From: Wei Dai (weidai@eskimo.com)
Date: Fri May 31 2002 - 14:45:48 MDT
On Thu, May 30, 2002 at 02:28:07PM -0400, Eliezer S. Yudkowsky wrote:
> But there are many different factors on which any of us can be prejudged. I
> can be prejudged as having more than two Jewish grandparents, as a white
> male, as a Georgian (male), as a twenty-something (male), or many other
> stereotypes which would be utterly misleading to anyone trying to sketch out
> a picture of Eliezer Yudkowsky. There are not "A" players and "B" players.
I thought you were saying that even rational Bayesians have game
theoretical reasons to not prejudge people. (That would be really cool if
it was true, but I don't see how it could be true.) If you're just saying
that we shouldn't prejudge people based on misleading stereotypes, then of
course I agree with you, but that doesn't seem to have anything to do with
the Prisoner's Dilemma.
So could you please clarify, are there or are there not game theoretical
reasons for Bayesian reasoners to not prejudge? If the answer is yes,
please provide an example to show what the reasons are.
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