From: Lee Corbin (lcorbin@tsoft.com)
Date: Mon Oct 28 2002 - 21:54:40 MST
Jef writes
> Paraphrasing to verify my understanding: Lee is talking about
> "survival of identity", and is suggesting that we make a couple of
> changes in our thinking. (1) He is saying we should broaden our
> concept of self-identity to include copies of ourselves, even if they
> have branched from the original and have somewhat different
> experiences.
Yes.
> This concept of identify can be justified by pointing
> out that we currently claim a constant identity despite many changes
> to our selves over the years. (2) He is suggesting we overcome our
> human nature, evolved to think of ourselves as constrained within a
> single body, and begin to value "survival of our identity" (as
> defined above) equally with our current concept of "survival of
> self".
Precisely. Actually, I recommend that we use our newer "human"
nature to analyze the problem, and that a somewhat more
appropriate solution is to accept duplicates as selves.
> I think I clearly see Lee's logic, and his statements have value, but
> I disagree with what seems to be a value judgment at the end of his
> reasoning. I don't see any reason why I should value other branches
> of myself equally with myself. I think it's more useful to consider
> them as separate individuals who have the special relationship of
> being branches of myself.
In some ways, it is not only more *useful* but actually
necessary to continue to adopt the present view. Suppose
that I and my duplicate are strapped down, and you begin
to torture one of us. Then soon, just as Julia and Winston
in 1984, each of us says, "Stop! *Please* to it to him!".
In this case the way that we are wired (and we can never
forget that all we are is wiring) dictates that we regard
a duplicate as *other*. But, Jef, you already appear to
understand this, as you have referred already to our
primitive, early-evolved instincts or whatever.
But in *other* ways, e.g. the thought experiment where
according to physics a version of Lee Corbin *will*
wake up tomorrow and *will* go to the bank and deposit
ten million dollars---it is better that causally that
version of me descend from my frozen duplicate, and
*this*, over here, commit suicide. It's better for
*me* this way.
It must help those who aren't following us here to
focus on the *physics* of the situation in my bedroom
tomorrow morning. A version of me wakes up. Who is
to say that it's not me? *Every* morning in my
bedroom a slightly different version of me wakes up.
If souls don't exist, why aren't they all me?
To elaborate, if we have a metric among objects that
yields the "distance" between them and me in terms
of similarity, then objects such as I was, oh, say
about 50 years ago would *not* be me, because I
was a very small child then. But if tomorrow any
more recent version of me wakes up---say the version
that was writing to this list last year---well, hell,
that's me and I survived *that* replacement.
Yes---it is non-intuitive for many to take this
view from physics seriously, and to realize that
we *only* are patterns, and that we *aren't*
atoms and aren't locations, and don't have anything
at all like a soul.
It is also scary and paradoxical to realize that
the duplicate sitting across the table from you
is---according again to physics and that similarity
metric---really you too! And because it is confounded
by *immediate* experience---pinch him and you won't
yell---it's indeed worthy to be called what I have
always called it: the Identity Paradox.
But, as you have said in so many words, if we can
rise above our animal programming and comprehend
our own advanced nature as *patterns*, then we have
a prescription for action in every situation,
difficult and impossible (in some scenarios) to
follow as it may be.
> Stated another way, I can see why we currently value "survival of
> self", even if only because of very strong evolutionary programming.
> It appears there is an implied assumption here that if we agree that
> "survival of self" is important to us now, then we must also agree
> that the broader "survival of identity" will be similarly important
> to us with the broader technical capabilities we will have in the
> future. I would argue that we will have broader choices to go with
> the broader capabilities, and that it would be more advantageous to
> consider all copies to be separate individuals with special
> relationships to each other due to branching.
I understand that you and I still disagree about
some things, but the above I clearly agree with.
Lee
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