summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/89/e7facd7479dba495728f99b8a0150db6aa3d25
blob: c6f25d8d052fce858d17641e5683d34f0079aa6c (plain)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
Received: from sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.194]
	helo=mx.sourceforge.net)
	by sfs-ml-3.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76)
	(envelope-from <gmaxwell@gmail.com>) id 1TPdsH-0006nm-RQ
	for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net;
	Sat, 20 Oct 2012 18:34:17 +0000
Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com
	designates 209.85.210.175 as permitted sender)
	client-ip=209.85.210.175; envelope-from=gmaxwell@gmail.com;
	helo=mail-ia0-f175.google.com; 
Received: from mail-ia0-f175.google.com ([209.85.210.175])
	by sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128)
	(Exim 4.76) id 1TPdsH-0003jq-8F
	for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net;
	Sat, 20 Oct 2012 18:34:17 +0000
Received: by mail-ia0-f175.google.com with SMTP id b35so1160042iac.34
	for <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>;
	Sat, 20 Oct 2012 11:34:12 -0700 (PDT)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Received: by 10.50.208.106 with SMTP id md10mr5060822igc.5.1350758051977; Sat,
	20 Oct 2012 11:34:11 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by 10.64.171.73 with HTTP; Sat, 20 Oct 2012 11:34:11 -0700 (PDT)
In-Reply-To: <CAPg+sBgBtYUHtHq1MnKuFJHc=NGZ4t+SxHDs0TLKmzf8bSig=g@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAPg+sBgBtYUHtHq1MnKuFJHc=NGZ4t+SxHDs0TLKmzf8bSig=g@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 20 Oct 2012 14:34:11 -0400
Message-ID: <CAAS2fgRX9hxAhbTTXdH3P=G27sCc6D9TMu=3m1euF8P0jMEb7A@mail.gmail.com>
From: Gregory Maxwell <gmaxwell@gmail.com>
To: Pieter Wuille <pieter.wuille@gmail.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
X-Spam-Score: -1.3 (-)
X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net.
	See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details.
	-1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for
	sender-domain
	0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider
	(gmaxwell[at]gmail.com)
	-0.0 SPF_PASS               SPF: sender matches SPF record
	-0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from
	author's domain
	0.1 DKIM_SIGNED            Message has a DKIM or DK signature,
	not necessarily valid
	-0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature
	0.3 AWL AWL: From: address is in the auto white-list
X-Headers-End: 1TPdsH-0003jq-8F
Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Public key and signature malleability
X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: <bitcoin-development.lists.sourceforge.net>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development>,
	<mailto:bitcoin-development-request@lists.sourceforge.net?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://sourceforge.net/mailarchive/forum.php?forum_name=bitcoin-development>
List-Post: <mailto:bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
List-Help: <mailto:bitcoin-development-request@lists.sourceforge.net?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development>,
	<mailto:bitcoin-development-request@lists.sourceforge.net?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 20 Oct 2012 18:34:18 -0000

On Sat, Oct 20, 2012 at 1:55 PM, Pieter Wuille <pieter.wuille@gmail.com> wrote:
> What do you think about these rules? If people want these rules,
> nothing would happen for now - just start try to find software that
> doesn't produce complying data. In a second step, these could be
> enabled as check similar to IsStandard() - making it hard for them to
> get into blocks, but still be accepted when they aren't standard.
> Finally, when no significant amount of non-standard transactions are
> seen anymore, we can write a BIP and start enforcing this as a network
> rule.

I strongly support heading down this path. Malleability has produced a
steady trickle of surprising outcomes. In addition to the problems we
already know about and expect there may be additional security or DOS
problems that arise from allowing these.