From: Lee Corbin (lcorbin@ricochet.net)
Date: Mon Jun 04 2001 - 22:24:13 MDT
>Lee Corbin wrote,
>> [Suppose indeed in your example that everyone that you knew started
>> voluntarily die and get replaced with an actor, but that they could
>> explain in great detail why this was a wise thing to do...]
>> Granted, you may still think that something weird is going on, but
>> I claim that you'd be affected. Some part of your mind would begin
>> to doubt. (I'm sure that indeed you have begun to wonder if perhaps
>> there could be something to "duplicates are selves" after all.)
>
>Why do you keep insisting that might belief systems will erode if I
>am in the minority. My very ideas of life extension drugs, cryonics,
>vegetarianism, libertarianism, scientific method, sexual orientation,
>religious beliefs, and favorite TV shows are all in the minority as well. I
>see know reason why my scientific world view should be changed to something
>I cannot prove to myself just because everybody else does it.
Oh, it definitely depends on contexts and circumstances! If
cryonics had been traditional for eons, but finally some very
bright people were beginning to question it, that would be
entirely different. *What* minority you are in has a big
effect. I can tell you that if I were the only person who
thought that getting his head chopped off and frozen was a
good idea, I'd have EXTREMELY severe self-doubt.
>> We do it all the time. You really do think that you are the same
>> person who wrote earlier emails in this thread. Or that if your
>> boss fires you tomorrow for having stayed up too late writing
>> emails, it's you that'll get canned.
>
>Yes, but the future me is derived from the past me. It is
>imprecise to say they are equivalent.
Now please. Indeed they are equivalent for some purposes
but not for others, as you will readily concede. I'm simply
saying that *ordinarily* we do consider ourselves to be the
same person that we were yesterday!
Only in this way do I mean: if A gets forked into B and C,
then B and C identify with A, but not with each other. So
B and C say that they are the same person as A, but (to me,
strangely) they do not admit (if they follow you) to being
the same person as each other. Before you write three or
four long paragraphs attacking that, please understand that
I only am putting this forth as an admittedly weak, though
very real, reason to prefer the state concept of identity.
>But you miss my point. I also don't think much of continuation.
>My point is not that continuation is important. My comments
>about continuation is to show that your logic is imprecise.
Now this is just ridiculous. Have I ever accused you of having
imprecise logic??? If you think that disagreeing with you about
very esoteric stuff like this evidences that I don't have any
logic on my side, we should terminate this discussion, because
you---like way too many political debaters---cannot see the real,
substantive issues beneath the surface disagreements. Or you
don't really want to address them.
>You are using "equivalence" over time to equate one object
>to later changed version of that object. Then you "define"
>them as "equivalent", even though the object has changed.
As I explained above, if I were B, then I'd consider C to be
the same person for the reasons given, namely B (the speaker)
is the same person as A, and C is the same person as A, and
so therefore B (the speaker) is the same person as C. Before
blasting that, can you see that it is possible for one to
consistently hold that position? Can you agree that someone
might (though not you) adopt that way of conceiving what
"persons" are?
>My requirements for uploads and replacement copies do not
>require continuation in time. I just require the same
>connection to the same "me" as I have now.
Yes, you've explained before. A single instance of you
cannot identify with other instances, because it cannot
control their bodies. I really do understand.
>My requirements for uploads and replacement copies do
>not require continuation in time. I just require the
>same connection to the same "me" as I have now. Movements
>in space or time do not matter as long as I end up connected
>to a body that I can control and experience. By your
>definition of self, the same single self is connected
>to the new body AND the old body. By my definition of
>self, the self connected to one body is not connected to
>the other body. There are two selves, each connected
>to a separate body and not connected to each other.
>I guess the real question we have to clear up is this: Do
>you agree with my assessment? Do you see what I mean when
>I say one mind is connected to one body and not to the other
>body? Do you agree that your copy method does not produce
>the one mind connected to two bodies that I want?
Again, yes.
>Specifically, can you choose one of the following statement to clarify your
>response to my position:
>A) Harvey is wrong when he says that the copy procedure does not do what he
>wants.
>B) Harvey wants something, but the copy procedure does something different
>which is just as good.
>C) Harvey wants something stupid, but the copy procedure does something that
>is what he really should want.
I guess that C comes closest, but B is also true.
Harvey wants an immortal life, say, but a single close duplicate
of him wouldn't take its own life so that the other close duplicate
of him would get it. He does not identify via the raw criteria
as determined by our best understanding of physics, but instead
allows those older parts of his brain to determine his choices,
as Rafal Smigrodzky has explained.
Lee
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