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Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Simple contacts exchange (was: Social
 network integration (brainstorm))
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You can prove ownership of a private key by signing a challenger-generated
nonce with the public part and giving the signature back to the challenger
- same as with any asymmetric crypto system.

As I already noted, the payment protocol is designed to solve that problem.
You could design a BIP that extended the payment protocol to include
information about the person who generated it.


On Tue, Sep 17, 2013 at 11:30 AM, Wendell <w@grabhive.com> wrote:

> Couple of things I just thought about:
>
> 1- Presume server should only sweep with two (or more, see below)
> revocation certificates being present
> 2- Need to insert something in the flow so that Alice can verify that the
> uploaded key is actually Bob's (and perhaps vise-versa, given an extremely
> dedicated attacker with a fast connection?).
>
> Is there a way to do #2 without creating yet another transaction?
> Admittedly I am still really puzzled about the accessibility of public keys
> in Bitcoin!
>
> Please remember that the idea is to have two wallets securely exchange a
> packet of metadata about a transaction beyond the scope of Bitcoin itself
> (a name, perhaps a small photo, etc) in order to increase usability. This
> will be my last post here on the topic except to reply in case anyone else
> contributes.
>
> -wendell
>
> grabhive.com | twitter.com/grabhive | gpg: 6C0C9411
>
> On Sep 16, 2013, at 4:05 PM, Wendell wrote:
>
> > Luke pointed out that we should not be inserting extraneous data into
> the blockchain, so this sounds like the best option, Eric.
> >
> > I'm under the impression that a Bitcoin user Alice cannot see the actual
> public key of Bitcoin user Bob, so if we had Hive store metadata on a
> server relating to a given transaction ID, I would not be able to use those
> public keys key to encrypt. Is this a misunderstanding or is it correct?
> >
> > Assuming it is correct, the best that I could come up with was storing
> the transaction ID with a _fresh_ public key on a server, each time a
> transfer is made. Altogether it looks like this:
> >
> > - Alice generates a new keypair & revocation certificate for the
> transaction
> > - Alice makes a Bitcoin transaction to Bob
> > - Alice sends the transaction ID plus the new public key to server
> > - Bob receives the Bitcoin transaction
> > - Bob generates a new keypair & revocation certificate
> > - Bob does a transaction ID lookup on the server, receives Alice's
> public key, sends his own new one
> > - Bob encrypts his user metadata against Alice's new key
> > - Alice downloads and decrypts Bob's metadata
> > - Alice uploads her revocation certificate
> > - Alice uploads her own metadata
> > - Bob downloads Alice's metadata
> > - Bob uploads his revocation certificate
> > - (Server removes all keys with revocation certificates)
> >
> > I presume going the extra mile to generate new keys for each transaction
> is helpful for privacy?
> >
> > The above seems rather inelegant to me. I really don't like that clients
> (wallets) are going to be beating down the server all the time checking for
> keys, or that there is a possibility of a desynchronization so severe that
> the user receives the data much too late for it to be useful. But, I
> suppose it can work.
> >
> > Another thing I'm considering is Alice/Bob validating each other. I
> suppose we should include some kind of code that we encourage people to
> read to each other over the phone or some other medium, to ensure that "it
> really is Alice", before (for example) returning money to a very
> legit-looking personage.
> >
> > Any other thoughts? I would love to do this without using any servers at
> all ("serverless keyserver", anyone?), but I am not quite sure how.
> >
> > -wendell
> >
> > grabhive.com | twitter.com/grabhive | gpg: 6C0C9411
> >
> > On Sep 7, 2013, at 12:47 AM, Eric Lombrozo wrote:
> >
> >> Why not just use the transaction hash itself for the lookup? Also,
> presumably you'd want to encrypt the data so that only the recipient of the
> transaction can do this lookup.
> >>
> >> -Eric
> >>
> >> On Sep 6, 2013, at 8:07 AM, Wendell <w@grabhive.com> wrote:
> >>
> >>> Hi all,
> >>>
> >>> We're thinking about ways of automatically exchanging contact details
> between wallets, in order to encourage the proliferation of identifiable
> names and photos rather than long and hard-to-verify addresses.
> >>>
> >>> The simplest version goes like this:
> >>>
> >>> 2 BTC Bitcoin is sent to someone, and a data lookup hash is inserted
> into the transaction. When it arrives on the other end, it is indeed looked
> up, and instead of being presented with a dialogue that says "you received
> 2 BTC from 13Y94z43Nbbb6wevRyk82CeDoYQ5S28zmA", it's "You received 2 BTC
> from Frank Jones" including a nice photo.
> >>>
> >>> Now. We can simply delete this data in reference to the transaction ID
> after it happens (or delete it after a time), but is there any more
> decentralized way to do it? I would prefer us to run no dedicated servers
> that would ever put us in a position of being coerced into giving data, or
> otherwise altering our system to store it.
> >>>
> >>> Any thoughts about this?
> >>>
> >>> -wendell
> >>>
> >>> grabhive.com | twitter.com/grabhive | gpg: 6C0C9411
> >>>
> >>>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >>> Learn the latest--Visual Studio 2012, SharePoint 2013, SQL 2012, more!
> >>> Discover the easy way to master current and previous Microsoft
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> http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=58041391&iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk_______________________________________________
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>
>
>
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--bcaec53fee9d26db3f04e6916e3d
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">You can prove ownership of a private key by signing a chal=
lenger-generated nonce with the public part and giving the signature back t=
o the challenger - same as with any asymmetric crypto system.<div><br></div=
>
<div>As I already noted, the payment protocol is designed to solve that pro=
blem. You could design a BIP that extended the payment protocol to include =
information about the person who generated it.</div></div><div class=3D"gma=
il_extra">
<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Sep 17, 2013 at 11:30 AM, Wendel=
l <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:w@grabhive.com" target=3D"_blank"=
>w@grabhive.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" =
style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
Couple of things I just thought about:<br>
<br>
1- Presume server should only sweep with two (or more, see below) revocatio=
n certificates being present<br>
2- Need to insert something in the flow so that Alice can verify that the u=
ploaded key is actually Bob&#39;s (and perhaps vise-versa, given an extreme=
ly dedicated attacker with a fast connection?).<br>
<br>
Is there a way to do #2 without creating yet another transaction? Admittedl=
y I am still really puzzled about the accessibility of public keys in Bitco=
in!<br>
<br>
Please remember that the idea is to have two wallets securely exchange a pa=
cket of metadata about a transaction beyond the scope of Bitcoin itself (a =
name, perhaps a small photo, etc) in order to increase usability. This will=
 be my last post here on the topic except to reply in case anyone else cont=
ributes.<br>

<div class=3D"im HOEnZb"><br>
-wendell<br>
<br>
<a href=3D"http://grabhive.com" target=3D"_blank">grabhive.com</a> | <a hre=
f=3D"http://twitter.com/grabhive" target=3D"_blank">twitter.com/grabhive</a=
> | gpg: 6C0C9411<br>
<br>
</div><div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5">On Sep 16, 2013, at 4:05 PM, =
Wendell wrote:<br>
<br>
&gt; Luke pointed out that we should not be inserting extraneous data into =
the blockchain, so this sounds like the best option, Eric.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I&#39;m under the impression that a Bitcoin user Alice cannot see the =
actual public key of Bitcoin user Bob, so if we had Hive store metadata on =
a server relating to a given transaction ID, I would not be able to use tho=
se public keys key to encrypt. Is this a misunderstanding or is it correct?=
<br>

&gt;<br>
&gt; Assuming it is correct, the best that I could come up with was storing=
 the transaction ID with a _fresh_ public key on a server, each time a tran=
sfer is made. Altogether it looks like this:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; - Alice generates a new keypair &amp; revocation certificate for the t=
ransaction<br>
&gt; - Alice makes a Bitcoin transaction to Bob<br>
&gt; - Alice sends the transaction ID plus the new public key to server<br>
&gt; - Bob receives the Bitcoin transaction<br>
&gt; - Bob generates a new keypair &amp; revocation certificate<br>
&gt; - Bob does a transaction ID lookup on the server, receives Alice&#39;s=
 public key, sends his own new one<br>
&gt; - Bob encrypts his user metadata against Alice&#39;s new key<br>
&gt; - Alice downloads and decrypts Bob&#39;s metadata<br>
&gt; - Alice uploads her revocation certificate<br>
&gt; - Alice uploads her own metadata<br>
&gt; - Bob downloads Alice&#39;s metadata<br>
&gt; - Bob uploads his revocation certificate<br>
&gt; - (Server removes all keys with revocation certificates)<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I presume going the extra mile to generate new keys for each transacti=
on is helpful for privacy?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; The above seems rather inelegant to me. I really don&#39;t like that c=
lients (wallets) are going to be beating down the server all the time check=
ing for keys, or that there is a possibility of a desynchronization so seve=
re that the user receives the data much too late for it to be useful. But, =
I suppose it can work.<br>

&gt;<br>
&gt; Another thing I&#39;m considering is Alice/Bob validating each other. =
I suppose we should include some kind of code that we encourage people to r=
ead to each other over the phone or some other medium, to ensure that &quot=
;it really is Alice&quot;, before (for example) returning money to a very l=
egit-looking personage.<br>

&gt;<br>
&gt; Any other thoughts? I would love to do this without using any servers =
at all (&quot;serverless keyserver&quot;, anyone?), but I am not quite sure=
 how.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; -wendell<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"http://grabhive.com" target=3D"_blank">grabhive.com</a> | <=
a href=3D"http://twitter.com/grabhive" target=3D"_blank">twitter.com/grabhi=
ve</a> | gpg: 6C0C9411<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On Sep 7, 2013, at 12:47 AM, Eric Lombrozo wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Why not just use the transaction hash itself for the lookup? Also,=
 presumably you&#39;d want to encrypt the data so that only the recipient o=
f the transaction can do this lookup.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; -Eric<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; On Sep 6, 2013, at 8:07 AM, Wendell &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:w@grabhi=
ve.com">w@grabhive.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Hi all,<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; We&#39;re thinking about ways of automatically exchanging cont=
act details between wallets, in order to encourage the proliferation of ide=
ntifiable names and photos rather than long and hard-to-verify addresses.<b=
r>

&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; The simplest version goes like this:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; 2 BTC Bitcoin is sent to someone, and a data lookup hash is in=
serted into the transaction. When it arrives on the other end, it is indeed=
 looked up, and instead of being presented with a dialogue that says &quot;=
you received 2 BTC from 13Y94z43Nbbb6wevRyk82CeDoYQ5S28zmA&quot;, it&#39;s =
&quot;You received 2 BTC from Frank Jones&quot; including a nice photo.<br>

&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Now. We can simply delete this data in reference to the transa=
ction ID after it happens (or delete it after a time), but is there any mor=
e decentralized way to do it? I would prefer us to run no dedicated servers=
 that would ever put us in a position of being coerced into giving data, or=
 otherwise altering our system to store it.<br>

&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Any thoughts about this?<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; -wendell<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"http://grabhive.com" target=3D"_blank">grabhive.com=
</a> | <a href=3D"http://twitter.com/grabhive" target=3D"_blank">twitter.co=
m/grabhive</a> | gpg: 6C0C9411<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; --------------------------------------------------------------=
----------------<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Learn the latest--Visual Studio 2012, SharePoint 2013, SQL 201=
2, more!<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Discover the easy way to master current and previous Microsoft=
 technologies<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; and advance your career. Get an incredible 1,500+ hours of ste=
p-by-step<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; tutorial videos with LearnDevNow. Subscribe today and save!<br=
>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=3D580=
41391&amp;iu=3D/4140/ostg.clktrk___________________________________________=
____" target=3D"_blank">http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=3D580=
41391&amp;iu=3D/4140/ostg.clktrk___________________________________________=
____</a><br>

&gt;&gt;&gt; Bitcoin-development mailing list<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net">B=
itcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net</a><br>
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</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div>

--bcaec53fee9d26db3f04e6916e3d--