1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
|
Return-Path: <ZmnSCPxj@protonmail.com>
Received: from hemlock.osuosl.org (smtp2.osuosl.org [140.211.166.133])
by lists.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A1EE9C0177
for <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>;
Sat, 28 Mar 2020 02:12:44 +0000 (UTC)
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
by hemlock.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8C295896B2
for <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>;
Sat, 28 Mar 2020 02:12:44 +0000 (UTC)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org
Received: from hemlock.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1])
by localhost (.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
with ESMTP id tOAGSds9FyHi
for <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>;
Sat, 28 Mar 2020 02:12:42 +0000 (UTC)
X-Greylist: domain auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6
Received: from mail-40130.protonmail.ch (mail-40130.protonmail.ch
[185.70.40.130])
by hemlock.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CBCAA89660
for <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>;
Sat, 28 Mar 2020 02:12:41 +0000 (UTC)
Date: Sat, 28 Mar 2020 02:12:37 +0000
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=protonmail.com;
s=default; t=1585361559;
bh=TDyBg4q9k+QRJpUd8+cItvIt41II7ohuLNgHfr0b/jU=;
h=Date:To:From:Cc:Reply-To:Subject:In-Reply-To:References:From;
b=SmtxJD2JARSkdUaKFiwCIqVDWRqOE0xsaEsWHK+8A0Rypd2JGhSPkaqOVuASI/Sji
7KNo3D6JJcmTV0qL5M6N64t7mfTzNJjVJz9wPZZXEF8TiZISdqJTZz3N6koIJjmJ+q
NdWwOa2VXT8qyXDL1hKoQuq5d8fPAflKnRoFDl5c=
To: Andrew Cann <shum@canndrew.org>
From: ZmnSCPxj <ZmnSCPxj@protonmail.com>
Reply-To: ZmnSCPxj <ZmnSCPxj@protonmail.com>
Message-ID: <s3Ca4bxK08bu1hHG3byopx9GWrcrR57zKOtuXsT86eDoydG2UQWrVqphBAQ9BTVh3Yb3cF34d1lMD3iVHmEtb4PbX6wu2cCyeNvkEKA7NCY=@protonmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <20200327091734.GA6531@canndrew.org>
References: <PS2P216MB0179EC99BDE0E3388F2627F89DF30@PS2P216MB0179.KORP216.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM>
<F713CAAC-1997-4645-A166-57358E520594@voskuil.org>
<CAGLBAhdTMbZPwqV9YLMyHdNzLbN2DLjiOe6cBUbkwR_x4cGRmQ@mail.gmail.com>
<20200323125922.GA29881@canndrew.org>
<CAGLBAhcUgTEWnraFem0YwODc61B4nwbzddHJtE0D7ZCjUNWfYg@mail.gmail.com>
<C_qo1AhQuklVr4owEXVgLXsvJomb9Usd1NP2zf_D_23r6Cmz9-iB7ygSfNihJp3FIfAf4c1P41fT3qQP7SFiKdCfXxpogcstHsOnpgLgbok=@protonmail.com>
<20200325152302.GA3355@canndrew.org>
<v1t2DhGSHFng23jy0XTRkoVJrhA_6x_QuHFWdrcxQnMS8Sdcbe7eksRtvjf6JCb8YLoHf2W5y29j3XbBIVfDALSBjoiMqxPUWKsQyGLOR_A=@protonmail.com>
<20200327091734.GA6531@canndrew.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block solving slowdown question/poll
X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev.lists.linuxfoundation.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/options/bitcoin-dev>,
<mailto:bitcoin-dev-request@lists.linuxfoundation.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/>
List-Post: <mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
List-Help: <mailto:bitcoin-dev-request@lists.linuxfoundation.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev>,
<mailto:bitcoin-dev-request@lists.linuxfoundation.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 28 Mar 2020 02:12:44 -0000
Good morning Andrew,
> Here's a better explanation than I could write of the phenomenon I'm talk=
ing
> about:
>
> > As a thought experiment, let=E2=80=99s consider aquaculture (fish farmi=
ng) in a lake.
> > Imagine a lake with a thousand identical fish farms owned by a thousand
> > competing companies. Each fish farm earns a profit of $1000/month. For =
a
> > while, all is well.
> > But each fish farm produces waste, which fouls the water in the lake. L=
et=E2=80=99s
> > say each fish farm produces enough pollution to lower productivity in t=
he
> > lake by $1/month.
> > A thousand fish farms produce enough waste to lower productivity by
> > $1000/month, meaning none of the fish farms are making any money. Capit=
alism
> > to the rescue: someone invents a complex filtering system that removes =
waste
> > products. It costs $300/month to operate. All fish farms voluntarily in=
stall
> > it, the pollution ends, and the fish farms are now making a profit of
> > $700/month =E2=80=93 still a respectable sum.
> > But one farmer (let=E2=80=99s call him Steve) gets tired of spending th=
e money to
> > operate his filter. Now one fish farm worth of waste is polluting the l=
ake,
> > lowering productivity by $1. Steve earns $999 profit, and everyone else=
earns
> > $699 profit.
> > Everyone else sees Steve is much more profitable than they are, because=
he=E2=80=99s
> > not spending the maintenance costs on his filter. They disconnect their
> > filters too.
> > Once four hundred people disconnect their filters, Steve is earning
> > $600/month =E2=80=93 less than he would be if he and everyone else had =
kept their
> > filters on! And the poor virtuous filter users are only making $300. St=
eve
> > goes around to everyone, saying =E2=80=9CWait! We all need to make a vo=
luntary pact
> > to use filters! Otherwise, everyone=E2=80=99s productivity goes down.=
=E2=80=9D
> > Everyone agrees with him, and they all sign the Filter Pact, except one
> > person who is sort of a jerk. Let=E2=80=99s call him Mike. Now everyone=
is back using
> > filters again, except Mike. Mike earns $999/month, and everyone else ea=
rns
> > $699/month. Slowly, people start thinking they too should be getting bi=
g
> > bucks like Mike, and disconnect their filter for $300 extra profit=
=E2=80=A6
> > A self-interested person never has any incentive to use a filter. A
> > self-interested person has some incentive to sign a pact to make everyo=
ne use
> > a filter, but in many cases has a stronger incentive to wait for everyo=
ne
> > else to sign such a pact but opt out himself. This can lead to an undes=
irable
> > equilibrium in which no one will sign such a pact.
>
> Won't a thousand bitcoin-spenders, individually paying for their transact=
ions
> but collectively paying for their security, end up falling into the same
> dynamic?
Fortunately in our case, only the top 4,000,000 weight worth of transaction=
s gets in a block.
Every bitcoin spender has an incentive to spend as little as possible to ge=
t into this top 4,000,000 weight and no more, but they still have to outbid=
every other user who wants the same security.
Some bitcoin spender will then decide that overpaying slightly to ensure th=
at they do not drop out of the top 4,000,000 weight even in case of a "slow=
" block.
Thus, there will always be a need for *some* block weight limit, and that i=
s what ensures that miners can get paid.
Now it was brought up earlier that people are moving transactions offchain,=
but that is perfectly fine, because every offchain mechanism first needs a=
n onchain setup, and will at some point need an onchain teardown.
This allows increasing the effective capacity, while still ensuring that on=
chain fees remain at a level that will still ensure continued healthy opera=
tion of the blockchain layer.
Basically, the offchain mechanism does not remove onchain fees, it only amo=
rtizes the onchain fees to multiple logical transactions.
Regards,
ZmnSCPxj
|
