From: scerir (scerir@libero.it)
Date: Thu Sep 21 2000 - 15:34:49 MDT
David Blenkinsop wrote:
> .............................. when something is already known to have
> happened, why then, the probability of the real occurrence is equal to
> 100%, in that particular timeline of course. At the same time, there is
> apparently no telling if the probabilities in other timelines are also
> firmly based in real occurrences there.
> (snip)
> What I'm getting at is, I am not following just how it is that any real
> alternate timelines are supposed to interfere with these knowledge-based
> entropy calculations?
As far as I know the MWI is not a theory about physical, real,
objective worlds. These worlds are - for the observer - just a
subjective concept, perceptions, consciousness.
All these worlds form the universe, which is real, one,
physical, objective.
For a supporter of MWI the probability *may* be some measure
of the existence of his world (he is not stupid, he knows there
are many more worlds, he knows that his world is existent like
any other world). This measure comes out from the decomposition
of the universe in worlds (each world orthogonal to the other).
But the number or worlds is very far from being defined.
These worlds continue to multiply!. That's the reason because
(I suppose) Everett called his theory "Relative State".
Note that the question "God plays - or does not play - dice"
has a very different taste in MWI:
Note also that the number of worlds is (perhaps) much bigger
than the number of different outcomes in a quantum experiment.
To normalize this situation you must introduce (in my
opinion) some decoherence (decoherent histories,
decoherent worlds) or some objective probability or some
2nd order collapse (world-collapse) or something else .......
But I'm not sure ... I answered your questions.
scerir
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