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To: Billy Tetrud <billy.tetrud@gmail.com>,
Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
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Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Proof of reserves - recording
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Good morning Billy,
> I wonder if there would be some way to include the ability to prove balan=
ces held on the lightning network, but I suspect that isn't generally possi=
ble.=C2=A0
Thinking about this in terms of economic logic:
Every channel is anchored onchain, and that anchor (the funding txout) is p=
roof of the existence, and size, of the channel.
The two participants in the channel can sign a plaintext containing their n=
ode pubkeys and how much each owns.
One of the participants should provably be the custodian.
* If the counterparty is a true third party, it has no incentive to lie abo=
ut its money.
* Especially if the counterparty is *another* custodian who wants proof-o=
f-reserves, it has every incentive to overreport, but then the first party =
will refuse to sign.
It has a disincentive to underreport, and would itself refuse to sign a=
dishonest report that assigns more funds to the first party.
The only case that would be acceptable to both custodians would be to h=
onestly report their holdings in the Lightning channel.
* If the counterparty is a sockpuppet of the custodian, then the entire cha=
nnel is owned by the custodian and it would be fairly dumb of he custodian =
to claim to have less funds than the entire channel.
Perhaps a more practical problem is that Lightning channel states change fa=
irly quickly, and there are possible race conditions, due to network latenc=
y (remember, both nodes need to sign, meaning both of them need to communic=
ate with each other, thus hit by network latency and other race conditions)=
where a custodian Lightning node is unable to "freeze" a snapshot of its c=
urrent state and make an atomic proof-of-reserves of *all* channels.
Regards,
ZmnSCPxj
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