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Message-ID: <c182227876c47f476000b0b54618dac73e45a03f.camel@timruffing.de>
From: Tim Ruffing <crypto@timruffing.de>
To: Dustin Dettmer <dustinpaystaxes@gmail.com>, Bitcoin Protocol Discussion
 <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>, Pieter Wuille
 <bitcoin-dev@wuille.net>
Date: Tue, 24 Mar 2020 08:49:38 +0100
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Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Overview of anti-covert-channel signing techniques
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Hi Dustin,

That sounds interesting but I can't follow your email to be honest.

On Mon, 2020-03-23 at 07:38 -0700, Dustin Dettmer via bitcoin-dev
wrote:
> This mitigates, I believe, all leak vectors besides k/R hacking and
> prechosen entropy.

Hm, so what vectors is this supposed to mitigate? Leaking through the
generated public keys? Anything else?

Here are a few questions:
 - What are you trying to achieve? You seem to describe how you get
from the setup to the goal in four steps but I don't understand what
the setup is or what the goal is. (What's a storage solution?)
 - "all SW being compromised" do you mean "SW and HW compromised"? Note
that SW and HW are parties in Pieter's writeup, not just abbreviations
for software and hardware. 
 - Where are the two stages? You mention four steps.
 - Where do you run the external software? On a second SW? Is this the
second stage?
 - Do you use unhardened derivation?
 - What's a k commitment?


Best,
Tim