From: Harvey Newstrom (mail@HarveyNewstrom.com)
Date: Sun Dec 10 2000 - 15:02:07 MST
I think one of the key problems with the copy question is semantics
and goals. Although I can agree with every scientific claim or
measurement theorized for the copy, it does not help me achieve what
I mean by immortality.
I don't want my personal consciousness to be destroyed. The concept
of "my" consciousness is an ownership claim. I can't prove with
science that I own my own consciousness. It is just a feeling of
attachment I have.
If an exact copy of me were made, I would feel like there were two
identical copies of me. I would still perceive sensations coming
from my original body. The copy would only perceive sensations
coming from its body. Even if we were identical and
indistinguishable, I would still be attached to my original body and
not the new one. If the new body were destroyed, I would feel like I
were alive and that another had died. If the old body were
destroyed, I would feel myself losing consciousness, know I were
dying, and never think again.
Although the functional utility of these two people are identical to
the external world, they are dramatically different to me. I still
lose my consciousness when my original body is destroyed. The new
body does not help my original consciousness survive. Even if a new
consciousness lives on, it is like my offspring. It is not
personally me. Even if it is another "me", I still would keep
searching for a way to make my original consciousness immortal.
I don't see how making a copy helps my quest in any way. Even if the
rest of the world cannot tell the difference, I can easily. The
hypothetical claims that feeding the copy my exact sensory input and
keeping the minds in synch do not help here. The goal is to move me
to another body so that I can diverge and avoid the death of the
original body. Although the copy question is always entertaining, I
am not sure what its usefulness is. Creating a new "me" is only half
the question. How do we handle the old "me"? Killing it or letting
it die is not a solution. That "solution" is the exact event I am
trying to prevent!
-- Harvey Newstrom <HarveyNewstrom.com>
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