From: Jef Allbright (jef@jefallbright.net)
Date: Sun Oct 27 2002 - 20:23:54 MST
Lee raises an interesting question:
Paraphrasing to verify my understanding:
Lee is talking about "survival of identity", and is suggesting that we make
a
couple of changes in our thinking. (1) He is saying we should broaden
our concept of self-identity to include copies of ourselves, even if they
have branched from the original and have somewhat different experiences.
This concept of identify can be justified by pointing out that we currently
claim
a constant identity despite many changes to our selves over the years.
(2) He is suggesting we overcome our human nature, evolved to think of
ourselves
as constrained within a single body, and begin to value "survival of our
identity"
(as defined above) equally with our current concept of "survival of self".
I think I clearly see Lee's logic, and his statements have value, but I
disagree with what seems to be a value judgment at the end of his reasoning.
I don't see
any reason why I should value other branches of myself equally with myself.
I think it's more useful to consider them as separate individuals who have
the special relationship of being branches of myself.
Stated another way, I can see why we currently value "survival of self",
even if only
because of very strong evolutionary programming. It appears there is an
implied
assumption here that if we agree that "survival of self" is important to us
now, then we must also
agree that the broader "survival of identity" will be similarly important to
us with the broader
technical capabilities we will have in the future. I would argue that we
will have
broader choices to go with the broader capabilities, and that it would be
more
advantageous to consider all copies to be separate individuals with special
relationships to each other due to branching.
- Jef
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Sat Nov 02 2002 - 09:17:48 MST