1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425
426
427
428
429
430
431
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444
445
446
447
448
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500
501
502
503
504
505
506
507
508
509
510
511
512
513
514
515
516
517
518
519
520
521
522
523
524
525
526
527
528
529
530
531
532
533
534
535
536
537
538
539
540
541
542
543
544
545
546
547
548
549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556
557
558
559
560
561
562
563
564
565
566
567
568
569
570
571
572
573
574
575
576
577
578
579
580
581
582
583
584
585
586
587
588
589
590
591
592
593
594
595
596
597
598
599
600
601
602
603
604
605
606
607
608
609
610
611
612
613
614
615
616
617
618
619
620
621
622
623
624
625
626
627
628
629
630
631
632
633
634
635
636
637
638
639
640
641
642
643
644
645
646
647
648
649
650
651
652
653
654
655
656
657
658
659
660
661
662
663
664
665
666
667
668
669
670
671
672
673
674
675
676
677
678
679
680
681
682
683
684
685
686
687
688
689
690
691
692
693
694
695
696
697
698
699
700
701
702
703
704
705
706
707
708
709
710
711
712
713
714
715
716
717
718
719
720
721
722
723
724
725
726
727
728
729
730
731
732
733
734
735
736
737
738
739
740
741
742
743
744
745
746
747
748
749
750
751
752
753
754
755
756
757
758
759
760
761
762
763
764
765
766
767
768
769
770
771
772
773
774
775
776
777
778
779
780
781
782
783
784
785
786
787
788
789
790
791
792
793
794
795
796
797
798
799
800
801
802
803
804
805
806
807
808
809
810
811
812
813
814
815
816
817
818
819
820
821
822
823
824
825
826
827
828
829
830
831
832
833
834
835
836
837
838
839
840
841
842
843
844
845
846
847
848
849
850
851
852
853
854
855
856
857
858
859
860
861
862
863
864
865
866
867
868
869
870
871
872
873
874
875
876
877
|
Received: from sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.192]
helo=mx.sourceforge.net)
by sfs-ml-3.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76)
(envelope-from <etotheipi@gmail.com>) id 1V7t3W-0001ls-5r
for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net;
Fri, 09 Aug 2013 20:13:02 +0000
Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com
designates 209.85.216.172 as permitted sender)
client-ip=209.85.216.172; envelope-from=etotheipi@gmail.com;
helo=mail-qc0-f172.google.com;
Received: from mail-qc0-f172.google.com ([209.85.216.172])
by sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128)
(Exim 4.76) id 1V7t3T-0002XQ-Tt
for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net;
Fri, 09 Aug 2013 20:13:02 +0000
Received: by mail-qc0-f172.google.com with SMTP id a1so1953733qcx.17
for <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>;
Fri, 09 Aug 2013 13:12:54 -0700 (PDT)
X-Received: by 10.224.127.196 with SMTP id h4mr12268129qas.59.1376079174328;
Fri, 09 Aug 2013 13:12:54 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from [192.168.1.85] (c-76-111-96-126.hsd1.md.comcast.net.
[76.111.96.126])
by mx.google.com with ESMTPSA id lk8sm21837297qeb.3.2013.08.09.13.12.53
for <multiple recipients>
(version=TLSv1 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA bits=128/128);
Fri, 09 Aug 2013 13:12:53 -0700 (PDT)
Message-ID: <52054D44.5050006@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 09 Aug 2013 16:12:52 -0400
From: Alan Reiner <etotheipi@gmail.com>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64;
rv:17.0) Gecko/20130620 Thunderbird/17.0.7
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Mike Hearn <mike@plan99.net>
References: <5AC3FA1D9B1F4FA0A2FE9A67333642B5@LAPTOPAIR>
<51C21035.9080407@gmail.com>
<53E406CF0D93498DAECAAE061555B7C9@LAPTOPAIR>
<51C234FA.5030909@gmail.com>
<9600E3D1DDC24D1391C1E4433F71684D@LAPTOPAIR>
<CANEZrP3ZcQEPOPrO_O2-tdLZUSezj1nbhtVFt1e77KEwzhfZ-A@mail.gmail.com>
<51CB08EE.1050403@gmail.com> <52052D8F.90706@gmail.com>
<CANEZrP1r3XCLpfjZdO5AymdrYi2CndxHH9HcB+NDas1TpOfUhQ@mail.gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <CANEZrP1r3XCLpfjZdO5AymdrYi2CndxHH9HcB+NDas1TpOfUhQ@mail.gmail.com>
X-Enigmail-Version: 1.5.2
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="------------050803000509070405080005"
X-Spam-Score: -0.6 (/)
X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net.
See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details.
-1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for
sender-domain
0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider
(etotheipi[at]gmail.com)
-0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record
1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message
-0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from
author's domain
0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature,
not necessarily valid
-0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature
X-Headers-End: 1V7t3T-0002XQ-Tt
X-Mailman-Approved-At: Fri, 09 Aug 2013 21:51:21 +0000
Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Optional "wallet-linkable" address format
(Re-request)
X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: <bitcoin-development.lists.sourceforge.net>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development>,
<mailto:bitcoin-development-request@lists.sourceforge.net?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://sourceforge.net/mailarchive/forum.php?forum_name=bitcoin-development>
List-Post: <mailto:bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
List-Help: <mailto:bitcoin-development-request@lists.sourceforge.net?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development>,
<mailto:bitcoin-development-request@lists.sourceforge.net?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 09 Aug 2013 20:13:02 -0000
This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
--------------050803000509070405080005
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
That's fine. I just want to make sure it's considered for inclusion at
some point, because I really hope to leverage the "identity" mechanism I
just described, and it's much easier if it's part of a standard instead
of convincing others to go around the standard with us.
I have not spent much time looking at the payment protocol itself. I
didn't feel like I'd have much to contribute (besides requesting a
feature I know isn't there). I was planning to wait until it was
complete before fully grokking and implementing it in Armory.
On 08/09/2013 03:58 PM, Mike Hearn wrote:
> Payment protocol is locked down for v1 already. But did you read it?
> It doesn't use addresses anywhere. Payments are specified in terms of
> a list of outputs which can contain any script. Of course it could be
> a pay-to-address script, but pay-to-address uses more bytes in the
> chain and there isn't any typeability benefit.
>
> The multiplication trick for deterministic keys is a nice one and
> worth doing, but it has to be a v2 feature by this point. It's more
> important to get v1 widely implemented and deployed first.
>
>
> On Fri, Aug 9, 2013 at 7:57 PM, Alan Reiner <etotheipi@gmail.com
> <mailto:etotheipi@gmail.com>> wrote:
>
> Guys,
>
> I'd like to reiterate my previous request to support this
> alternate address serialization in the payment protocol. We got
> caught up in the specifics of one use case, but didn't acknowledge
> that it's still a valid address representation that will provide
> value to those who wish to use it and can be safely ignored by others.
>
> Current address format: binary_to_base58( idbyte +
> hash160(pubkey) + checksum)
> Alternate format: binary_to_base58( idbyte + parentpubkey
> + multiplier + checksum)
>
> The receiving party will multiply the pubkey by the multiplier,
> and then hash it to get the 20-byte address to send to. The idea
> is that you use your BIP 32 parent public key, and then you
> generate whatever child you want, and only send them the
> multiplier used (not the chaincode). This preserves privacy, but
> if the recipient has your parent public key already, they can
> identify that address being linked to you, but cannot determine
> any other addresses in your wallet.
>
> This form has no drawbacks to the existing address format except
> for being longer and requiring an extra EC multiplication by the
> person sending to that address. But the advantage is that it
> optionally allows the sender to provide more information than
> currently contained in the 25-byte hash160 form. The discussion
> about this got side-tracked with the use case I presented, but I
> believe there are plenty of other uses for this.
>
> The particular use case I had in mind was that certain services
> could be setup (pre-arranged), say between wallet software and a
> business/exchange. The exchange would like to be able to reliably
> send addresses to the user for deposit, without risk of MITM, or
> even if their own public server is compromised. The author of
> wallet software pre-verifies the public key portion of the
> service, and either hardcodes it into the software, or hardcodes
> their own public key into the software and makes the service's
> signed public key available through query server (allowing the
> software author to offline-sign replacement keys, or add keys for
> new service providers, as needed).
>
> When the user's software receives a payment address, the software
> can verify it belongs to that service. You can't use dedicated
> chain technique, because it would either have to be exchanged with
> the user on first transaction which half defeats the purpose, or
> they give them the full public key and chaincode which allows the
> user to see /all /addresses ever used by the service. Neither one
> is a reasonable solution.
>
> This use case doesn't necessarily scale, but it doesn't have to.
> It simply allows service providers to skip the SSL and go right to
> public key exchange/verification for a few of the important
> services they provide access to, and will provide better security
> than relying on SSL/PKI. This would simply be one, coexisting
> option for providing payment details in the absence (or in
> addition to) SSL/PKI infrastructure.
>
> I'm sure there's other use cases, but it seems simple enough and
> non-disruptive enough that it could be supported easily for no
> other reason than to support that use case (which I intend to
> implement in Armory to help verify high-volume services).
>
> -Alan
>
>
>
>
>
> On 06/26/2013 11:29 AM, Alan Reiner wrote:
>> Although I'd still prefer my original request, I get much of what
>> I want from your guys' recommendation. It complicates the wallet
>> design, because it requires tracking and associating a matrix of
>> addresses for each wallet, instead of a single linear list. But
>> if this is what it's going to take then I will go along.
>>
>> Right now BIP 32 defines, m/i'/j/k, where j=0 is the "external"
>> chain used for distributing addresses, and j=1 is the "internal"
>> chain for sending change. The CONOPs (concept of operations) for
>> the extended wallet would be like Jeremy described:
>>
>> - Chains with j>=2 would be independent address chains carved out
>> for individuals relationships
>> - Add wallet code to individually associate each j-value with a
>> particular identity
>> - Update the wallet code to pool all the addresses in all
>> j-chains when calculating the balance of the wallet and/or
>> creating transactions
>> - When choosing to generically "Receive Bitcoins", will pick the
>> next address from the j=0 chain
>> - Will have to add extra function to "Receive Bitcoins" button to
>> allow creation of new contacts/identities.
>> - Change will always go to the next address in j=1, no matter
>> which chains are used to provide inputs.
>> - Add code to figure out lookaheads for each alternate chain.
>> Not just each chain, but looking ahead a couple chains, too.
>> Luckily, the lookahead doesn't have to be very big for chains j>=1
>> - Add an interface to display and choose the different chains in
>> your wallet, and export the pubkey&chaincode in some
>> soon-to-be-standardized format.
>> - Add code and interface to receive and track alternate j-chains
>> from other clients/users, and maintain those. Should we try
>> associating incoming and outgoing chains? What happens if they
>> do it wrong? Meh...
>>
>> Just as one final swipe at this idea, you can see that I gotta do
>> quite a bit of work to support the multi-chain idea, and adds a
>> little extra burden on the user to maintain the organization of
>> the wallet. This would all be totally unnecessary with a simple
>> alternate encoding. Granted, I think the multi-chain idea is
>> good, and one that I will probably implement anyway, but it seems
>> like overkill in terms of developer complexity, and interface
>> complexity to achieve something much simpler. Developers of much
>> simpler/lightweight clients would probably find this prohibitive.
>>
>> On another note: I thought we weren't encouraging automatic
>> payments without requesting from the other party...? It makes me
>> uneasy, but it sounds like group thought has converged on that
>> being acceptable. I bring it up, because there are situations
>> where it makes sense, but it sounds unsafe for general users.
>> Alice will give Bob his own chain for sending Alice money, then a
>> year later Bob will send money automatically to Alice not
>> realizing that the wallet was lost, retired or compromised. It's
>> not that Bob can't ask for a new address, it's that if the
>> interface says "Send Money to Alice", that looks legit enough
>> that Bob may not feel it necessary to check with Alice first.
>> That's more of an interface issue though. We can add a warning
>> to "check with the recipient that they still have access to
>> wallet 3cQ398x", etc. But I just know someone is going to lose
>> money anyway...
>>
>> -Alan
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On 06/20/2013 03:32 AM, Mike Hearn wrote:
>>> Agree with Jeremy and once the payment protocol work is further
>>> along I'd like to see us define an extension that lets you send
>>> payment requests containing public keys+chain codes, so further
>>> payments can be made push-style with no recipient interaction
>>> (e.g. for repeated billing). How apps choose to arrange their
>>> chains internally seems like an area for experimentation. I
>>> definitely want to implement HD wallets in bitcoinj to allow
>>> this and if that means not using the same tree structure as in
>>> the BIP then so be it.
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thu, Jun 20, 2013 at 5:54 AM, Jeremy Spilman
>>> <jeremy@taplink.co <mailto:jeremy@taplink.co>> wrote:
>>>
>>> > BIP 32 already specifies how to use the first three tree
>>> levels: M/i/j/k,
>>> > i~wallet, j~Internal/External, k~address. The first level
>>> is actually
>>> > type-1 derived, and thus we cannot create an arbitrary
>>> number of them
>>> > without pre-computing them from the offline wallet. So
>>> it's not "free" to
>>> > create new wallets unless we redefine how the levels work.
>>>
>>> Initially I was thinking that you would share the public key
>>> and chain code
>>> from [m/i'/0] so that you can receive payments at
>>> [m/i'/0/k], for a unique
>>> value of 'i' for each receive chain.
>>>
>>> For the case of generating new receive chains from a
>>> *watch-only* wallet, as
>>> you say, the options are to either keep a cache of
>>> PubKey/ChainCode for
>>> unused [m/i'] or simply increment 'j' past 1 for an existing
>>> [m/i'/j] -- the
>>> concept of 'internal/'external' and change addresses at
>>> Depth=2 don't make
>>> sense for handing out receive chains to lots of people
>>> anyway, and certainly
>>> BIP32 doesn't *require* 0 <= j <= 1. So I think
>>> incrementing 'j' is the way
>>> to go here...
>>>
>>> The "default" layout of BIP32 does NOT mean that
>>> implementations should not
>>> check for transactions with j > 1. That would be a useless
>>> constraint and
>>> obviously self-limiting. It might be helpful to add to the
>>> 'Compatibility'
>>> section some minimum expectations about how a wallet should
>>> be 'probed' when
>>> imported. If you don't feel completely free to monotonically
>>> increment 'j'
>>> to your hearts content to achieve major usability benefits,
>>> then I say BIP32
>>> could use some clarifying.
>>>
>>> BTW - the spec calls for addition not multiplication now, so
>>> we should call
>>> it the 'Addend' not the 'Multiplier' :-)
>>>
>>> > Do these extra wallet chains behave as different wallets,
>>> or sub-wallets?
>>>
>>> They could, but they certainly don't need to! A single-wallet
>>> implementation treats this merely as an address-generation
>>> algorithm, and
>>> does not expose any hierarchy to the user interface. The
>>> user just
>>> “magically” gets the ability to send multiple payments to
>>> their contacts
>>> without immediately sacrificing their privacy
>>> (http://www.wired.com/wiredenterprise/2013/06/bitcoin_retai/).
>>> Everything
>>> goes into the same ledger, balance, coin pool, etc. Most of
>>> the code base is
>>> unaware BIP32 is even in use.
>>>
>>> While it is *possible* to support separate ledgers,
>>> balances, etc. it is
>>> certainly not required, and you get all the benefits either way.
>>>
>>> I think, since your proposal generates and receives payments
>>> into
>>> BIP32-style addresses, we both need similar underlying
>>> wallet code. The only
>>> difference is that you are passing the Kpar for [m/i'/0/k]
>>> and the *result*
>>> of CKD'((Kpar, cpar), k), and instead I proposed passing
>>> Kpar and cpar, and
>>> leaving 'k' out of it, letting the receive choose 'k'.
>>>
>>> > For instance, maybe there's a benefit to using the same
>>> parent pubkey
>>> > across multiple services, as a form of identity. If I
>>> don't want that, I
>>> > use your method. If I do want that, I use my method.
>>>
>>> I think it's a interesting idea using static public keys as
>>> a means for
>>> persistent identity and hence security from MitM. If you
>>> want a shared
>>> public key across multiple services we could just combine
>>> both ideas and get
>>> all the benefits, by making the data structure {
>>> ParentPubKey, Addend,
>>> ChainCode }:
>>>
>>> ParentPubKey: Public key of m/i' -- 33 bytes
>>> Addend: I[L]*G from CDK'(m/i', j) -- 33 bytes
>>> ChainCode: I[R] from CDK'(m/i', j) -- 32 bytes
>>>
>>> All that remains secret is the ChainCode from [m/i'] -- and
>>> of course the
>>> private keys. The ParentPubKey is a common value across
>>> multiple services,
>>> corresponding to user's identity rooted in [m/i']. Each
>>> service gets their
>>> own 'j'. ParentPubKey + Addend gives you the PubKey of
>>> [m/i'/j]. With the
>>> ChainCode, the receiver then can generate [m/i'/j/k] for
>>> monotonically
>>> increasing 'k'. Again, from the user perspective all
>>> transactions under
>>> [m/i'] can be presented in a single ledger, or not.
>>>
>>> Anyway, fundamentally my feedback is if you are designing
>>> for persistent
>>> long-term relationships, you could build in a mechanism for
>>> generating
>>> address chains so you don't need any further communication
>>> after the initial
>>> exchange, and it need not complicate the wallet.
>>>
>>> Thanks,
>>> --Jeremy
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> This SF.net email is sponsored by Windows:
>>>
>>> Build for Windows Store.
>>>
>>> http://p.sf.net/sfu/windows-dev2dev
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> Bitcoin-development mailing list
>>> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
>>> <mailto:Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
>>> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> This SF.net email is sponsored by Windows:
>>>
>>> Build for Windows Store.
>>>
>>> http://p.sf.net/sfu/windows-dev2dev
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> Bitcoin-development mailing list
>>> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net <mailto:Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
>>> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>>
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Get 100% visibility into Java/.NET code with AppDynamics Lite!
> It's a free troubleshooting tool designed for production.
> Get down to code-level detail for bottlenecks, with <2% overhead.
> Download for free and get started troubleshooting in minutes.
> http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=48897031&iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk
> _______________________________________________
> Bitcoin-development mailing list
> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
> <mailto:Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>
>
--------------050803000509070405080005
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
<html>
<head>
<meta content="text/html; charset=UTF-8" http-equiv="Content-Type">
</head>
<body text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
That's fine. I just want to make sure it's considered for inclusion
at some point, because I really hope to leverage the "identity"
mechanism I just described, and it's much easier if it's part of a
standard instead of convincing others to go around the standard with
us.<br>
<br>
I have not spent much time looking at the payment protocol itself.
I didn't feel like I'd have much to contribute (besides requesting a
feature I know isn't there). I was planning to wait until it was
complete before fully grokking and implementing it in Armory.<br>
<br>
<br>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 08/09/2013 03:58 PM, Mike Hearn
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote
cite="mid:CANEZrP1r3XCLpfjZdO5AymdrYi2CndxHH9HcB+NDas1TpOfUhQ@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">Payment protocol is locked down for v1 already. But
did you read it? It doesn't use addresses anywhere. Payments are
specified in terms of a list of outputs which can contain any
script. Of course it could be a pay-to-address script, but
pay-to-address uses more bytes in the chain and there isn't any
typeability benefit.
<div>
<br>
</div>
<div>The multiplication trick for deterministic keys is a nice
one and worth doing, but it has to be a v2 feature by this
point. It's more important to get v1 widely implemented and
deployed first.</div>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Fri, Aug 9, 2013 at 7:57 PM, Alan
Reiner <span dir="ltr"><<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:etotheipi@gmail.com" target="_blank">etotheipi@gmail.com</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF"> Guys, <br>
<br>
I'd like to reiterate my previous request to support this
alternate address serialization in the payment protocol.
We got caught up in the specifics of one use case, but
didn't acknowledge that it's still a valid address
representation that will provide value to those who wish
to use it and can be safely ignored by others.<br>
<br>
<tt>Current address format: binary_to_base58( idbyte +
hash160(pubkey) + checksum)</tt><tt><br>
</tt><tt>Alternate format: binary_to_base58(
idbyte + parentpubkey + multiplier + checksum)</tt><br>
<br>
The receiving party will multiply the pubkey by the
multiplier, and then hash it to get the 20-byte address to
send to. The idea is that you use your BIP 32 parent
public key, and then you generate whatever child you want,
and only send them the multiplier used (not the
chaincode). This preserves privacy, but if the recipient
has your parent public key already, they can identify that
address being linked to you, but cannot determine any
other addresses in your wallet.<br>
<br>
This form has no drawbacks to the existing address format
except for being longer and requiring an extra EC
multiplication by the person sending to that address. But
the advantage is that it optionally allows the sender to
provide more information than currently contained in the
25-byte hash160 form. The discussion about this got
side-tracked with the use case I presented, but I believe
there are plenty of other uses for this.<br>
<br>
The particular use case I had in mind was that certain
services could be setup (pre-arranged), say between wallet
software and a business/exchange. The exchange would like
to be able to reliably send addresses to the user for
deposit, without risk of MITM, or even if their own public
server is compromised. The author of wallet software
pre-verifies the public key portion of the service, and
either hardcodes it into the software, or hardcodes their
own public key into the software and makes the service's
signed public key available through query server (allowing
the software author to offline-sign replacement keys, or
add keys for new service providers, as needed). <br>
<br>
When the user's software receives a payment address, the
software can verify it belongs to that service. You can't
use dedicated chain technique, because it would either
have to be exchanged with the user on first transaction
which half defeats the purpose, or they give them the full
public key and chaincode which allows the user to see <i>all
</i>addresses ever used by the service. Neither one is a
reasonable solution.<br>
<br>
This use case doesn't necessarily scale, but it doesn't
have to. It simply allows service providers to skip the
SSL and go right to public key exchange/verification for a
few of the important services they provide access to, and
will provide better security than relying on SSL/PKI.
This would simply be one, coexisting option for providing
payment details in the absence (or in addition to) SSL/PKI
infrastructure.<br>
<br>
I'm sure there's other use cases, but it seems simple
enough and non-disruptive enough that it could be
supported easily for no other reason than to support that
use case (which I intend to implement in Armory to help
verify high-volume services).<br>
<br>
-Alan<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<div>On 06/26/2013 11:29 AM, Alan Reiner wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"> Although I'd still prefer my
original request, I get much of what I want from your
guys' recommendation. It complicates the wallet design,
because it requires tracking and associating a matrix of
addresses for each wallet, instead of a single linear
list. But if this is what it's going to take then I
will go along. <br>
<br>
Right now BIP 32 defines, m/i'/j/k, where j=0 is the
"external" chain used for distributing addresses, and
j=1 is the "internal" chain for sending change. The
CONOPs (concept of operations) for the extended wallet
would be like Jeremy described:<br>
<br>
- Chains with j>=2 would be independent address
chains carved out for individuals relationships<br>
- Add wallet code to individually associate each j-value
with a particular identity<br>
- Update the wallet code to pool all the addresses in
all j-chains when calculating the balance of the wallet
and/or creating transactions<br>
- When choosing to generically "Receive Bitcoins", will
pick the next address from the j=0 chain<br>
- Will have to add extra function to "Receive Bitcoins"
button to allow creation of new contacts/identities.<br>
- Change will always go to the next address in j=1, no
matter which chains are used to provide inputs.<br>
- Add code to figure out lookaheads for each alternate
chain. Not just each chain, but looking ahead a couple
chains, too. Luckily, the lookahead doesn't have to be
very big for chains j>=1 <br>
- Add an interface to display and choose the different
chains in your wallet, and export the
pubkey&chaincode in some soon-to-be-standardized
format. <br>
- Add code and interface to receive and track alternate
j-chains from other clients/users, and maintain those.
Should we try associating incoming and outgoing chains?
What happens if they do it wrong? Meh...<br>
<br>
Just as one final swipe at this idea, you can see that I
gotta do quite a bit of work to support the multi-chain
idea, and adds a little extra burden on the user to
maintain the organization of the wallet. This would all
be totally unnecessary with a simple alternate
encoding. Granted, I think the multi-chain idea is
good, and one that I will probably implement anyway, but
it seems like overkill in terms of developer complexity,
and interface complexity to achieve something much
simpler. Developers of much simpler/lightweight clients
would probably find this prohibitive.<br>
<br>
On another note: I thought we weren't encouraging
automatic payments without requesting from the other
party...? It makes me uneasy, but it sounds like group
thought has converged on that being acceptable. I bring
it up, because there are situations where it makes
sense, but it sounds unsafe for general users. Alice
will give Bob his own chain for sending Alice money,
then a year later Bob will send money automatically to
Alice not realizing that the wallet was lost, retired or
compromised. It's not that Bob can't ask for a new
address, it's that if the interface says "Send Money to
Alice", that looks legit enough that Bob may not feel it
necessary to check with Alice first. That's more of an
interface issue though. We can add a warning to "check
with the recipient that they still have access to wallet
3cQ398x", etc. But I just know someone is going to
lose money anyway...<br>
<br>
-Alan<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<div>On 06/20/2013 03:32 AM, Mike Hearn wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">Agree with Jeremy and once the payment
protocol work is further along I'd like to see us
define an extension that lets you send payment
requests containing public keys+chain codes, so
further payments can be made push-style with no
recipient interaction (e.g. for repeated billing).
How apps choose to arrange their chains internally
seems like an area for experimentation. I definitely
want to implement HD wallets in bitcoinj to allow
this and if that means not using the same tree
structure as in the BIP then so be it.</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Thu, Jun 20, 2013 at
5:54 AM, Jeremy Spilman <span dir="ltr"><<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:jeremy@taplink.co"
target="_blank">jeremy@taplink.co</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0
0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc
solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div>> BIP 32 already specifies how to use
the first three tree levels: M/i/j/k,<br>
> i~wallet, j~Internal/External, k~address.
The first level is actually<br>
> type-1 derived, and thus we cannot create
an arbitrary number of them<br>
> without pre-computing them from the
offline wallet. So it's not "free" to<br>
> create new wallets unless we redefine how
the levels work.<br>
<br>
</div>
Initially I was thinking that you would share
the public key and chain code<br>
from [m/i'/0] so that you can receive payments
at [m/i'/0/k], for a unique<br>
value of 'i' for each receive chain.<br>
<br>
For the case of generating new receive chains
from a *watch-only* wallet, as<br>
you say, the options are to either keep a cache
of PubKey/ChainCode for<br>
unused [m/i'] or simply increment 'j' past 1 for
an existing [m/i'/j] -- the<br>
concept of 'internal/'external' and change
addresses at Depth=2 don't make<br>
sense for handing out receive chains to lots of
people anyway, and certainly<br>
BIP32 doesn't *require* 0 <= j <= 1. So I
think incrementing 'j' is the way<br>
to go here...<br>
<br>
The "default" layout of BIP32 does NOT mean that
implementations should not<br>
check for transactions with j > 1. That would
be a useless constraint and<br>
obviously self-limiting. It might be helpful to
add to the 'Compatibility'<br>
section some minimum expectations about how a
wallet should be 'probed' when<br>
imported. If you don't feel completely free to
monotonically increment 'j'<br>
to your hearts content to achieve major
usability benefits, then I say BIP32<br>
could use some clarifying.<br>
<br>
BTW - the spec calls for addition not
multiplication now, so we should call<br>
it the 'Addend' not the 'Multiplier' :-)<br>
<div><br>
> Do these extra wallet chains behave as
different wallets, or sub-wallets?<br>
<br>
</div>
They could, but they certainly don't need to! A
single-wallet<br>
implementation treats this merely as an
address-generation algorithm, and<br>
does not expose any hierarchy to the user
interface. The user just<br>
“magically” gets the ability to send multiple
payments to their contacts<br>
without immediately sacrificing their privacy<br>
(<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="http://www.wired.com/wiredenterprise/2013/06/bitcoin_retai/"
target="_blank">http://www.wired.com/wiredenterprise/2013/06/bitcoin_retai/</a>).
Everything<br>
goes into the same ledger, balance, coin pool,
etc. Most of the code base is<br>
unaware BIP32 is even in use.<br>
<br>
While it is *possible* to support separate
ledgers, balances, etc. it is<br>
certainly not required, and you get all the
benefits either way.<br>
<br>
I think, since your proposal generates and
receives payments into<br>
BIP32-style addresses, we both need similar
underlying wallet code. The only<br>
difference is that you are passing the Kpar for
[m/i'/0/k] and the *result*<br>
of CKD'((Kpar, cpar), k), and instead I proposed
passing Kpar and cpar, and<br>
leaving 'k' out of it, letting the receive
choose 'k'.<br>
<div><br>
> For instance, maybe there's a benefit to
using the same parent pubkey<br>
</div>
> across multiple services, as a form of
identity. If I don't want that, I<br>
<div>> use your method. If I do want that, I
use my method.<br>
<br>
</div>
I think it's a interesting idea using static
public keys as a means for<br>
persistent identity and hence security from
MitM. If you want a shared<br>
public key across multiple services we could
just combine both ideas and get<br>
all the benefits, by making the data structure {
ParentPubKey, Addend,<br>
ChainCode }:<br>
<br>
ParentPubKey: Public key of m/i' -- 33 bytes<br>
Addend: I[L]*G from CDK'(m/i', j) -- 33 bytes<br>
ChainCode: I[R] from CDK'(m/i', j) -- 32
bytes<br>
<br>
All that remains secret is the ChainCode from
[m/i'] -- and of course the<br>
private keys. The ParentPubKey is a common
value across multiple services,<br>
corresponding to user's identity rooted in
[m/i']. Each service gets their<br>
own 'j'. ParentPubKey + Addend gives you the
PubKey of [m/i'/j]. With the<br>
ChainCode, the receiver then can generate
[m/i'/j/k] for monotonically<br>
increasing 'k'. Again, from the user perspective
all transactions under<br>
[m/i'] can be presented in a single ledger, or
not.<br>
<br>
Anyway, fundamentally my feedback is if you are
designing for persistent<br>
long-term relationships, you could build in a
mechanism for generating<br>
address chains so you don't need any further
communication after the initial<br>
exchange, and it need not complicate the wallet.<br>
<div>
<div><br>
Thanks,<br>
--Jeremy<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
------------------------------------------------------------------------------<br>
This SF.net email is sponsored by Windows:<br>
<br>
Build for Windows Store.<br>
<br>
<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="http://p.sf.net/sfu/windows-dev2dev"
target="_blank">http://p.sf.net/sfu/windows-dev2dev</a><br>
_______________________________________________<br>
Bitcoin-development mailing list<br>
<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net"
target="_blank">Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net</a><br>
<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development"
target="_blank">https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development</a><br>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
<br>
</div>
<br>
<fieldset></fieldset>
<br>
<pre>------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This SF.net email is sponsored by Windows:
Build for Windows Store.
<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="http://p.sf.net/sfu/windows-dev2dev" target="_blank">http://p.sf.net/sfu/windows-dev2dev</a></pre>
<br>
<fieldset></fieldset>
<br>
<pre>_______________________________________________
Bitcoin-development mailing list
<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net" target="_blank">Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net</a>
<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development" target="_blank">https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development</a>
</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
</div>
<br>
------------------------------------------------------------------------------<br>
Get 100% visibility into Java/.NET code with AppDynamics
Lite!<br>
It's a free troubleshooting tool designed for production.<br>
Get down to code-level detail for bottlenecks, with <2%
overhead.<br>
Download for free and get started troubleshooting in
minutes.<br>
<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=48897031&iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk"
target="_blank">http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=48897031&iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk</a><br>
_______________________________________________<br>
Bitcoin-development mailing list<br>
<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net">Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net</a><br>
<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development"
target="_blank">https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development</a><br>
<br>
</blockquote>
</div>
<br>
</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
</body>
</html>
--------------050803000509070405080005--
|