From: Eugen Leitl (eugen@leitl.org)
Date: Sun Dec 15 2002 - 05:32:57 MST
On Fri, 13 Dec 2002, Charles Hixson wrote:
> Yes, but that's missing the point of a bioweapon. A good bioweapon is
> difficult, but not impossible to cure. At least difficult to prevent.
There are different classes of bioweapons. The single misanthrop or an
extremist group have different requirements than a deployment in the field
by 'legitimate' (scarecrowed as 'legitimate' used adjacent to 'bioweapons'
does look rather strangely) troops against enemy civilians or combatants.
The misanthrop or the extremist group would want something which achieves
sustainable burn and is impossible to cure -- something combining the
properties of influenza and HIV. Legitimate warfare in the field would
want to transiently incapacitate, but not to kill. A strangelovish last
resort weapon is to make the aggressor pay, so it will try to inflict the
maximal amount of damage possible.
> Asymptomatic until after the infectious cycle is well under way. And
Autoamplification (whether in a fast burn with hemorrhagic viruses or slow
stealthy propagation with engineered viruses) is only a required property
by nutty/desperate people. It is very difficult to create a sustainable
burn weapon of this kind, so it will be limited to groups commanding large
resources; these have no interest in actually deploying this.
> slowly fatal, with the first step being the degradation of the
> decision making process. (Sort of like a combination of cocaine
> addiction and aids.)
It depends on the intentions of the developers. MDR anthrax is actually
pretty optimal from a nutter point of view if you have the deployment
infrastructure and a lot of the agent (which nutters typically don't
have, thankfully).
> P.S.: Note that hiv is not, itself, fatal. It depends on a weakened
> immune system to create the horrific effects. If it were more
> contagious (say, also by coughing or sneezing), and a bit faster, it
> would be a nearly ideal...
I agree we should be watching out for engineered common cold. A
delayed-expression nastygram in the genome packaged into multiple
independent strains is definitely Bad News.
> Well, anthrax doesn't come close! (Smallpox, now, that has
You'd be surprised what can be done with some 10 tons of weaponized MDR
anthrax clandestinely distributed across a major city during a windless
night by a fleet of suitably equipped deployment platforms.
> possibilities.) I did hear a report that Iraq had been working on a
Smallpox is difficult to make in required quantities and has a short shelf
life. Recent epidemiology simulations do not seem to indicate it would
become a big killer in an industrial society.
> camelpox weapon, since many Iraqui already have immunity. (O, yes, an
> ideal bio-weapon should be one that you are immune to, but which you
> enemy isn't, and can't easily come, immune to.)
Assuming the person who develops it is thinking rationally, yes.
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