From: Harvey Newstrom (mail@HarveyNewstrom.com)
Date: Tue Jun 05 2001 - 12:18:41 MDT
Lee Corbin wrote,
> Before you write three or
> four long paragraphs attacking that, please understand that
> I only am putting this forth as an admittedly weak, though
> very real, reason to prefer the state concept of identity.
Alright. Let me write three or four long paragraphs agreeing with
everything you say (and still explaining why I would not choose this option
for self-preservation).
I will concede and agree to your concepts and terms. One person steps into
a duplicating machine, and the same person steps out with two bodies. The
two people stepping out are the same person as the one that stepped in. The
two people who stepped out will be called "one" person in two bodies.
Even conceding all these points, I still don't like it. The double-body
person stepping out of the machine has a different operating system than the
one-body person who stepped in. Even though the hardware is based on the
previous version, and the meme database is the same, the operational
functionality and command syntax are radically different. Those changes
cause operational and functional differences that I do not want. They
destroy other operational abilities and functions that I do want.
The single-body person had centralized control. The dual-body person has
distributed control. The single-body person could process all sensory input
into a single mental representation of the external world. The dual-body
person processes separate input streams separately into multiple mental
representations of the external world. The single body person has mental
telepathic communication to all its parts. The dual-body person must resort
to mundane human communications such as talking or e-mail to communicate
with different parts.
I consider my centralized point of control part of me. If I lose the
ability to control parts of myself from my central mind, I would feel
disconnected from my parts. I also consider the ability to receive
real-time sensory input as part of my conscious self. If I lose the ability
to receive all my input in real time, I would feel like I was unconscious
during these events and learned about them at a later time. I would
consider the new multiple copies to be "me" using your definition, but I
would lose some of the benefits of "me" or the functional abilities of "me"
that I enjoy now.
Even conceding your definition of "me", I would prefer to find a more
functional version of "me" before considering the upload. I believe that
the duplication process produces a fine replacement set of hardware and a
fine backup of my software. However, I find that the communications network
is lacking, the real-time response speed is too slow, and the integration of
the separate parts is insufficient to match the earlier version of me.
Although the multi-body me has many advantages, I feel that there are some
disadvantages as well. Maybe I can wait for a third version where the
multiple body parts are neurally connected with wireless thought transfer in
real-time. Then I would definitely consider this a plausible replacement.
-- Harvey Newstrom <http://HarveyNewstrom.com> <http://Newstaff.com>
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