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From: Mark Friedenbach <mark@friedenbach.org>
Date: Wed, 9 Dec 2015 14:59:43 +0800
Message-ID: <CAOG=w-sN5Kc5_W07iSKvZqSz_cNu50rkoQ65cP3_bWeFNcyizA@mail.gmail.com>
To: Gregory Maxwell <greg@xiph.org>
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Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Capacity increases for the Bitcoin system.
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Greg, if you have actual data showing that putting the commitment in the
last transaction would be disruptive, and how disruptive, that would be
appreciated. Of the mining hardware I have looked at, none of it cared at
all what transactions other than the coinbase are. You need to provide a
path to the coinbase for extranonce rolling, but the witness commitment
wouldn't need to be updated.
I'm sorry but it's not clear how this would be an incompatible upgrade,
disruptive to anything other than the transaction selection code. Maybe I'm
missing something? I'm not familiar with all the hardware or pooling setups
out there.
On Wed, Dec 9, 2015 at 2:29 PM, Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> On Wed, Dec 9, 2015 at 4:44 AM, Ryan Butler <rryananizer@gmail.com> wrote:
> >>I agree, but nothing I have advocated creates significant technical
> >>debt. It is also a bad engineering practice to combine functional
> >>changes (especially ones with poorly understood system wide
> >>consequences and low user autonomy) with structural tidying.
> >
> > I don't think I would classify placing things in consensus critical code
> > when it doesn't need to be as "structural tidying". Gavin said "pile on"
> > which you took as implying "a lot", he can correct me, but I believe he
> > meant "add to".
>
> Nothing being discussed would move something from consensus critical
> code to not consensus critical.
>
> What was being discussed was the location of the witness commitment;
> which is consensus critical regardless of where it is placed. Should
> it be placed in an available location which is compatible with the
> existing network, or should the block hashing data structure
> immediately be changed in an incompatible way to accommodate it in
> order to satisfy an ascetic sense of purity and to make fraud proofs
> somewhat smaller?
>
> I argue that the size difference in the fraud proofs is not
> interesting, the disruption to the network in an incompatible upgrade
> is interesting; and that if it really were desirable reorganization to
> move the commitment point could be done as part of a separate change
> that changes only the location of things (and/or other trivial
> adjustments); and that proceeding int this fashion would minimize
> disruption and risk... by making the incompatible changes that will
> force network wide software updates be as small and as simple as
> possible.
>
> >> (especially ones with poorly understood system wide consequences and low
> >> user autonomy)
> >
> > This implies there you have no confidence in the unit tests and
> functional
> > testing around Bitcoin and should not be a reason to avoid refactoring.
> > It's more a reason to increase testing so that you will have confidence
> when
> > you refactor.
>
> I am speaking from our engineering experience in a public,
> world-wide, multi-vendor, multi-version, inter-operable, distributed
> system which is constantly changing and in production contains private
> code, unknown and assorted hardware, mixtures of versions, unreliable
> networks, undisclosed usage patterns, and more sources of complex
> behavior than can be counted-- including complex economic incentives
> and malicious participants.
>
> Even if we knew the complete spectrum of possible states for the
> system the combinatioric explosion makes complete testing infeasible.
>
> Though testing is essential one cannot "unit test" away all the risks
> related to deploying a new behavior in the network.
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
--047d7bdc9daeaab8e9052671a326
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Greg, if you have actual data showing that putting th=
e commitment in the last transaction would be disruptive, and how disruptiv=
e, that would be appreciated. Of the mining hardware I have looked at, none=
of it cared at all what transactions other than the coinbase are. You need=
to provide a path to the coinbase for extranonce rolling, but the witness =
commitment wouldn't need to be updated.<br><br></div>I'm sorry but =
it's not clear how this would be an incompatible upgrade, disruptive to=
anything other than the transaction selection code. Maybe I'm missing =
something? I'm not familiar with all the hardware or pooling setups out=
there.<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
On Wed, Dec 9, 2015 at 2:29 PM, Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev <span dir=
=3D"ltr"><<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org" targe=
t=3D"_blank">bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a>></span> wrote:<br=
><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1=
px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class=3D"">On Wed, Dec 9, 2015 at 4:4=
4 AM, Ryan Butler <<a href=3D"mailto:rryananizer@gmail.com">rryananizer@=
gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br>
>>I agree, but nothing I have advocated creates significant technical=
<br>
>>debt. It is also a bad engineering practice to combine functional<b=
r>
>>changes (especially ones with poorly understood system wide<br>
>>consequences and low user autonomy) with structural tidying.<br>
><br>
> I don't think I would classify placing things in consensus critica=
l code<br>
> when it doesn't need to be as "structural tidying".=C2=
=A0 Gavin said "pile on"<br>
> which you took as implying "a lot", he can correct me, but I=
believe he<br>
> meant "add to".<br>
<br>
</span>Nothing being discussed would move something from consensus critical=
<br>
code to not consensus critical.<br>
<br>
What was being discussed was the location of the witness commitment;<br>
which is consensus critical regardless of where it is placed. Should<br>
it be placed in an available location which is compatible with the<br>
existing network, or should the block hashing data structure<br>
immediately be changed in an incompatible way to accommodate it in<br>
order to satisfy an ascetic sense of purity and to make fraud proofs<br>
somewhat smaller?<br>
<br>
I argue that the size difference in the fraud proofs is not<br>
interesting, the disruption to the network in an incompatible upgrade<br>
is interesting; and that if it really were desirable reorganization to<br>
move the commitment point could be done as part of a separate change<br>
that changes only the location of things (and/or other trivial<br>
adjustments); and that proceeding int this fashion would minimize<br>
disruption and risk... by making the incompatible changes that will<br>
force network wide software updates be as small and as simple as<br>
possible.<br>
<span class=3D""><br>
>> (especially ones with poorly understood system wide consequences a=
nd low<br>
>> user autonomy)<br>
><br>
> This implies there you have no confidence in the unit tests and functi=
onal<br>
> testing around Bitcoin and should not be a reason to avoid refactoring=
.<br>
> It's more a reason to increase testing so that you will have confi=
dence when<br>
> you refactor.<br>
<br>
</span>I am speaking from our engineering experience in a=C2=A0 public,<br>
world-wide, multi-vendor, multi-version, inter-operable, distributed<br>
system which is constantly changing and in production contains private<br>
code, unknown and assorted hardware, mixtures of versions, unreliable<br>
networks, undisclosed usage patterns, and more sources of complex<br>
behavior than can be counted-- including complex economic incentives<br>
and malicious participants.<br>
<br>
Even if we knew the complete spectrum of possible states for the<br>
system the combinatioric explosion makes complete testing infeasible.<br>
<br>
Though testing is essential one cannot "unit test" away all the r=
isks<br>
related to deploying a new behavior in the network.<br>
<div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5">___________________________________=
____________<br>
bitcoin-dev mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org">bitcoin-dev@lists.=
linuxfoundation.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev" =
rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail=
man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div>
--047d7bdc9daeaab8e9052671a326--
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