From: Dan Fabulich (dfabulich@warpmail.net)
Date: Wed Oct 16 2002 - 16:50:00 MDT
Lee Corbin wrote:
> > We can make time-indexed synonyms from the perspective of the Nth split:
> > me[now]() is synonymous with me[N](), and me[past]() is synonymous with
> > me(), the original property. And then what you notice is this:
> >
> > If I push that button, me[now]() will die, but me[past]() will survive.
> >
> > This is an extraordinary situation in which to find yourself; if you're at
> > all like me, you have no relevant moral intuitions with which to settle
> > this matter.
>
> Yes, it is extraordinary, but only by historical accident.
> It might have turned out that duplicating physical objects
> was no harder than exploiting nuclear energy. Now if we
> were very used to duplicates being around, I predict that
> over time we'd accommodate the perspective from physics,
> namely, there isn't much difference between someone and
> his duplicate. The whole difference is in a few memories,
> and we forget things all the time. Besides, since I'll
> be the same person next month, I can hardly fail (from the
> point of view of physics) to be the same person as my xox.
>
> So since you have realized that your "moral intuitions" aren't
> founded on anything objective, you *can* decide that duplicates
> are self because that's what a completely physical materialistic
> analysis would suggest.
Actually, I think this is a bit too fast. A purely physical analysis
shows just what I said, and nothing more: 1 and 2 are both me[past], but
only 1 is me[1] and only 2 is me[2].
Physical analysis will not reveal whether the property of being "me" is
the me[now] property or the me[past] property. If anything, "I" am both.
But, if so, then 1 may rightly take the conjunction of these properties:
If I push that button, me[1] will die. Since to be "me" is to be me[1]
and me[past], and since there will be nothing that is me[1] and me[past]
after I push the button, "I" will die if I push that button.
But perhaps rather than the conjunction of me[1] and me[past], I'm merely
the disjunction of me[1] and me[past]. If so, 1 may rightly say:
If I push that button, me[past] will die. Since to be "me" is to be
me[1] or me[past], and since there will be something that is me[past]
after I push the button, "I" will survive if I push that button.
There's no reason to think that "I" am me[past] any more than there is
reason to think that "I" am me[now]. That captures the spirit of Emlyn's
argument as well: you can call your "self" whatever you like in this
picture.
> > If you want to reject this notion, you'll have to give some kind account
> > of why I would pay more attention to one or the other: why I'd pay
> > attention to me[now]() over me[past](), *or vice versa*.
>
> Yes. But you'll wait in vein, I predict, because I don't believe
> that such an account exists. IMO, people simply haven't gotten
> used to the idea of being in two places at the same time.
If no account exists, then you are not licensed to conclude that
duplicates are self. You'll have to conclude, like I did, that the
question doesn't actually make sense. 'Are duplicates "self"?' can't be
answered without knowing which self: now or past. (The answers are "no"
and "yes", respectively.)
"African or European swallow?"
-Dan
-unless you love someone-
-nothing else makes any sense-
e.e. cummings
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