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From: Billy Tetrud <billy.tetrud@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 24 May 2021 10:43:53 -1000
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To: Erik Aronesty <erik@q32.com>
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Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Opinion on proof of stake in future
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>  proof of burn clearly solves this, since nothing is held online

Well.. the coins to be burned need to be online when they're burned. But
yes, only a small fraction of the total coins need to be online.

> your burn investment is always "at stake", any redaction can result in a
loss-of-burn, because burns can be tied, precisely, to block-heights

So you're saying that if say someone tries to mine a block on a shorter
chain, that requires them to send a transaction burning their coins, and
that transaction could also be spent on the longest chain, which means
their coins are burned even if the chain they tried to mine on doesn't win?
I'm fuzzy on how proof of burn works.

> proof of burn can be more secure than proof-of-stake

FYI, proof of stake can be done without the "nothing at stake" problem. You
can simply punish people who mint on shorter chains (by rewarding people
who publish proofs of this happening on the main chain). In quorum-based
PoS, you can punish people in the quorum that propose or sign multiple
blocks for the same height. The "nothing at stake" problem is a solved
problem at this point for PoS.



On Mon, May 24, 2021 at 3:47 AM Erik Aronesty <erik@q32.com> wrote:

> > I don't see a way to get around the conflicting requirement that the
> keys for large amounts of coins should be kept offline but those are
> exactly the coins we need online to make the scheme secure.
>
> proof of burn clearly solves this, since nothing is held online
>
> >  how does proof of burn solve the "nothing at stake" problem in your
> view?
>
> definition of nothing at stake: in the event of a fork, whether the
> fork is accidental or a malicious, the optimal strategy for any miner
> is to mine on every chain, so that the miner gets their reward no
> matter which fork wins.   indeed in proof-of-stake, the proofs are
> published on the very chains mines, so the incentive is magnified.
>
> in proof-of-burn, your burn investment is always "at stake", any
> redaction can result in a loss-of-burn, because burns can be tied,
> precisely, to block-heights
>
> as a result, miners no longer have an incentive to mine all chains
>
> in this way proof of burn can be more secure than proof-of-stake, and
> even more secure than proof of work
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >
>
> On Sun, May 23, 2021 at 3:52 AM Lloyd Fournier via bitcoin-dev
> <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> >
> > Hi Billy,
> >
> > I was going to write a post which started by dismissing many of the wea=
k
> arguments that are made against PoS made in this thread and elsewhere.
> > Although I don't agree with all your points you have done a decent job
> here so I'll focus on the second part: why I think Proof-of-Stake is
> inappropriate for a Bitcoin-like system.
> >
> > Proof of stake is not fit for purpose for a global settlement layer in =
a
> pure digital asset (i.e. "digital gold") which is what Bitcoin is trying =
to
> be.
> > PoS necessarily gives responsibilities to the holders of coins that the=
y
> do not want and cannot handle.
> > In Bitcoin, large unsophisticated coin holders can put their coins in
> cold storage without a second thought given to the health of the underlyi=
ng
> ledger.
> > As much as hardcore Bitcoiners try to convince them to run their own
> node, most don't, and that's perfectly acceptable.
> > At no point do their personal decisions affect the underlying consensus
> -- it only affects their personal security assurance (not that of the
> system itself).
> > In PoS systems this clean separation of responsibilities does not exist=
.
> >
> > I think that the more rigorously studied PoS protocols will work fine
> within the security claims made in their papers.
> > People who believe that these protocols are destined for catastrophic
> consensus failure are certainly in for a surprise.
> > But the devil is in the detail.
> > Let's look at what the implications of using the leading proof of stake
> protocols would have on Bitcoin:
> >
> > ### Proof of SquareSpace (Cardano, Polkdadot)
> >
> > Cardano is a UTXO based PoS coin based on Ouroboros Praos[3] with an
> inbuilt on-chain delegation system[5].
> > In these protocols, coin holders who do not want to run their node with
> their hot keys in it delegate it to a "Stake Pool".
> > I call the resulting system Proof-of-SquareSpace since most will choose
> a pool by looking around for one with a nice website and offering the
> largest share of the block reward.
> > On the surface this might sound no different than someone with an minin=
g
> rig shopping around for a good mining pool but there are crucial
> differences:
> >
> > 1. The person making the decision is forced into it just because they
> own the currency -- someone with a mining rig has purchased it with the
> intent to make profit by participating in consensus.
> >
> > 2. When you join a mining pool your systems are very much still online.
> You are just partaking in a pool to reduce your profit variance. You stil=
l
> see every block that you help create and *you never help create a block
> without seeing it first*.
> >
> > 3. If by SquareSpace sybil attack you gain a dishonest majority and
> start censoring transactions how are the users meant to redelegate their
> stake to honest pools?
> > I guess they can just send a transaction delegating to another pool...o=
h
> wait I guess that might be censored too! This seems really really bad.
> > In Bitcoin, miners can just join a different pool at a whim. There is
> nothing the attacker can do to stop them. A temporary dishonest majority
> heals relatively well.
> >
> > There is another severe disadvantage to this on-chain delegation system=
:
> every UTXO must indicate which staking account this UTXO belongs to so th=
e
> appropriate share of block rewards can be transferred there.
> > Being able to associate every UTXO to an account ruins one of the main
> privacy advantages of the UTXO model.
> > It also grows the size of the blockchain significantly.
> >
> > ### "Pure" proof of stake (Algorand)
> >
> > Algorand's[4] approach is to only allow online stake to participate in
> the protocol.
> > Theoretically, This means that keys holding funds have to be online in
> order for them to author blocks when they are chosen.
> > Of course in reality no one wants to keep their coin holding keys onlin=
e
> so in Alogorand you can authorize a set of "participation keys"[1] that
> will be used to create blocks on your coin holding key's behalf.
> > Hopefully you've spotted the problem.
> > You can send your participation keys to any malicious party with a nice
> website (see random example [2]) offering you a good return.
> > Damn it's still Proof-of-SquareSpace!
> > The minor advantage is that at least the participation keys expire afte=
r
> a certain amount of time so eventually the SquareSpace attacker will lose
> their hold on consensus.
> > Importantly there is also less junk on the blockchain because the
> participation keys are delegated off-chain and so are not making as much =
of
> a mess.
> >
> > ### Conclusion
> >
> > I don't see a way to get around the conflicting requirement that the
> keys for large amounts of coins should be kept offline but those are
> exactly the coins we need online to make the scheme secure.
> > If we allow delegation then we open up a new social attack surface and
> it degenerates to Proof-of-SquareSpace.
> >
> > For a "digital gold" like system like Bitcoin we optimize for simplicit=
y
> and desperately want to avoid extraneous responsibilities for the holder =
of
> the coin.
> > After all, gold is an inert element on the periodic table that doesn't
> confer responsibilities on the holder to maintain the quality of all the
> other bars of gold out there.
> > Bitcoin feels like this too and in many ways is more inert and
> beautifully boring than gold.
> > For Bitcoin to succeed I think we need to keep it that way and
> Proof-of-Stake makes everything a bit too exciting.
> >
> > I suppose in the end the market will decide what is real digital gold
> and whether these bad technical trade offs are worth being able to say it
> uses less electricity. It goes without saying that making bad technical
> decisions to appease the current political climate is an anathema to
> Bitcoin.
> >
> > Would be interested to know if you or others think differently on these
> points.
> >
> > [1]:
> https://developer.algorand.org/docs/run-a-node/participate/generate_keys/
> > [2]: https://staking.staked.us/algorand-staking
> > [3]: https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/573.pdf
> > [4]:
> https://algorandcom.cdn.prismic.io/algorandcom%2Fece77f38-75b3-44de-bc7f-=
805f0e53a8d9_theoretical.pdf
> > [5]:
> https://hydra.iohk.io/build/790053/download/1/delegation_design_spec.pdf
> >
> > Cheers,
> >
> > LL
> >
> > On Fri, 21 May 2021 at 19:21, Billy Tetrud via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> >>
> >> I think there is a lot of misinformation and bias against Proof of
> Stake. Yes there have been lots of shady coins that use insecure PoS
> mechanisms. Yes there have been massive issues with distribution of PoS
> coins (of course there have also been massive issues with PoW coins as
> well). However, I want to remind everyone that there is a difference
> between "proved to be impossible" and "have not achieved recognized succe=
ss
> yet". Most of the arguments levied against PoS are out of date or rely on
> unproven assumptions or extrapolation from the analysis of a particular P=
oS
> system. I certainly don't think we should experiment with bitcoin by
> switching to PoS, but from my research, it seems very likely that there i=
s
> a proof of stake consensus protocol we could build that has substantially
> higher security (cost / capital required to execute an attack) while at t=
he
> same time costing far less resources (which do translate to fees on the
> network) *without* compromising any of the critical security properties
> bitcoin relies on. I think the critical piece of this is the disagreement=
s
> around hardcoded checkpoints, which is a critical piece solving attacks
> that could be levied on a PoS chain, and how that does (or doesn't) affec=
t
> the security model.
> >>
> >> @Eric Your proof of stake fallacy seems to be saying that PoS is worse
> when a 51% attack happens. While I agree, I think that line of thinking
> omits important facts:
> >> * The capital required to 51% attack a PoS chain can be made
> substantially greater than on a PoS chain.
> >> * The capital the attacker stands to lose can be substantially greater
> as well if the attack is successful.
> >> * The effectiveness of paying miners to raise the honest fraction of
> miners above 50% may be quite bad.
> >> * Allowing a 51% attack is already unacceptable. It should be
> considered whether what happens in the case of a 51% may not be
> significantly different. The currency would likely be critically damaged =
in
> a 51% attack regardless of consensus mechanism.
> >>
> >> > Proof-of-stake tends towards oligopolistic control
> >>
> >> People repeat this often, but the facts support this. There is no
> centralization pressure in any proof of stake mechanism that I'm aware of=
.
> IE if you have 10 times as much coin that you use to mint blocks, you
> should expect to earn 10x as much minting revenue - not more than 10x. By
> contrast, proof of work does in fact have clear centralization pressure -
> this is not disputed. Our goal in relation to that is to ensure that the
> centralization pressure remains insignifiant. Proof of work also clearly
> has a lot more barriers to entry than any proof of stake system does. Bot=
h
> of these mean the tendency towards oligopolistic control is worse for PoW=
.
> >>
> >> > Energy usage, in-and-of-itself, is nothing to be ashamed of!!
> >>
> >> I certainly agree. Bitcoin's energy usage at the moment is I think
> quite warranted. However, the question is: can we do substantially better=
.
> I think if we can, we probably should... eventually.
> >>
> >> > Proof of Stake is only resilient to =E2=85=93 of the network demonst=
rating a
> Byzantine Fault, whilst Proof of Work is resilient up to the =C2=BD thres=
hold
> >>
> >> I see no mention of this in the pos.pdf you linked to. I'm not aware o=
f
> any proof that all PoS systems have a failure threshold of 1/3. I know th=
at
> staking systems like Casper do in fact have that 1/3 requirement. However
> there are PoS designs that should exceed that up to nearly 50% as far as
> I'm aware. Proof of work is not in fact resilient up to the 1/2 threshold
> in the way you would think. IE, if 100% of miners are currently honest an=
d
> have a collective 100 exahashes/s hashpower, an attacker does not need to
> obtain 100 exahashes/s, but actually only needs to accumulate 50
> exahashes/s. This is because as the attacker accumulates hashpower, it
> drives honest miners out of the market as the difficulty increases to
> beyond what is economically sustainable. Also, its been shown that the be=
st
> proof of work can do is require an attacker to obtain 33% of the hashpowe=
r
> because of the selfish mining attack discussed in depth in this paper:
> https://arxiv.org/abs/1311.0243. Together, both of these things reduce
> PoW's security by a factor of about 83% (1 - 50%*33%).
> >>
> >>  > Proof of Stake requires other trade-offs which are incompatible wit=
h
> Bitcoin's objective (to be a trustless digital cash) =E2=80=94 specifical=
ly the
> famous "security vs. liveness" guarantee
> >>
> >> Do you have a good source that talks about why you think proof of stak=
e
> cannot be used for a trustless digital cash?
> >>
> >> > You cannot gain tokens without someone choosing to give up those
> coins - a form of permission.
> >>
> >> This is not a practical constraint. Just like in mining, some nodes ma=
y
> reject you, but there will likely be more that will accept you, some
> sellers may reject you, but most would accept your money as payment for
> bitcoins. I don't think requiring the "permission" of one of millions of
> people in the market can be reasonably considered a "permissioned currenc=
y".
> >>
> >> > 2. Proof of stake must have a trusted means of timestamping to
> regulate overproduction of blocks
> >>
> >> Both PoW and PoS could mine/mint blocks twice as fast if everyone
> agreed to double their clock speeds. Both systems rely on an honest
> majority sticking to standard time.
> >>
> >>
> >> On Wed, May 19, 2021 at 5:32 AM Michael Dubrovsky via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> >>>
> >>> Ah sorry, I didn't realize this was, in fact, a different thread! :)
> >>>
> >>> On Wed, May 19, 2021 at 10:07 AM Michael Dubrovsky <mike@powx.org>
> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>> Folks, I suggest we keep the discussion to PoW, oPoW, and the BIP
> itself. PoS, VDFs, and so on are interesting but I guess there are other
> threads going on these topics already where they would be relevant.
> >>>>
> >>>> Also, it's important to distinguish between oPoW and these other
> "alternatives" to Hashcash. oPoW is a true Proof of Work that doesn't alt=
er
> the core game theory or security assumptions of Hashcash and actually
> contains SHA (can be SHA3, SHA256, etc hash is interchangeable).
> >>>>
> >>>> Cheers,
> >>>> Mike
> >>>>
> >>>> On Tue, May 18, 2021 at 4:55 PM Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> >>>>>
> >>>>> 1. i never suggested vdf's to replace pow.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> 2. my suggestion was specifically *in the context of* a working
> >>>>> proof-of-burn protocol
> >>>>>
> >>>>> - vdfs used only for timing (not block height)
> >>>>> - blind-burned coins of a specific age used to replace proof of wor=
k
> >>>>> - the required "work" per block would simply be a competition to
> >>>>> acquire rewards, and so miners would have to burn coins, well in
> >>>>> advance, and hope that their burned coins got rewarded in some far
> >>>>> future
> >>>>> - the point of burned coins is to mimic, in every meaningful way, t=
he
> >>>>> value gained from proof of work... without some of the security
> >>>>> drawbacks
> >>>>> - the miner risks losing all of his burned coins (like all miners
> risk
> >>>>> losing their work in each block)
> >>>>> - new burns can't be used
> >>>>> - old burns age out (like ASICs do)
> >>>>> - other requirements on burns might be needed to properly mirror th=
e
> >>>>> properties of PoW and the incentives Bitcoin uses to mine honestly.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> 3. i do believe it is *possible* that a "burned coin + vdf system"
> >>>>> might be more secure in the long run, and that if the entire space
> >>>>> agreed that such an endeavor was worthwhile, a test net could be sp=
un
> >>>>> up, and a hard-fork could be initiated.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> 4. i would never suggest such a thing unless i believed it was
> >>>>> possible that consensus was possible.  so no, this is not an "alt
> >>>>> coin"
> >>>>>
> >>>>> On Tue, May 18, 2021 at 10:02 AM Zac Greenwood <zachgrw@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> > Hi ZmnSCPxj,
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> > Please note that I am not suggesting VDFs as a means to save
> energy, but solely as a means to make the time between blocks more consta=
nt.
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> > Zac
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> > On Tue, 18 May 2021 at 12:42, ZmnSCPxj <ZmnSCPxj@protonmail.com>
> wrote:
> >>>>> >>
> >>>>> >> Good morning Zac,
> >>>>> >>
> >>>>> >> > VDFs might enable more constant block times, for instance by
> having a two-step PoW:
> >>>>> >> >
> >>>>> >> > 1. Use a VDF that takes say 9 minutes to resolve (VDF being
> subject to difficulty adjustments similar to the as-is). As per the
> property of VDFs, miners are able show proof of work.
> >>>>> >> >
> >>>>> >> > 2. Use current PoW mechanism with lower difficulty so finding =
a
> block takes 1 minute on average, again subject to as-is difficulty
> adjustments.
> >>>>> >> >
> >>>>> >> > As a result, variation in block times will be greatly reduced.
> >>>>> >>
> >>>>> >> As I understand it, another weakness of VDFs is that they are no=
t
> inherently progress-free (their sequential nature prevents that; they are
> inherently progress-requiring).
> >>>>> >>
> >>>>> >> Thus, a miner which focuses on improving the amount of energy
> that it can pump into the VDF circuitry (by overclocking and freezing the
> circuitry), could potentially get into a winner-takes-all situation,
> possibly leading to even *worse* competition and even *more* energy
> consumption.
> >>>>> >> After all, if you can start mining 0.1s faster than the
> competition, that is a 0.1s advantage where *only you* can mine *in the
> entire world*.
> >>>>> >>
> >>>>> >> Regards,
> >>>>> >> ZmnSCPxj
> >>>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> >>>>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> >>>>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> --
> >>>> Michael Dubrovsky
> >>>> Founder; PoWx
> >>>> www.PoWx.org
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> --
> >>> Michael Dubrovsky
> >>> Founder; PoWx
> >>> www.PoWx.org
> >>> _______________________________________________
> >>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> >>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> >>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> >> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> >> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > bitcoin-dev mailing list
> > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">&gt;=C2=A0

proof of burn clearly solves this, since nothing is held online<div><br></d=
iv><div>Well.. the coins to be burned need to be online when they&#39;re bu=
rned. But yes, only a small fraction of the total coins need to be online.=
=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>&gt; your burn investment is always &quot;a=
t stake&quot;, any redaction can result in a loss-of-burn, because burns ca=
n be tied, precisely, to block-heights</div><div><br></div><div>So you&#39;=
re saying that if say someone tries to mine a block on a shorter chain, tha=
t requires them to send a transaction burning their coins, and that transac=
tion could also be spent on the longest chain, which means their coins are =
burned even if the chain they tried to mine on doesn&#39;t win? I&#39;m fuz=
zy on how proof of burn works.</div><div><br></div><div>&gt; proof of burn =
can be more secure than proof-of-stake</div><div><br></div><div>FYI, proof =
of stake can be done without the &quot;nothing at stake&quot; problem. You =
can simply punish people who mint on shorter chains (by rewarding people wh=
o publish proofs of this happening on the main chain). In quorum-based PoS,=
 you can punish people in the quorum that propose or sign multiple blocks f=
or the same height. The &quot;nothing at stake&quot; problem is a solved pr=
oblem at this point for PoS.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div></div><br><=
div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, May=
 24, 2021 at 3:47 AM Erik Aronesty &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:erik@q32.com">erik=
@q32.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D=
"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-le=
ft:1ex">&gt; I don&#39;t see a way to get around the conflicting requiremen=
t that the keys for large amounts of coins should be kept offline but those=
 are exactly the coins we need online to make the scheme secure.<br>
<br>
proof of burn clearly solves this, since nothing is held online<br>
<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 how does proof of burn solve the &quot;nothing at stake&quot; pr=
oblem in your view?<br>
<br>
definition of nothing at stake: in the event of a fork, whether the<br>
fork is accidental or a malicious, the optimal strategy for any miner<br>
is to mine on every chain, so that the miner gets their reward no<br>
matter which fork wins.=C2=A0 =C2=A0indeed in proof-of-stake, the proofs ar=
e<br>
published on the very chains mines, so the incentive is magnified.<br>
<br>
in proof-of-burn, your burn investment is always &quot;at stake&quot;, any<=
br>
redaction can result in a loss-of-burn, because burns can be tied,<br>
precisely, to block-heights<br>
<br>
as a result, miners no longer have an incentive to mine all chains<br>
<br>
in this way proof of burn can be more secure than proof-of-stake, and<br>
even more secure than proof of work<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
&gt;<br>
<br>
On Sun, May 23, 2021 at 3:52 AM Lloyd Fournier via bitcoin-dev<br>
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org" target=3D"_bla=
nk">bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Hi Billy,<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I was going to write a post which started by dismissing many of the we=
ak arguments that are made against PoS made in this thread and elsewhere.<b=
r>
&gt; Although I don&#39;t agree with all your points you have done a decent=
 job here so I&#39;ll focus on the second part: why I think Proof-of-Stake =
is inappropriate for a Bitcoin-like system.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Proof of stake is not fit for purpose for a global settlement layer in=
 a pure digital asset (i.e. &quot;digital gold&quot;) which is what Bitcoin=
 is trying to be.<br>
&gt; PoS necessarily gives responsibilities to the holders of coins that th=
ey do not want and cannot handle.<br>
&gt; In Bitcoin, large unsophisticated coin holders can put their coins in =
cold storage without a second thought given to the health of the underlying=
 ledger.<br>
&gt; As much as hardcore Bitcoiners try to convince them to run their own n=
ode, most don&#39;t, and that&#39;s perfectly acceptable.<br>
&gt; At no point do their personal decisions affect the underlying consensu=
s -- it only affects their personal security assurance (not that of the sys=
tem itself).<br>
&gt; In PoS systems this clean separation of responsibilities does not exis=
t.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I think that the more rigorously studied PoS protocols will work fine =
within the security claims made in their papers.<br>
&gt; People who believe that these protocols are destined for catastrophic =
consensus failure are certainly in for a surprise.<br>
&gt; But the devil is in the detail.<br>
&gt; Let&#39;s look at what the implications of using the leading proof of =
stake protocols would have on Bitcoin:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; ### Proof of SquareSpace (Cardano, Polkdadot)<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Cardano is a UTXO based PoS coin based on Ouroboros Praos[3] with an i=
nbuilt on-chain delegation system[5].<br>
&gt; In these protocols, coin holders who do not want to run their node wit=
h their hot keys in it delegate it to a &quot;Stake Pool&quot;.<br>
&gt; I call the resulting system Proof-of-SquareSpace since most will choos=
e a pool by looking around for one with a nice website and offering the lar=
gest share of the block reward.<br>
&gt; On the surface this might sound no different than someone with an mini=
ng rig shopping around for a good mining pool but there are crucial differe=
nces:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; 1. The person making the decision is forced into it just because they =
own the currency -- someone with a mining rig has purchased it with the int=
ent to make profit by participating in consensus.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; 2. When you join a mining pool your systems are very much still online=
. You are just partaking in a pool to reduce your profit variance. You stil=
l see every block that you help create and *you never help create a block w=
ithout seeing it first*.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; 3. If by SquareSpace sybil attack you gain a dishonest majority and st=
art censoring transactions how are the users meant to redelegate their stak=
e to honest pools?<br>
&gt; I guess they can just send a transaction delegating to another pool...=
oh wait I guess that might be censored too! This seems really really bad.<b=
r>
&gt; In Bitcoin, miners can just join a different pool at a whim. There is =
nothing the attacker can do to stop them. A temporary dishonest majority he=
als relatively well.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; There is another severe disadvantage to this on-chain delegation syste=
m: every UTXO must indicate which staking account this UTXO belongs to so t=
he appropriate share of block rewards can be transferred there.<br>
&gt; Being able to associate every UTXO to an account ruins one of the main=
 privacy advantages of the UTXO model.<br>
&gt; It also grows the size of the blockchain significantly.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; ### &quot;Pure&quot; proof of stake (Algorand)<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Algorand&#39;s[4] approach is to only allow online stake to participat=
e in the protocol.<br>
&gt; Theoretically, This means that keys holding funds have to be online in=
 order for them to author blocks when they are chosen.<br>
&gt; Of course in reality no one wants to keep their coin holding keys onli=
ne so in Alogorand you can authorize a set of &quot;participation keys&quot=
;[1] that will be used to create blocks on your coin holding key&#39;s beha=
lf.<br>
&gt; Hopefully you&#39;ve spotted the problem.<br>
&gt; You can send your participation keys to any malicious party with a nic=
e website (see random example [2]) offering you a good return.<br>
&gt; Damn it&#39;s still Proof-of-SquareSpace!<br>
&gt; The minor advantage is that at least the participation keys expire aft=
er a certain amount of time so eventually the SquareSpace attacker will los=
e their hold on consensus.<br>
&gt; Importantly there is also less junk on the blockchain because the part=
icipation keys are delegated off-chain and so are not making as much of a m=
ess.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; ### Conclusion<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I don&#39;t see a way to get around the conflicting requirement that t=
he keys for large amounts of coins should be kept offline but those are exa=
ctly the coins we need online to make the scheme secure.<br>
&gt; If we allow delegation then we open up a new social attack surface and=
 it degenerates to Proof-of-SquareSpace.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; For a &quot;digital gold&quot; like system like Bitcoin we optimize fo=
r simplicity and desperately want to avoid extraneous responsibilities for =
the holder of the coin.<br>
&gt; After all, gold is an inert element on the periodic table that doesn&#=
39;t confer responsibilities on the holder to maintain the quality of all t=
he other bars of gold out there.<br>
&gt; Bitcoin feels like this too and in many ways is more inert and beautif=
ully boring than gold.<br>
&gt; For Bitcoin to succeed I think we need to keep it that way and Proof-o=
f-Stake makes everything a bit too exciting.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I suppose in the end the market will decide what is real digital gold =
and whether these bad technical trade offs are worth being able to say it u=
ses less electricity. It goes without saying that making bad technical deci=
sions to appease the current political climate is an anathema to Bitcoin.<b=
r>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Would be interested to know if you or others think differently on thes=
e points.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; [1]: <a href=3D"https://developer.algorand.org/docs/run-a-node/partici=
pate/generate_keys/" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://developer=
.algorand.org/docs/run-a-node/participate/generate_keys/</a><br>
&gt; [2]: <a href=3D"https://staking.staked.us/algorand-staking" rel=3D"nor=
eferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://staking.staked.us/algorand-staking</a><b=
r>
&gt; [3]: <a href=3D"https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/573.pdf" rel=3D"noreferre=
r" target=3D"_blank">https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/573.pdf</a><br>
&gt; [4]: <a href=3D"https://algorandcom.cdn.prismic.io/algorandcom%2Fece77=
f38-75b3-44de-bc7f-805f0e53a8d9_theoretical.pdf" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=
=3D"_blank">https://algorandcom.cdn.prismic.io/algorandcom%2Fece77f38-75b3-=
44de-bc7f-805f0e53a8d9_theoretical.pdf</a><br>
&gt; [5]: <a href=3D"https://hydra.iohk.io/build/790053/download/1/delegati=
on_design_spec.pdf" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://hydra.iohk=
.io/build/790053/download/1/delegation_design_spec.pdf</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Cheers,<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; LL<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On Fri, 21 May 2021 at 19:21, Billy Tetrud via bitcoin-dev &lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org" target=3D"_blank">bitcoin=
-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; I think there is a lot of misinformation and bias against Proof of=
 Stake. Yes there have been lots of shady coins that use insecure PoS mecha=
nisms. Yes there have been massive issues with distribution of PoS coins (o=
f course there have also been massive issues with PoW coins as well). Howev=
er, I want to remind everyone that there is a difference between &quot;prov=
ed to be impossible&quot; and &quot;have not achieved recognized success ye=
t&quot;. Most of the arguments levied against PoS are out of date or rely o=
n unproven assumptions or extrapolation from the analysis of a particular P=
oS system. I certainly don&#39;t think we should experiment with bitcoin by=
 switching to PoS, but from my research, it seems very likely that there is=
 a proof of stake consensus protocol we could build that has substantially =
higher security (cost / capital required to execute an attack) while at the=
 same time costing far less resources (which do translate to fees on the ne=
twork) *without* compromising any of the critical security properties bitco=
in relies on. I think the critical piece of this is the disagreements aroun=
d hardcoded checkpoints, which is a critical piece solving attacks that cou=
ld be levied on a PoS chain, and how that does (or doesn&#39;t) affect the =
security model.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; @Eric Your proof of stake fallacy seems to be saying that PoS is w=
orse when a 51% attack happens. While I agree, I think that line of thinkin=
g omits important facts:<br>
&gt;&gt; * The capital required to 51% attack a PoS chain can be made subst=
antially greater than on a PoS chain.<br>
&gt;&gt; * The capital the attacker stands to lose can be substantially gre=
ater as well if the attack is successful.<br>
&gt;&gt; * The effectiveness of paying miners to raise the honest fraction =
of miners above 50% may be quite bad.<br>
&gt;&gt; * Allowing a 51% attack is already unacceptable. It should be cons=
idered whether what happens in the case of a 51% may not be significantly d=
ifferent. The currency would likely be critically damaged in a 51% attack r=
egardless of consensus mechanism.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; Proof-of-stake tends towards oligopolistic control<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; People repeat this often, but the facts support this. There is no =
centralization pressure in any proof of stake mechanism that I&#39;m aware =
of. IE if you have 10 times as much coin that you use to mint blocks, you s=
hould expect to earn 10x as much minting revenue - not more than 10x. By co=
ntrast, proof of work does in fact have clear centralization pressure - thi=
s is not disputed. Our goal in relation to that is to ensure that the centr=
alization pressure remains insignifiant. Proof of work also clearly has a l=
ot more barriers to entry than any proof of stake system does. Both of thes=
e mean the tendency towards oligopolistic control is worse for PoW.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; Energy usage, in-and-of-itself, is nothing to be ashamed of!!=
<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; I certainly agree. Bitcoin&#39;s energy usage at the moment is I t=
hink quite warranted. However, the question is: can we do substantially bet=
ter. I think if we can, we probably should... eventually.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; Proof of Stake is only resilient to =E2=85=93 of the network =
demonstrating a Byzantine Fault, whilst Proof of Work is resilient up to th=
e =C2=BD threshold<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; I see no mention of this in the pos.pdf you linked to. I&#39;m not=
 aware of any proof that all PoS systems have a failure threshold of 1/3. I=
 know that staking systems like Casper do in fact have that 1/3 requirement=
. However there are PoS designs that should exceed that up to nearly 50% as=
 far as I&#39;m aware. Proof of work is not in fact resilient up to the 1/2=
 threshold in the way you would think. IE, if 100% of miners are currently =
honest and have a collective 100 exahashes/s hashpower, an attacker does no=
t need to obtain 100 exahashes/s, but actually only needs to accumulate 50 =
exahashes/s. This is because as the attacker accumulates hashpower, it driv=
es honest miners out of the market as the difficulty increases to beyond wh=
at is economically sustainable. Also, its been shown that the best proof of=
 work can do is require an attacker to obtain 33% of the hashpower because =
of the selfish mining attack discussed in depth in this paper: <a href=3D"h=
ttps://arxiv.org/abs/1311.0243" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https:=
//arxiv.org/abs/1311.0243</a>. Together, both of these things reduce PoW&#3=
9;s security by a factor of about 83% (1 - 50%*33%).<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 &gt; Proof of Stake requires other trade-offs which are inco=
mpatible with Bitcoin&#39;s objective (to be a trustless digital cash) =E2=
=80=94 specifically the famous &quot;security vs. liveness&quot; guarantee<=
br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Do you have a good source that talks about why you think proof of =
stake cannot be used for a trustless digital cash?<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; You cannot gain tokens without someone choosing to give up th=
ose coins - a form of permission.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; This is not a practical constraint. Just like in mining, some node=
s may reject you, but there will likely be more that will accept you, some =
sellers may reject you, but most would accept your money as payment for bit=
coins. I don&#39;t think requiring the &quot;permission&quot; of one of mil=
lions of people in the market can be reasonably considered a &quot;permissi=
oned currency&quot;.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; 2. Proof of stake must have a trusted means of timestamping t=
o regulate overproduction of blocks<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Both PoW and PoS could mine/mint blocks twice as fast if everyone =
agreed to double their clock speeds. Both systems rely on an honest majorit=
y sticking to standard time.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; On Wed, May 19, 2021 at 5:32 AM Michael Dubrovsky via bitcoin-dev =
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org" target=3D"_bla=
nk">bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Ah sorry, I didn&#39;t realize this was, in fact, a different =
thread! :)<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; On Wed, May 19, 2021 at 10:07 AM Michael Dubrovsky &lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:mike@powx.org" target=3D"_blank">mike@powx.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br=
>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Folks, I suggest we keep the discussion to PoW, oPoW, and =
the BIP itself. PoS, VDFs, and so on are interesting but I guess there are =
other threads going on these topics already where they would be relevant.<b=
r>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Also, it&#39;s important to distinguish between oPoW and t=
hese other &quot;alternatives&quot; to Hashcash. oPoW is a true Proof of Wo=
rk that doesn&#39;t alter the core game theory or security assumptions of H=
ashcash and actually contains SHA (can be SHA3, SHA256, etc hash is interch=
angeable).<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Cheers,<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Mike<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; On Tue, May 18, 2021 at 4:55 PM Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-=
dev &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org" target=3D"=
_blank">bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; 1. i never suggested vdf&#39;s to replace pow.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; 2. my suggestion was specifically *in the context of* =
a working<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; proof-of-burn protocol<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; - vdfs used only for timing (not block height)<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; - blind-burned coins of a specific age used to replace=
 proof of work<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; - the required &quot;work&quot; per block would simply=
 be a competition to<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; acquire rewards, and so miners would have to burn coin=
s, well in<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; advance, and hope that their burned coins got rewarded=
 in some far<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; future<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; - the point of burned coins is to mimic, in every mean=
ingful way, the<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; value gained from proof of work... without some of the=
 security<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; drawbacks<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; - the miner risks losing all of his burned coins (like=
 all miners risk<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; losing their work in each block)<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; - new burns can&#39;t be used<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; - old burns age out (like ASICs do)<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; - other requirements on burns might be needed to prope=
rly mirror the<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; properties of PoW and the incentives Bitcoin uses to m=
ine honestly.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; 3. i do believe it is *possible* that a &quot;burned c=
oin + vdf system&quot;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; might be more secure in the long run, and that if the =
entire space<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; agreed that such an endeavor was worthwhile, a test ne=
t could be spun<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; up, and a hard-fork could be initiated.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; 4. i would never suggest such a thing unless i believe=
d it was<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; possible that consensus was possible.=C2=A0 so no, thi=
s is not an &quot;alt<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; coin&quot;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; On Tue, May 18, 2021 at 10:02 AM Zac Greenwood &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:zachgrw@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">zachgrw@gmail.com</a>&g=
t; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; Hi ZmnSCPxj,<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; Please note that I am not suggesting VDFs as a me=
ans to save energy, but solely as a means to make the time between blocks m=
ore constant.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; Zac<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; On Tue, 18 May 2021 at 12:42, ZmnSCPxj &lt;<a hre=
f=3D"mailto:ZmnSCPxj@protonmail.com" target=3D"_blank">ZmnSCPxj@protonmail.=
com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; Good morning Zac,<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt; VDFs might enable more constant block ti=
mes, for instance by having a two-step PoW:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt; 1. Use a VDF that takes say 9 minutes to=
 resolve (VDF being subject to difficulty adjustments similar to the as-is)=
. As per the property of VDFs, miners are able show proof of work.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt; 2. Use current PoW mechanism with lower =
difficulty so finding a block takes 1 minute on average, again subject to a=
s-is difficulty adjustments.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt; As a result, variation in block times wi=
ll be greatly reduced.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; As I understand it, another weakness of VDFs =
is that they are not inherently progress-free (their sequential nature prev=
ents that; they are inherently progress-requiring).<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; Thus, a miner which focuses on improving the =
amount of energy that it can pump into the VDF circuitry (by overclocking a=
nd freezing the circuitry), could potentially get into a winner-takes-all s=
ituation, possibly leading to even *worse* competition and even *more* ener=
gy consumption.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; After all, if you can start mining 0.1s faste=
r than the competition, that is a 0.1s advantage where *only you* can mine =
*in the entire world*.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; Regards,<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; ZmnSCPxj<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; bitcoin-dev mailing list<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.or=
g" target=3D"_blank">bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/l=
istinfo/bitcoin-dev" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://lists.lin=
uxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; --<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Michael Dubrovsky<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Founder; PoWx<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"http://www.PoWx.org" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=
=3D"_blank">www.PoWx.org</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; --<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Michael Dubrovsky<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Founder; PoWx<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"http://www.PoWx.org" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_=
blank">www.PoWx.org</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; bitcoin-dev mailing list<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org" targe=
t=3D"_blank">bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/=
bitcoin-dev" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://lists.linuxfounda=
tion.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev</a><br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt;&gt; bitcoin-dev mailing list<br>
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oin-dev" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://lists.linuxfoundation=
.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; bitcoin-dev mailing list<br>
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</blockquote></div>

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