From: Lee Corbin (lcorbin@tsoft.com)
Date: Wed Oct 23 2002 - 19:27:50 MDT
Jef referees the identity wrestling match:
> Hey folks, this discussion keeps twisting and turning without any apparent
> increase in understanding. There are some useful concepts in the mix, but
> it has become a seemingly endless debate on definitions of what we mean by a
> copy of a person. I think people can actually agree on the various concepts,
> but there's confusion arising because people are choosing to use a word
> differently depending on their values and the point they're trying to make.
Yes, but perhaps a little progress has been made. And you sum
it up quite nicely:
> Lee is saying that for all practical purposes, a copy of someone should be
> considered to be effectively the same person. He is saying that, in general,
> differences are not significant, since we routinely think of ourselves as
> the same person even after many years of differences have accumulated. This
> viewpoint has interesting implications.
Yes.
> gts is saying that even the slightest difference between the original and
> the copy means they're not the same, by definition, and the bigger the
> difference, the greater the significance. This viewpoint has interesting
> implications.
I too think that this is what gts believes.
> Please correct me if I'm wrong in my simplified assessment of the two views
> but if basically correct, it might be very useful for the various parties to
> agree on a common understanding of what the other means, and then proceed to
> discuss the ramifications and value judgements that arise from the two
> viewpoints.
My own guess is that we won't really be getting anywhere even
then. I believe that most of philosophy, to be of any use,
must be prescriptive. It must tell us what to do, not only
in familiar terrain, but in unexplored future possibilities
as well.
> It helps to acknowledge the other person's understanding, agree on some
> common understanding, and then move on the differences where things get
> truly interesting.
Maybe. But I propose that only by analyzing a huge number
of potential situations (thought experiments), and carefully
considering just what one would do and how one would value
each possible decision, can one approach consistency. In
other words, inconsistencies in the other person's position
can only be uncovered by the submission of hypothetical
situations.
All one can achieve IMO is *consistency*, and a hopefully
minimum awkwardness. It is quite awkward, for example,
to maintain that you are not the same person you were
five minutes ago, and as you say, leads to many interesting
implications (to put it mildly). For one thing, why bother
to even try for *consistency*, if you're not even the same
person from second to second?
Thanks,
Lee
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