From: Randall R Randall (rrandall6@juno.com)
Date: Mon Jul 13 1998 - 09:09:28 MDT
--
On Sun, 12 Jul 1998 20:59:03 -0700 (PDT) John K Clark <johnkc@well.com>
writes:
>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>
>I have no idea what Randall R Randall really wrote, all I saw was a
>copy.
That's what the digsig is for. :)
> >rrandall6@juno.com
> >I am trying to argue that there must be continuity of
consciousness
> >to be sure that the uploaded one is the actual original
> >consciousness, instead of a consciousness that was just
created,
> >while destroying the first.
>
>
>Perhaps true, perhaps not, it's irrelevant. Consciousness is obviously
>
>subjective so even if I stopped all your brain activity for a billion
years
>and then restarted it there is no way you could tell internally, you
could
>detect no gaps without observing the outside world, so your
consciousness
>would be continuous.
If it is the same consciousness, I would agree.
However, this begs the question at hand, which
is: *Is* this the same consciousness, or a very
similar consciousness which happens to have
the original consciousness' memories?
> >you might need to simulate the entire structure to get
consciousness
>
>
>Then simulate the mind, although "simulate" is not really the correct
word
>when dealing with information, a calculator doesn't perform simulated
arithmetic.
Perhaps you will agree that consciousness is somewhat
more complicated than arithmetic? :) When dealing with
other simulations, it seems clear that the most
straightforward way to run a Macintosh program on a
PC is not to rewrite the program from scratch, but to
simulate the Macintosh to the program. It may be that
this will be the *only* practical way to transfer
consciousness to a non-brain computer.
> >I don't agree that the entire brain is required [to understand
> >subjective experience]. Only specific memories are required,
those
> >of you thinking about being conscious.
>
>Interesting theory, but as we're talking about consciousness not
intelligence
>or behavior, how will you ever know if you're theory is correct?
By subjectively experiencing the memories.
This seems very clear to me. If I experience
a memory from your brain, of you thinking about
being conscious, then I know that you are
(or were, at least, for that period) conscious,
as that is the only way such a memory could be
produced.
> >if I could experience a memory of yours, then *that* would
> >be me experiencing being you, for the length of the memory, no?
>
>
>Books, music or a painting, give me a different subjective experience
than
>these exact same things give you (I think), sometimes very different (I
think)
>so why would you expect my memories to effect you the same way they do
>me?
They don't have to produce the same effect, I only
have to *know* that you thought about being
conscious, which is the same as being conscious.
>There is an even deeper problem, the only reason I think the 6 year old
>John Clark is not dead, at least not entirely dead, is that I remember
being
>him, if technology advances to the point (and it will) where you can
really
>remember being me then you are me, and Randall R Randall still has no
idea
>what it's like to be John Clark.
I don't know whether the 6 year old John Clark (or Randall Randall)
is dead. Perhaps further knowledge about consciousness will
allow us to determine things like this.
> >If someone with plastic surgery and a really good imitation of
you
> >came along and asked you politely to commit suicide, so he
could
> >step into your life, would you?
>
>HELL NO, my momma didn't raise no dummies! The situation is not
symmetrical
>because the two act differently, one asks the other to sacrifice himself
but
>the other asks no such thing, so the two "copies" can not be anywhere
close
>to being identical. Let me propose a thought experiment of my own.
That's a good point.
>An exact duplicate of the earth, and it's entire ecosystem, is created
>a billion light years away. The duplicate world would need some sort of
>feedback mechanism to keep the worlds in synchronization, non linear
effects
>would amplify tiny variations, even quantum fluctuations, into big
>differences, but this is a thought experiment so who cares. In the first
two
>cases below the results would vary according to personalities, remember
>there's a lot of illogic even in the best of us.
>
>1) I know all about the duplicate world and you put a 44 magnum to my
head
> and tell me in ten seconds you will blow my brains out, am I
concerned?
> You bet I am because I know that your double is holding an identical
gun
> to the head of my double and making an identical threat.
>
>2) I find out that for the first time since the Big Bang the worlds will
> diverge, in 10 seconds you will put a bullet in my head but my double
will
> be spared, am I concerned? Yes, and angry as well, in times of
intense
> stress nobody is very logical. My double is no longer exact because I
am
> going through a traumatic experience and my double is not. I'd be
looking
> at that huge gun and wondering what it will be like when it goes off
and
> if death will really be instantaneous. I'd be wondering if my
philosophy
> was really as sound as I thought it was and I'd also be wondering why
I
> get the bullet and not my double and cursing the unfairness of it
all.
> My (semi) double would be thinking "it's a shame about that other
fellow
> but I'm glad it's not me".
I agree with these two reactions, at least.
>3) I know nothing about the duplicate world, a gun is at both our heads
and
> we both are convinced we're going to die. One gun goes off, making a
hell
> of a mess, but the other gun, for inexplicable reasons misfires. In
this
> case NOBODY died and except for undergoing a terrifying experience I
am
> completely unharmed. The real beauty part is that I don't even have
to
> clean up the mess.
But if no one died, who is that dead guy? Did
the consciousness inside him magically jump
to the other John Clark and combine with it? I
would say that the fellow who used to own that
dead body has died, even though this doesn't
affect the fellow who is exactly like him, except
for location.
>The bottom line is we don't have thoughts and emotions, we are thoughts
and
>emotions, and the idea that the particular hardware that is rendering
them
>changes their meaning is as crazy as my computer making the meaning of
your
>post different from what it was on yours.
Nor am I arguing that the hardware changes the
meaning, if done properly. I am only arguing that
it is very important to have continuity in consciousness,
even while uploading.
--digsig
Wolfkin.
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4p6QM+eokbyOc62mjCw3COVtDY9WJvbkSrdV/P1iG
wolfkin@flatoday.infi.net | ICQ: 3043097
E-Gold Acct: 100678 @ www.e-gold.com
On a visible but distant shore a new image of man,
The shape of his own future, now in his own hands.
| Johnny Clegg
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