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From: Johnson Lau <jl2012@xbt.hk>
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Date: Fri, 31 Aug 2018 15:42:07 +0800
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To: Christian Decker <decker.christian@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] SIGHASH2 for version 1 witness programme
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Great, I=E2=80=99ll revise it.

Follow-up questions:

1. Is there any useful case which one would like to use NOINPUT with =
scriptCode and/or scriptPubKey committed? (Note that with taproot/MAST, =
scriptCode and scriptPubKey are not interchangeable. scriptPubKey =
commits to all branches, and scriptCode is just one script branch). If =
yes, we could make this configurable.

2. Which of the following approaches is better?
A) sign scriptPubKey in every cases except NOINPUT
B) sign the type (P2SH-segwit vs. Native-segwit) of scriptPubKey in =
every cases, including NOINPUT
C) all of the above
D) none of the above

Option B is very easy to implement as SignatureHash() could distinguish =
the type by the size of scriptSig in TxTo. Option A is more complicated =
as GenericTransactionSignatureChecker needs to know the scriptPubKey.

If the only reason for doing this is to allow hardware wallet to =
distinguish the segwit type, option B is probably enough. This is also =
compatible with eltoo.

Option A is useful when a hardware wallet reuses the same public key in =
different scripts, but it couldn=E2=80=99t be applied to NOINPUT

3. Is the proposed DUALOUTPUT somehow useful for eltoo? Eltoo use =
NOINPUT|SINGLE to allow fee pumping, since it is an one-input-one-output =
tx. This is not possible with the existing LN as the tx is =
one-input-two-output. If we had DUALOUTPUT which signs the matched and =
last output, fee-pumping would be possible in the existing LN.




> On 31 Aug 2018, at 4:51 AM, Christian Decker =
<decker.christian@gmail.com> wrote:
>=20
> Thanks for the update Johnson, just wanted to give a really quick NACK
> on the SIGHASH_NOINPUT variant: the whole idea of BIP 118 is to have
> floating transactions that can be bound to predecessors, and still
> enforce some application logic. In eltoo's case this is the fact that
> the state number needs to be smaller than the state number of the
> transaction that is being rewritten. The state number that we bind to =
is
> part of the `scriptPubKey`, so we can't commit to the `scriptPubKey` =
in
> the signature since we don't know which output (and thus it's
> scriptPubKey`) is at the time we sign.
>=20
> If we are committing to `scriptPubKey` this whole way of enforcing =
order
> in updates is no longer possible, and the only thing we actually get
> from this change is a (very weak) malleability fix. The same argument
> goes for `scriptCode`.
>=20
> Cheers,
> Christian
>=20
> Johnson Lau <jl2012@xbt.hk> writes:
>> After gathering some feedbacks I substantially revised the proposal. =
This version focus on improving security, and reduces the number of =
optional features.
>>=20
>> Formatted BIP and sample code at:
>> https://github.com/jl2012/bips/blob/sighash2/bip-sighash2.mediawiki
>> https://github.com/jl2012/bitcoin/commits/sighash2
>>=20
>> The major new features compared with BIP143:
>>=20
>> 1. If signing all inputs, also sign all input value. BIP143 signature =
only covers the value of the same input. In some cases this may not be =
adequate for hardware wallet to determine the right amount of fees. =
Signing all input values will secure any possible case.
>> 2. Sign both scriptCode and previous scriptPubKey. In the original =
bitcoin design, previous scriptPubKey is signed as the scriptCode. =
However, this is not the case with P2SH and segwit. Explicitly =
committing to the scriptPubKey allows hardware wallet to confirm what it =
is actually signing (e.g. P2SH-segwit vs. Native-segwit).
>> 3. SIGHASH2_NOINPUT: basically same as BIP118, but the signature =
commits to both scriptCode and scriptPubKey. This prevents signature =
replay if the same public key is used in different scripts.
>> 4. SIGHASH2_MATCHOUTPUT (previously SIGHASH_SINGLE) disallows =
out-of-range case.
>> 5. SIGHASH2_LASTOUTPUT: signs only the highest index output.
>> 6. SIGHASH2_DUALOUTPUT: signs the matched output and the highest =
index output. Described by gmaxwell at =
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2018-July/016188.h=
tml =
<https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2018-July/016188.=
html>
>> 7. Signing the amount of fees (optional, yes by default). In case of =
not signing all inputs or outputs, users may still want to commit to a =
specific fee amount.
>> 8. Signing the witness size (optional, yes by default). While segwit =
fixed txid malleability, it is not a fix of script malleability. It may =
cause some trouble if an attacker could bloat the witness and reduce the =
fee priority of a transaction. Although the witness size is not =
malleable for most simple scripts, this is not guaranteed for more =
complex ones. Such kind of size malleability could be avoided if =
signatures commit to the size of witness.
>>=20
>> Any suggestions are welcomed. But I have the following questions:
>>=20
>> 1. Should NOINPUT commit to scriptCode and/or scriptPubKey? I think =
it should, because that helps avoid signature replay in some cases, and =
also lets hardware wallets know what they are signing. I am asking this =
because BIP118 proposes the opposite. I want to make sure I=E2=80=99m =
not missing something here.
>> 2. Do we want to add LASTOUTPUT and DUALOUTPUT? Suggested by =
gmaxwell, an example use case is kickstarter, where individual =
supporters send money to the last output for a kickstarter project, and =
send change to the matched output. However, I doubt if this would be =
actually used this way, because the kickstarter organiser could always =
take the money before the target is met, by making up the difference =
with his own input. This is an inherent problem for any anonymous =
kickstarter scheme. If these new SIGHASHs are not useful in other =
applications, I am not sure if we should add them.
>> 3. Instead of these restrictive MATCH/LAST/DUALOUTPUT, do we want a =
fully flexible way to sign a subset of outputs? The indexes of signed =
outputs are put at the end of the signature, and the signature won=E2=80=99=
t commit to these index values. Therefore, a third party could collect =
all transactions of this kind and merge them into one transaction. To =
limit the sighash cost, number of signed outputs might not be more than =
2 or 3. Some potential problems: a) code complexity; b) 1-byte or 2-byte =
index: 1-byte will limit the number of outputs to 256. 2-byte will use =
more space even for smaller txs; c) highly variable signature size makes =
witness size estimation more difficult
>> 4. Should we sign the exact witness size (as proposed), or an upper =
size limit? Signing an upper limit will take up more space, as the limit =
has to be explicitly shown in the witness. The overhead could be avoided =
by showing the limit only if the actual witness size is not equal to the =
committed limit. However, I tend to keep it simple and sign the exact =
value. If in a multi-sig setup some signers are unable to accurately =
estimate the witness size, they should leave this responsibility to the =
last signer who should know the exact size.
>>=20
>>=20
>>> On 1 Jun 2018, at 2:35 AM, Johnson Lau via bitcoin-dev =
<bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>>>=20
>>> Since 2016, I have made a number of proposals for the next =
generation of script. Since then, there has been a lot of exciting =
development on this topic. The most notable ones are Taproot and =
Graftroot proposed by Maxwell. It seems the most logical way is to =
implement MAST and other new script functions inside Taproot and/or =
Graftroot. Therefore, I substantially simplified my earlier proposal on =
SIGHASH2. It is a superset of the existing SIGHASH and the BIP118 =
SIGHASH_NOINPUT, with further flexibility but not being too complicated. =
It also fixes some minor problems that we found in the late stage of =
BIP143 review. For example, the theoretical (but not statistical) =
possibility of having same SignatureHash() results for a legacy and a =
witness transaction. This is fixed by padding a constant at the end of =
the message so collision would not be possible.
>>>=20
>>> A formatted version and example code could be found here:
>>> https://github.com/jl2012/bips/blob/sighash2/bip-sighash2.mediawiki
>>> https://github.com/jl2012/bitcoin/commits/sighash2
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
>>>=20
>>> BIP: YYY
>>> Layer: Consensus (soft fork)
>>> Title: Signature checking operations in version 1 witness program
>>> Author: Johnson Lau <jl2012@xbt.hk>
>>> Comments-Summary: No comments yet.
>>> Comments-URI: https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/wiki/Comments:BIP-0YYY
>>> Status: Draft
>>> Type: Standards Track
>>> Created: 2017-07-19
>>> License: BSD-3-Clause
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> *Abstract
>>>=20
>>> This BIP defines signature checking operations in version 1 witness =
program.
>>>=20
>>> *Motivation
>>>=20
>>> Use of compact signatures to save space.
>>>=20
>>> More SIGHASH options, more flexibility
>>>=20
>>> *Specification
>>>=20
>>> The following specification is applicable to OP_CHECKSIG and =
OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY in version 1 witness program.
>>>=20
>>> **Public Key Format
>>>=20
>>> The pubic key MUST be exactly 33 bytes.
>>>=20
>>> If the first byte of the public key is a 0x02 or 0x03, it MUST be a =
compressed public key. The signature is a Schnorr signature (To be =
defined separately)
>>>=20
>>> If the first byte of the public key is neither 0x02 nor 0x03, the =
signature is assumed valid. This is for future upgrade.
>>>=20
>>> **Signature Format
>>>=20
>>> The following rules apply only if the first byte of the public key =
is a 0x02 or 0x03.
>>>=20
>>> If the signature size is 64 to 66 byte, it MUST be a valid Schnorr =
signature or the script execution MUST fail (cf. BIP146 NULLFAIL). The =
first 32-byte is the R value in big-endian. The next 32-byte is the S =
value in big-endian. The remaining data, if any, denotes the hashtype in =
little-endian (0 to 0xffff).
>>>=20
>>> hashtype MUST be minimally encoded. Any trailing zero MUST be =
removed.
>>>=20
>>> If the signature size is zero, it is accepted as the "valid failing" =
signature for OP_CHECKSIG to return a FALSE value to the stack. (cf. =
BIP66)
>>>=20
>>> The script execution MUST fail with a signature size not 0, 64, 65, =
or 66-byte.
>>>=20
>>> **New hashtype definitions
>>>=20
>>> hashtype and the SignatureHash function are re-defined:
>>>=20
>>> Double SHA256 of the serialization of:
>>>    1. nVersion (4-byte little endian)
>>>    2. hashPrevouts (32-byte hash)
>>>    3. hashSequence (32-byte hash)
>>>    4. outpoint (32-byte hash + 4-byte little endian)
>>>    5. scriptCode (serialized as scripts inside CTxOuts)
>>>    6. nAmount (8-byte little endian)
>>>    7. nSequence (4-byte little endian)
>>>    8. hashOutputs (32-byte hash)
>>>    9. nLocktime (4-byte little endian)
>>>   10. nInputIndex (4-byte little endian)
>>>   11. nFees (8-byte little endian)
>>>   12. hashtype (4-byte little endian)
>>>   13. sigversion (4-byte little endian for the fixed value =
0x01000000)
>>>=20
>>> The bit 0 to 3 of hashtype denotes a value between 0 and 15:
>>>=20
>>> 	=E2=80=A2 If the value is 1, the signature is invalid.
>>> 	=E2=80=A2 If the value is 3 or below, hashPrevouts is the hash =
of all input, same as defined in BIP143. Otherwise, it is 32-byte of =
0x0000......0000.
>>> 	=E2=80=A2 If the value is 7 or below, outpoint is the COutPoint =
of the current input. Otherwise, it is 36-byte of 0x0000......0000.
>>> 	=E2=80=A2 If the value is 0, hashSequence is the hash of all =
sequence, same as defined in BIP143. Otherwise, it is 32-byte of =
0x0000......0000.
>>> 	=E2=80=A2 If the value is even (including 0), nSequence is the =
nSequence of the current input. Otherwise, it is 0x00000000.
>>> 	=E2=80=A2 If the value is 6, 7, 10, 11, 14, or 15, nInputIndex =
is 0x00000000. Otherwise, it is the index of the current input.
>>> 	=E2=80=A2 If the value is 11 or below, nAmount is the value of =
the current input (same as BIP143). Otherwise, it is 0x0000000000000000.
>>>=20
>>> The bit 4 and 5 of hashtype denotes a value between 0 and 3:
>>>=20
>>> 	=E2=80=A2 If the value is 0, hashOutputs is same as the =
SIGHASH_ALL case in BIP143 as a hash of all outputs.
>>> 	=E2=80=A2 If the value is 1, the signature is invalid.
>>> 	=E2=80=A2 If the value is 2, hashOutputs is same as the =
SIGHASH_SINGLE case in BIP143 as a hash of the matching output. If a =
matching output does not exist, hashOutputs is 32-byte of =
0x0000......0000.
>>> 	=E2=80=A2 If the value is 3, hashOutputs is 32-byte of =
0x0000......0000.
>>> If bit 6 is set (SIGHASH2_NOFEE), nFees is 0x0000000000000000. =
Otherwise, it is the fee paid by the transaction.
>>> If bit 7 is set (SIGHASH2_NOLOCKTIME), nLockTime is 0x00000000. =
Otherwise, it is the transaction nLockTime.
>>>=20
>>> If bit 8 is set (SIGHASH2_NOVERSION), nVersion is 0x00000000. =
Otherwise, it is the transaction nVersion.
>>>=20
>>> If bit 9 is set (SIGHASH2_NOSCRIPTCODE), scriptCode is an empty =
script. Otherwise, it is same as described in BIP143.
>>>=20
>>> Bits 10 to 15 are reserved and ignored, but the signature still =
commits to their value as hashtype.
>>>=20
>>> hashtype of 0 is also known as SIGHASH2_ALL, which covers all the =
available options. In this case the singnature MUST be exactly 64-byte.
>>>=20
>>> hashtype of 0x3ff is also known as SIGHASH2_NONE, which covers =
nothing and is effectively forfeiting the right related to this public =
key to anyone.
>>>=20
>>> *Rationale
>>>=20
>>> **Signature Format
>>>=20
>>> The current DER format is a complete waste of block space. The new =
format saves ~8 bytes per signature.
>>>=20
>>> **New hashtype definitions
>>>=20
>>> The default and most commonly used case is SIGHASH2_ALL. Making it =
zero size to save space. As a result, the bit flags are defined in a =
negative way (e.g. NOLOCKTIME)
>>>=20
>>> Why decouple INPUT and SEQUENCE? Maybe you want NOINPUT but still =
have a relative lock-time?
>>>=20
>>> Why some combinations are missing? To save some bits for useless =
flags. If you sign all inputs, you must know its index and value. If you =
sign only this input, you must know its value, but probably don't know =
its index in the input vector.
>>>=20
>>> Why only allow signing all SEQUENCE if all INPUT are signed? It =
doesn't make much sense if you care about their sequence without even =
knowing what they are.
>>>=20
>>> Why signing INPUTINDEX? Legacy and BIP143 SINGLE|ANYONECANPAY =
behaves differently for input index. Better make it explicit and =
optional.
>>>=20
>>> Why signing FEE? Sometimes you don't sign all inputs / outputs but =
still want to make sure the fees amount is correct.
>>>=20
>>> Putting NOVERSION and NOSCRIPTCODE in the second byte makes most =
signatures below 66 bytes:
>>>=20
>>> 	=E2=80=A2 NOVERSION: Currently the only use of transaction =
version is to enforce BIP68. It could be safely assumed that version 2 =
is used. The only case one would like to use NOVERSION is to make the =
signature compatible with some unknown new features that use a different =
transaction version.
>>> 	=E2=80=A2 NOSCRIPTCODE: It would be very rare if one could make =
a signature without knowing what the script is (at least they know the =
public key). The only scenario that a NOSCRIPTCODE is really needed is =
the public key being reused in different scripts, and the user wants to =
use a single signature to cover all these scripts.
>>> Reserved bits: These bits are ignored but should normally be unset. =
Users MUST NOT set these bits until they are defined by a future =
proposal, or they might lose money.
>>> Why sigversion? Make sure the message digest won't collide with =
SIGHASH schemes in the past (legacy and BIP143) and future (which will =
use a different sigversion).
>>>=20
>>> *Examples
>>>=20
>>> Equivalent SIGHASH2 value for other SIGHASH schemes:
>>> Legacy/BIP143 ALL: 0 (commit to everything)
>>> Legacy/BIP143 SINGLE with matching output: 0x62 (all input, one =
sequence, one output, no fee)
>>> Legacy SINGLE without matching output: 0x3ff (Not exactly. Both =
signatures commit to nothing, but the legacy one is valid only without a =
matched output. Practically, they are both "wildcard" signatures that =
allow anyone to spend any related UTXO)
>>> Legacy/BIP143 NONE: 0x72 (all input, one sequence, no output, no =
fee)
>>> Legacy/BIP143 ANYONECANPAY|ALL: 0x46 (one input without index, one =
sequence, all output, no fee)
>>> Legacy ANYONECANPAY|SINGLE with matching output: 0x64 (one input =
with index, one sequence, one output, no fee)
>>> Legacy/BIP143 ANYONECANPAY|NONE: 0x76 (one input without index, one =
sequence, no output, no fee)
>>> BIP143 SINGLE without matching output: 0x62 (all input, one =
sequence, no output, no fee)
>>> BIP143 ANYONECANPAY|SINGLE with matching output: 0x66 (one input =
without index, one sequence, one output, no fee)
>>> BIP143 ANYONECANPAY|SINGLE without matching output: 0x66 (one input =
without index, one sequence, no output, no fee)
>>> BIP118 NOINPUT: 0x14b (no input but with value, no index, no =
sequence, no fee, no scriptcode)
>>>=20
>>> Notes:
>>>=20
>>> 1. In legacy and BIP143 SIGHASH, only ALL but not other types =
implicitly commits to the fee paid.
>>> 2. Legacy SIGHASH always implicitly commits to the input value. =
BIP143 and BIP118 commits to that explicitly.
>>> 3. Legacy and BIP143 SIGHASH behaves differently in the case of =
SINGLE without matching output. In legacy SIGHASH it is a true "wildcard =
signature" that allows anyone to spend any related UTXO. In BIP143 such =
signature applies only to a specific UTXO.
>>> 4. BIP143 ANYONECANPAY never commits to the input index. Legacy =
ANYONECANPAY|SINGLE implicitly commits to the input index.
>>>=20
>>> *Backward compatibility
>>>=20
>>> This is a soft-fork.
>>>=20
>>> *Deployment
>>>=20
>>> Exact details TBD.
>>>=20
>>> *Reference Implementation
>>>=20
>>> https://github.com/jl2012/bitcoin/commits/sighash2 (To be updated)
>>>=20
>>> *Copyright
>>>=20
>>> This document is licensed as BSD 3-clause.
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
>>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev