From: Samantha Atkins (samantha@objectent.com)
Date: Sun Nov 24 2002 - 21:39:52 MST
Eliezer S. Yudkowsky wrote:
>
>> If we try to more carefully state your distaste of cauliflower,
>> we end up with statements like "Eliezer (now) disapproves of
>> Eliezer now ingesting cauliflower". I guess I don't have a
>> problem with that; I probably disapprove of the process
>> "Lee experiencing stomach ache" as much as you disapprove of
>> "Eliezer eating cauliflower". Of course, as you point out,
>> your tastes could change, whereas in my example, I disapprove
>> of anyone ever having stomach aches.
>
>
> I disapprove of almost everyone having stomach aches because almost
> everyone doesn't want to have them, and the violation of volition
> involved is morally wrong.
Nothing can be morally wrong that doesn't involve an agent with the
power of choice choosing to violate your volition. A stomach ache
hardly qualifies.
>>
>>> Or in simpler terms, when I say that X is MORALLY WRONG, I mean that
>>> X seems to me to be wrong regardless of what I think about it, and
>>> the fact that an alternate Eliezer might be warped to think X was
>>> right makes no difference in that. Similarly, it seems to me that 2
>>> + 2 = 4 whether I believe that or not, and the idea of being
>>> hypnotized to believe 2 + 2 = 5 doesn't change that, nor does the
>>> fact that "2 + 2 = 4" is a cognitive representation somewhere in my
>>> brain.
>>
In what sense does it "seem to you" to be wrong that is distinct from
how you think about it? There are circumstances where murder might be
lesser of a set of other greater evils. I cannot therefore say that
murder is always and forever wrong and that is the end of the matter
regardless of any and every context. I agree that it is wrong barring
very extenuating circumstances.
- samantha
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