From: xgl (xli03@emory.edu)
Date: Fri Jun 08 2001 - 07:20:31 MDT
On Fri, 8 Jun 2001 hal@finney.org wrote:
>
> One problem is that you describe them as being relative to a given mind.
> But goals are a property of systems without minds as well. Animals,
> even very primitive ones, plants, bacteria can all be said to have goals.
> Do you mean to claim that the goal structure for mindless creatures does
> not have super and subgoals? Why is it that when something evolves a
> mind, suddenly some goals have "inherent" desirability and others are
> only a means to an end?
>
interesting observation. if goals seem to be a property of systems
in general, i wonder whether they are ultimately a descriptional
expedient. that is, perhaps the main reason for positing goals (and
ultimately intentionality and mind) is that it makes the description of a
system simpler.
if so, then perhaps supergoals can be objective after all.
assuming that any system has an objectively verifiable "simplest
description," does that also enable one to calculate an objective goal
structure for any system given sufficient computational power?
if this is also true, then perhaps supergoals can even be
universal. assuming that the entire universe, as a uber-system, has
finite informational content, does that mean it too might have a supergoal
even though i can't think of a way to calculate it?
-x
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