From: Lee Corbin (lcorbin@tsoft.com)
Date: Tue Oct 08 2002 - 18:00:14 MDT
Peter writes
> [Lee writes]
> >Robin replied
> >
> >> If you realize your position on recounts may be biased because you favor Gore,
> >> you can correct for that by moving your position on recounts in the other
> >> direction, even if you don't change your position on Gore at all.
> >
> >Okay, Peter, so far I don't know exactly how you are thinking
> >that Robin and I disagree. I could entertain hypotheses, but
> >if it's anything in the above so far, please help me focus on
> >what it is.
>
> I guess it's going to be harder than I expected to pin down
> whether or not you disagree with Robin. Possibly some agents
> within your mind disagree and others agree.
> Your apparent claim that value differences are the explanation
> for left-right debates implied to me that you were rejecting
> Robin's explanation,...
Ah ha! Perhaps this is the problem. So far as I know,
Robin *was not* supplying any explanation for the
persistent disagreements in left-right debates. On
the contrary, he was merely suggesting a prophylactic
or corrective remedy for the case when one *perceives*
that one has a particular bias.
His medicine, when taken as directed above, causes one
to re-estimate one's take on a *minor* or more *specific*
issue (say the mundane recounting of ballots) by shifting
one's opinion in the contrary direction. I don't remember
if I thought that this was a good idea in this particular
case or not, but I did shoot back the notion that it
*wouldn't* be of any use, at least not to me, in those
cases where I already held iron-clad opinions. (For
example, I have an iron-clad opinion about the shape
of the Earth, and tell the Flat Earthers so, whereas
when I'm arguing with leftists, it may turn out that
there is some matter of fact that I need to learn from
them.)
> >So if I'm already in possession of some explanation as to why
> >certain people hold certain opinions (e.g., they were red-diaper
> >babies and believe that Chomsky is infallible, or that they
> >have a deep commitment to a personal relationship with their
> >alleged Creator), then I consider Robin's trick inapplicable,
> >even if it's pretty good to keep it in mind for other times.
>
> looks to me like a partial rejection of Robin's theory.
Sorry, you're right: I am being inconsistent. I'm not sure
what I was thinking when I wrote that paragraph, and withdraw
it.
> Certainty that someone else is wrong appears to indicate
> that the allegedly wrong person is actually wrong less
> frequently than it indicates that the person who claims
> to be certain is overestimating his abilities,
I think you are saying (or meant to say) that if A claims B
is wrong a particular fraction of the time, then B is actually
wrong a smaller fraction of time than that, in the case that
A is *certain*; and it's more likely that A is overestimating
his abilities.
If I have paraphrased you correctly, then I agree.
> so I ought to assume that I normally can't justify the
> conclusion that someone else is certainly wrong.
Well, we all know cases where you are not only warranted,
but required, to say that B is certainly wrong. For example,
if B were to claim that the Peter M. who wrote the above
lines is a small girl, then I'm sure that you would agree
that B is *certainly* wrong, wrong beyond any doubt whatsoever.
> And I don't understand why Robin's trick would be inapplicable
> if I can't justify the conclusion that the other person is
> certainly wrong.
I think that I agree with you (if I didn't before): Robin's
trick seems applicable in all cases to the degree that the
other party does not seem certainly wrong. In the case of
the Florida ballots, however, one runs into the old problem
of one's heart leading one's mind. Suppose a certain person
(Lee) has never considered under what circumstances ballots
should be *recounted*. Now, a significant issue (like who
is going to be President of the United States) has come up
and demands his opinion on the matter of ballots. As Lee
tries to think clearly about the issue, the *very* notions
and ideas he employs are *already* tainted by the desired
outcome, and so tainted at an unconscious level. Finally,
after the appropriate ratiocination, Lee pronounces his
verdict on ballots: "The stupid ballots are impossible to
get exactly correct, and further recounts will probably be
as suspect as earlier ones: to hell with it, just count
them once and be done with it, unless we want to *always*
allow losers to obtain a recount!".
So how can I possibly apply Robin's trick? Here is how I
think I can, but this is the only way I know of: Let us
suppose that someone asks, "Lee, how sure are you that
ballots should not be recounted?", and I reply "95%".
Then Robin's trick is to lower that percentage and say
(and believe!) "80%".
> Your apparently inability to come up with an explanation for the persistent
> exhortations that people should "just get along" is another small piece of
> evidence that you are biased against nonaltruistic/unflattering explanations
> of people's behavior.
Hardly! I *enjoy* unflattering explanations of (other) people's
behavior. I readily confess that injunctions like "follow the
money trail!", and "who benefits?" are wise indeed. No; my
"explanation" for why people continue useless exhortations are
(1) some people are quite young and haven't seen the futility
of such exhortations (2) some people are simply naive and
idealistic, and truly believe that *misunderstanding* lies at
the roots of all controversy, and that there are no nasty and
cantankerous souls (3) many people don't understand how deep,
how substantial, and how almost irreconcilable are people's
disagreements in philosophical, political, and ideological
arenas.
> (My guess is that the biggest single cause of such exhortations
> is a desire to show membership in a group that holds allegedly
> altruistic beliefs such as "seeking agreement causes valuable
> cooperation".
Ugh. Yes, I forgot that. By saying "can't we all just
get along", one advertises oneself as a *good* person,
a person who rises above mere conflict and negative
emotions. "I'm a better person than she."
> I also suspect you underestimate the effectiveness of
> such exhortations at producing conformity. Presumably
> some people benefit from conformity.)
Could be. Sometimes "just say no" really works. But
in most cases, such exhortations are a waste of time,
and lead young people to thinking that people's minds
are such that this sort of thing is effective.
> >> It predicts disagreements such as the one between you and Robin.
> >
> >Would you spell this out please? In some sentence like, "Lee
> >and Robin disagreed because they were being loyal to their
> >past beliefs".
>
> Yes. Robin's belief in the importance of idea futures and of economists
> causes him to be more biased than most people towards the theory that people
> act more selfishly than they realize. The effort you have put into debates
> biases you into overestimating the degree to which people listen to each
> other's logic.
I agree with your first statement here, and I sense that
you and Robin may have a clearer view than I. But the
second sentence is completely wrong. It's obvious that
few minds are really changed during debates; perhaps
you are referring to my claim that people often *are*
affected weeks or months *after* a debate. (This was
one of my five claims in "What is Accomplished in Debates"
http://www.extropy.org/exi-lists/extropians/1767.html
So: I do not believe that I overestimate the degree
to which people listen to each other's logic [sic].
> Robin seems to have a clear argument that value differences fail to
> explain the lack of objectivity (i.e. unbiased weighing of the evidence
> pertaining to factual questions) in ideological debates.
I'm sorry. Where does he claim that differences in values
fail to explain lack of objectivity? Let's see: yes, I do
acknowledge that "loyalty to a former position", as you were
saying, is a big factor, but it rather begs the question as
to how the former position was obtained in the first place.
Also, I concede that people hate to be seen as *wrong*, and
that also diminishes their objectivity. But are you thinking
of something more precise when you imply criticism of the
(IMO) crucial role played by differences in values?
> I thought you
> started this (or a related thread) in an attempt to explain that lack,
> and it looked like you were implying that value differences explain the
> question you asked about objectivity.
Doesn't ring an exact bell.
> Upon rereading your earlier messages, I see that you are emphasizing
> different things when referring to objectivity than Robin would, which
> might indicate that I misunderstood what you are referring to.
Probably.
> But if that's the case, I suspect I will want to argue that
> you are confused about something.
Yes. ;-) You might want to start with my inconsistency above. ;-)
Lee
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