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From: Tamas Blummer <tamas@bitsofproof.com>
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Date: Sat, 29 Mar 2014 19:16:28 +0100
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To: Alan Reiner <etotheipi@gmail.com>
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Cc: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Presenting a BIP for Shamir's Secret
	Sharing of Bitcoin private keys
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I also think that we can add usability features if the underlying secret =
remains well protected.
I do not think there is any reason to assume that the knowledge of the =
degree of the polynomial, would aid an attacker.

Similarly a fingerprint of the secret if it is unrelated to the hash =
used in the polinomyal should leak no useful information,

The length of such fingerpring (say 4 bytes) and the degree (1 byte) =
does not seem a big overhead for me.

Remember that the biggest obstacle of Bitcoin is usability not security.

Regards,

Tamas Blummer
http://bitsofproof.com

On 29.03.2014, at 18:52, Alan Reiner <etotheipi@gmail.com> wrote:

> On 03/29/2014 01:19 PM, Matt Whitlock wrote:
>> I intentionally omitted the parameter M (minimum subset size) from =
the shares because including it would give an adversary a vital piece of =
information. Likewise, including any kind of information that would =
allow a determination of whether the secret has been correctly =
reconstituted would give an adversary too much information. Failing =
silently when given incorrect shares or an insufficient number of shares =
is intentional.
>=20
> I do not believe this is a good tradeoff.  It's basically obfuscation =
of
> something that is already considered secure at the expense of
> usability.  It's much more important to me that the user understands
> what is in their hands (or their family members after they get hit by =
a
> bus), than to obfuscate the parameters of the secret sharing to =
provide
> a tiny disadvantage to an adversary who gets ahold of one.=20
>=20
> The fact that it fails silently is really all downside, not a benefit.=20=

> If I have enough fragments, I can reconstruct the seed and see that it
> produces addresses with money.  If not, I know I need more fragments.=20=

> I'm much more concerned about my family having all the info they need =
to
> recover the money, than an attacker knowing that he needs two more
> fragments instead of which are well-secured anyway.
>=20
>=20
>=20
> =
--------------------------------------------------------------------------=
----
> _______________________________________________
> Bitcoin-development mailing list
> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>=20


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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dus-ascii"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; ">I =
also think that we can add usability features if the underlying secret =
remains well protected.<div>I do not think there is any reason to assume =
that the knowledge of the degree of the polynomial, would aid an =
attacker.</div><div><br></div><div>Similarly a fingerprint of the secret =
if it is unrelated to the hash used in the polinomyal should leak no =
useful information,</div><div><br></div><div>The length of such =
fingerpring (say 4 bytes) and the degree (1 byte) does not seem a big =
overhead for me.</div><div><br></div><div>Remember that the biggest =
obstacle of Bitcoin is usability not security.</div><div><div =
apple-content-edited=3D"true"><br style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); =
font-family: Helvetica; font-size: medium; font-style: normal; =
font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: -webkit-auto; text-indent: =
0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: =
0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
"><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: =
medium; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; =
letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: =
-webkit-auto; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: none; =
">Regards,</span><br style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: medium; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; =
orphans: 2; text-align: -webkit-auto; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: =
none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; "><br =
style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: medium; =
font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; =
letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: =
-webkit-auto; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; "><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); =
font-family: Helvetica; font-size: medium; font-style: normal; =
font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: -webkit-auto; text-indent: =
0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: =
0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
display: inline !important; float: none; ">Tamas Blummer</span><br =
style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: medium; =
font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; =
letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: =
-webkit-auto; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; "><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); =
font-family: Helvetica; font-size: medium; font-style: normal; =
font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: -webkit-auto; text-indent: =
0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: =
0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
display: inline !important; float: none; "><a =
href=3D"http://bitsofproof.com">http://bitsofproof.com</a></span>
</div>
<br><div><div>On 29.03.2014, at 18:52, Alan Reiner &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:etotheipi@gmail.com">etotheipi@gmail.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote =
type=3D"cite">On 03/29/2014 01:19 PM, Matt Whitlock =
wrote:<br><blockquote type=3D"cite">I intentionally omitted the =
parameter M (minimum subset size) from the shares because including it =
would give an adversary a vital piece of information. Likewise, =
including any kind of information that would allow a determination of =
whether the secret has been correctly reconstituted would give an =
adversary too much information. Failing silently when given incorrect =
shares or an insufficient number of shares is =
intentional.<br></blockquote><br>I do not believe this is a good =
tradeoff. &nbsp;It's basically obfuscation of<br>something that is =
already considered secure at the expense of<br>usability. &nbsp;It's =
much more important to me that the user understands<br>what is in their =
hands (or their family members after they get hit by a<br>bus), than to =
obfuscate the parameters of the secret sharing to provide<br>a tiny =
disadvantage to an adversary who gets ahold of one. <br><br>The fact =
that it fails silently is really all downside, not a benefit. <br>If I =
have enough fragments, I can reconstruct the seed and see that =
it<br>produces addresses with money. &nbsp;If not, I know I need more =
fragments. <br>I'm much more concerned about my family having all the =
info they need to<br>recover the money, than an attacker knowing that he =
needs two more<br>fragments instead of which are well-secured =
anyway.<br><br><br><br>---------------------------------------------------=
---------------------------<br>___________________________________________=
____<br>Bitcoin-development mailing list<br><a =
href=3D"mailto:Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net">Bitcoin-developm=
ent@lists.sourceforge.net</a><br>https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listi=
nfo/bitcoin-development<br><br></blockquote></div><br></div></body></html>=

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