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--Apple-Mail=_0B1F3391-D70D-48C7-875B-9532A9BA582E
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Great discussion, Sergio and Tom!

> I now think my reasoning and conclusions are based on a false premise: =
that BU block size policies for miners can be heterogeneous.


Right, miners who set their block size limits (BSL) above OR below the =
"effective BSL" are disadvantaged.  Imagine that we plot the =
distribution (by hash power) for all miners' BSLs.  We might get a chart =
that looks like this:

http://imgur.com/a/tWNr6 <http://imgur.com/a/tWNr6>

In this chart, the "effective BSL" is defined as the largest block size =
that no less than half the hash power will accept. =20

If a block is mined with a size Q that is less than the "effective BSL," =
then all the hash power with BSLs between BSL_min and Q will be forked =
from the longest chain (until they update their software if they're =
running Core or until their acceptance depth is hit if they're running =
BU).  This wastes these miners' hash power. =20

However, if a block is mined with a size Q that is greater than the =
effective BSL, then all the hash power with BSLs between Q and BSL_max =
will temporarily be mining on a "destined to be orphaned" chain.  This =
also wastes these miners' hash power. =20

Therefore, it is in the best interest of miners to all set the same =
block size limit (and reliably signal in their coinbase TX what that =
limit is, as done by Bitcoin Unlimited miners). =20

We have empirical evidence the miners in fact behave this way:=20

(1) No major miner has ever set his block size limit to less than 1 MB =
(not even those such as Luke-Jr who think 1 MB is too big) because doing =
so would just waste money. =20

(2) After switching to Bitcoin Unlimited, both ViaBTC and the =
Bitcoin.com pool temporarily set their BSLs to 2 MB and 16 MB, =
respectively (of course keeping their _generation limit_ at 1MB).  =
However, both miners quickly reduced these limits back to 1 MB when they =
realized how it was possible to lose money in an attack scenario.  (This =
actually surprised me because the only way they could lose money is if =
some _other_ miner wasted even more money by purposely mining a =
destined-to-be-orphaned block.)  =20

The follow-up article I'm working on is about the topics we're =
discussing now, particularly about how Bitcoin Unlimited's =
=E2=80=9Cnode-scale=E2=80=9D behavior facilitates the emergence of a =
fluid and organic block size limit at the network scale.  Happy to keep =
continue with this current discussion, however.

Best regards
Peter


--Apple-Mail=_0B1F3391-D70D-48C7-875B-9532A9BA582E
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/html;
	charset=utf-8

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;" =
class=3D""><div class=3D"">Great discussion, Sergio and Tom!</div><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D"">I now think my reasoning and conclusions are based on a false =
premise: that BU block size policies for miners can be =
heterogeneous.</blockquote></div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div=
 class=3D"">Right, miners who set their block size limits (BSL) above OR =
below the "effective BSL" are disadvantaged. &nbsp;Imagine that we plot =
the distribution (by hash power) for all miners' BSLs. &nbsp;We might =
get a chart that looks like this:</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><a href=3D"http://imgur.com/a/tWNr6" =
class=3D"">http://imgur.com/a/tWNr6</a></div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">In this chart, the "effective BSL" is =
defined as the largest block size that no less than half the hash power =
will accept. &nbsp;</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">If a block is mined with a size Q that is less than the =
"effective BSL," then all the hash power with BSLs between BSL_min and Q =
will be forked from the longest chain (until they update their software =
if they're running Core or until their acceptance depth is hit if =
they're running BU). &nbsp;This wastes these miners' hash power. =
&nbsp;</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">However, =
if a block is mined with a size Q that is greater than the effective =
BSL, then all the hash power with BSLs between Q and BSL_max will =
temporarily be mining on a "destined to be orphaned" chain. &nbsp;This =
also wastes these miners' hash power. &nbsp;</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Therefore, it is in the best interest =
of miners to all set the same block size limit (and reliably signal in =
their coinbase TX what that limit is, as done by Bitcoin Unlimited =
miners). &nbsp;</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">We have empirical evidence the miners in fact behave this =
way:&nbsp;</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">(1) =
No major miner has ever set his block size limit to less than 1 MB (not =
even those such as Luke-Jr who think 1 MB is too big) because doing so =
would just waste money. &nbsp;</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">(2) After switching to Bitcoin =
Unlimited, both ViaBTC and the <a href=3D"http://Bitcoin.com" =
class=3D"">Bitcoin.com</a> pool temporarily set their BSLs to 2 MB and =
16 MB, respectively (of course keeping their _generation limit_ at 1MB). =
&nbsp;However, both miners quickly reduced these limits back to 1 MB =
when they realized how it was possible to lose money in an attack =
scenario. &nbsp;(This actually surprised me because the only way they =
could lose money is if some _other_ miner wasted even more money by =
purposely mining a destined-to-be-orphaned block.) =
&nbsp;&nbsp;</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">The=
 follow-up article I'm working on is about the topics we're discussing =
now, particularly about how Bitcoin Unlimited's =E2=80=9Cnode-scale=E2=80=9D=
 behavior facilitates the emergence of a fluid and organic block size =
limit at the network scale. &nbsp;Happy to keep continue with this =
current discussion, however.</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Best regards</div><div =
class=3D"">Peter</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div></body></html>=

--Apple-Mail=_0B1F3391-D70D-48C7-875B-9532A9BA582E--