
> This question and its discussion has revealed to me
> that different people
> have different goals for uploading. Some people
> want their current self to
> live forever. Others find it acceptable for their
> current self to die as
> long as good enough copies live forever. The former
> measure their own
> identity internally as to where they feel they are.
> The latter measure
> their own identity externally, as to where other
> people think they are.
> They claim that if no one can tell the difference,
> its the same as there
> being no difference.
%<snip>%
Thank you for your clear statement of the 2 points of
view.
To say what has doubtless been said already (sorry)-
IMHO your stream of consciousness is YOUR stream of
consciousness, if a copy is made there are 2 streams
and the survival of a copy is NOT a substitute for
the subjective survival of the original.
As for observers, how are they ever going to know
what the inner experience of original or copy really
is? I don't think Turing tests ad infinitum will
suffice. Again it comes back to whether a
non-conscious "zombie" could simulate consciousness.
I suppose I don't place that much value in public
opinion :)
I suppose experimenters could only know by a wholesale
uploading of the experimental subject into their own
brains, and then where is the experimenter?
> survive. All existing copies of me would want to
> survive. The above
> scenario is only helpful because there is always
> only one copy of me at any
> time. If a second copy is created, each one of them
> would want to survive.
> --
Therefore killing *any* of them is murder, by my idea
of a humane standard. If you believe an upload is
conscious you can't treat either upload or original as
non-human.
Paid 2c,
Mike
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