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Return-Path: <jl2012@xbt.hk>
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Date: Sat, 19 Dec 2015 15:03:28 -0500
From: jl2012 <jl2012@xbt.hk>
To: Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org>
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Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] We need to fix the block withholding attack
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After the meeting I find a softfork solution. It is very inefficient and 
I am leaving it here just for record.

1. In the first output of the second transaction of a block, mining pool 
will commit a random nonce with an OP_RETURN.

2. Mine as normal. When a block is found, the hash is concatenated with 
the committed random nonce and hashed.

3. The resulting hash must be smaller than 2 ^ (256 - 1/64) or the block 
is invalid. That means about 1% of blocks are discarded.

4. For each difficulty retarget, the secondary target is decreased by 2 
^ 1/64.

5. After 546096 blocks or 10 years, the secondary target becomes 2 ^ 
252. Therefore only 1 in 16 hash returned by hasher is really valid. 
This should make the detection of block withholding attack much easier.

All miners have to sacrifice 1% reward for 10 years. Confirmation will 
also be 1% slower than it should be.

If a node (full or SPV) is not updated, it becomes more vulnerable as an 
attacker could mine a chain much faster without following the new rules. 
But this is still a softfork, by definition.

---------------

ok, back to topic. Do you mean this? 
http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2012-June/001506.html



Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev 於 2015-12-19 13:42 寫到:
> At the recent Scaling Bitcoin conference in Hong Kong we had a chatham
> house rules workshop session attending by representitives of a super
> majority of the Bitcoin hashing power.
> 
> One of the issues raised by the pools present was block withholding
> attacks, which they said are a real issue for them. In particular, 
> pools
> are receiving legitimate threats by bad actors threatening to use block
> withholding attacks against them. Pools offering their services to the
> general public without anti-privacy Know-Your-Customer have little
> defense against such attacks, which in turn is a threat to the
> decentralization of hashing power: without pools only fairly large
> hashing power installations are profitable as variance is a very real
> business expense. P2Pool is often brought up as a replacement for 
> pools,
> but it itself is still relatively vulnerable to block withholding, and
> in any case has many other vulnerabilities and technical issues that 
> has
> prevented widespread adoption of P2Pool.
> 
> Fixing block withholding is relatively simple, but (so far) requires a
> SPV-visible hardfork. (Luke-Jr's two-stage target mechanism) We should
> do this hard-fork in conjunction with any blocksize increase, which 
> will
> have the desirable side effect of clearly show consent by the entire
> ecosystem, SPV clients included.
> 
> 
> Note that Ittay Eyal and Emin Gun Sirer have argued(1) that block
> witholding attacks are a good thing, as in their model they can be used
> by small pools against larger pools, disincentivising large pools.
> However this argument is academic and not applicable to the real world,
> as a much simpler defense against block withholding attacks is to use
> anti-privacy KYC and the legal system combined with the variety of
> withholding detection mechanisms only practical for large pools.
> Equally, large hashing power installations - a dangerous thing for
> decentralization - have no block withholding attack vulnerabilities.
> 
> 1) http://hackingdistributed.com/2014/12/03/the-miners-dilemma/
> 
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