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Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev]
 =?utf-8?q?R=C4=83spuns=3A_Personal_opinion_on_the_f?=
 =?utf-8?q?ee_market_from_a_worried_local_trader=E2=80=8F?=
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> On 31 Jul 2015, at 06:59, Un Ix via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfo=
undation.org> wrote:
>=20
> +1 on the comments below by Thomas.=20
>=20
> "Fee market" is not a binary option, either on or off.  Like all markets i=
t exists in varying degrees over time and with more or less influence on the=
 process of which it is part of.  As it stands now, and likely for another d=
ecade at least, the fee per tx constitutes a very, very weak market signal f=
or the miners since it makes up less than 0.5% of the rewards paid for minin=
g a full block. This is the normal and expected scenario, aimed at driving u=
se of Bitcoin as widely and cheaply as possible so that network effects will=
 cement  Bitcoin for the future, for all users.
>=20
> As a comparison, how many people would have taken up using email if there h=
ad been a per-message fee and hourly sending limits with only the highest-fe=
e messages being delivered? And how would it look if the email protocol deve=
lopers imposing fees & hourly sending limits were pushing hard for use of an=
other email-delivery protocol on top of the existing one?
>=20
How would email have looked if it required 300 MW of power to support it for=
 "free" for 10 years?

In practice email was never free- it was paid for by the payments users made=
 to ISPs. ISPs paid for email and network infrastructure from that.

The equivalent analogy here would be to drop fees completely and pay a speci=
fic miner to mine all of your transactions as a monthly subscription (which o=
f course doesn't work in a non-permission-based network).

Miners have real (huge) costs - they will be in a lot of pain with reward ha=
lving if a few model does not replace that. That in turn poses a huge risk o=
f smaller miners shutting down, which in turn centralises things even more. I=
 would argue that the lack of pool diversity and thus lack of block makers i=
s already the single biggest risk for a decentralised system; avoiding the i=
ssue of fees just accelerates this.=

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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"content-type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3D=
utf-8"></head><body dir=3D"auto"><div><br></div><div>On 31 Jul 2015, at 06:5=
9, Un Ix via bitcoin-dev &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfounda=
tion.org">bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br><br></div>=
<blockquote type=3D"cite"><div>


<div dir=3D"ltr">


<div dir=3D"ltr">


<div dir=3D"ltr">


<div dir=3D"ltr">


<div dir=3D"ltr">

<style><!--
.hmmessage P
{
margin:0px;
padding:0px
}
body.hmmessage
{
font-size: 12pt;
font-family:Calibri
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--></style>
<div dir=3D"ltr">+1 on the comments below by Thomas. <br><br>"Fee market" is=
 not a=20
binary option, either on or off.&nbsp; Like all markets it exists in varying=
=20
degrees over time and with more or less influence on the process of which it=
 is=20
part of.&nbsp; As it stands now, and likely for another decade at least, the=
=20
fee per tx constitutes a very, very weak market signal for the miners since i=
t=20
makes up less than 0.5% of the rewards paid for mining a full block. This is=
 the normal and expected scenario, aimed at driving use of Bitcoin=20
as widely and cheaply as possible so that network effects will cement=20
Bitcoin for the future, for all users.<br><br>As a comparison, how many peop=
le would have
 taken up using email if there had been a per-message fee and hourly=20
sending limits with only the highest-fee messages being delivered? And=20
how would it look if the email protocol developers imposing fees=20
&amp; hourly sending limits were pushing hard for use of another email-deliv=
ery protocol on
 top of the existing one?<br><br></div></div></div></div></div></div></div><=
/blockquote><div><span style=3D"background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);">H=
ow would email have looked if it required 300 MW of power to support it for "=
free" for 10 years?</span></div><div><span style=3D"background-color: rgba(2=
55, 255, 255, 0);"><br></span></div><div><span style=3D"background-color: rg=
ba(255, 255, 255, 0);">In practice email was never free- it was paid for by t=
he payments users made to ISPs. ISPs paid for email and network infrastructu=
re from that.</span></div><div><span style=3D"background-color: rgba(255, 25=
5, 255, 0);"><br></span></div><div><span style=3D"background-color: rgba(255=
, 255, 255, 0);">The equivalent analogy here would be to drop fees completel=
y and pay a specific miner to mine all of your transactions as a monthly sub=
scription (which of course doesn't work in a non-permission-based network).<=
/span></div><div><span style=3D"background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);"><=
br></span></div><div><span style=3D"background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0)=
;">Miners have real (huge) costs - they will be in a lot of pain with reward=
 halving if a few model does not replace that. That in turn poses a huge ris=
k of smaller miners shutting down, which in turn centralises things even mor=
e. I would argue that the lack of pool diversity and thus lack of block make=
rs is already the single biggest risk for a decentralised system; avoiding t=
he issue of fees just accelerates this.</span></div></body></html>=

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