1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
|
Received: from sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.192]
helo=mx.sourceforge.net)
by sfs-ml-1.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76)
(envelope-from <dscvlt@gmail.com>) id 1Z42Cw-0006bA-Bk
for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net;
Sun, 14 Jun 2015 07:19:54 +0000
Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com
designates 209.85.214.177 as permitted sender)
client-ip=209.85.214.177; envelope-from=dscvlt@gmail.com;
helo=mail-ob0-f177.google.com;
Received: from mail-ob0-f177.google.com ([209.85.214.177])
by sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128)
(Exim 4.76) id 1Z42Cv-0004ry-5x
for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net;
Sun, 14 Jun 2015 07:19:54 +0000
Received: by obcej4 with SMTP id ej4so46226639obc.0
for <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>;
Sun, 14 Jun 2015 00:19:47 -0700 (PDT)
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-Received: by 10.182.153.197 with SMTP id vi5mr15498747obb.28.1434266387726;
Sun, 14 Jun 2015 00:19:47 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by 10.183.3.38 with HTTP; Sun, 14 Jun 2015 00:19:47 -0700 (PDT)
In-Reply-To: <20150612181153.GB19199@muck>
References: <20150612181153.GB19199@muck>
Date: Sun, 14 Jun 2015 17:19:47 +1000
Message-ID: <CAOXABZoAqNa1dou0zPffAj+m0J78VTPoZxscK8yiZ4JXfTBBsw@mail.gmail.com>
From: Ashley Holman <dscvlt@gmail.com>
To: Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=089e014953208dc86e0518752ada
X-Spam-Score: -0.6 (/)
X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net.
See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details.
-1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for
sender-domain
0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider
(dscvlt[at]gmail.com)
-0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record
1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message
-0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from
author's domain
0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature,
not necessarily valid
-0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature
X-Headers-End: 1Z42Cv-0004ry-5x
Cc: Bitcoin Development <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] User vote in blocksize through fees
X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: <bitcoin-development.lists.sourceforge.net>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development>,
<mailto:bitcoin-development-request@lists.sourceforge.net?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://sourceforge.net/mailarchive/forum.php?forum_name=bitcoin-development>
List-Post: <mailto:bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
List-Help: <mailto:bitcoin-development-request@lists.sourceforge.net?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development>,
<mailto:bitcoin-development-request@lists.sourceforge.net?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 14 Jun 2015 07:19:54 -0000
--089e014953208dc86e0518752ada
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Economic policy sounds like a dirty word in the context of Bitcoin, but as
Jeff Garzik said, choosing a block size cap is unfortunately an economic
policy that has to be chosen somehow. Enabling users to incentivise the
voting process is an interesting tool to have in the toolbox, but I think
it would be sensible to first observe how the miner-only voting system
behaves on its own.
If, for example, the hashing majority tended to favour a move towards
centralization (big blocks), user preferences could potentially hasten this
move by further punishing marginal miners through reduced fees. On the
other hand, if user preferences tended to oppose the preferences of miners,
then such a system might function well in keeping a balance between
usability and security (although it's not clear how this balance might
change over time as the block subsidy drops).
In short, I think it's wise to keep it simple and implement one mechanism
at a time.
On Sat, Jun 13, 2015 at 4:11 AM, Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org> wrote:
> Jeff Garzik recently proposed that the upper blocksize limit be removed
> entirely, with a "soft" limit being enforced via miner vote, recorded by
> hashing power.
>
> This mechanism within the protocol for users to have any influence over
> the miner vote. We can add that back by providing a way for transactions
> themselves to set a flag determining whether or not they can be included
> in a block casting a specific vote.
>
> We can simplify Garzik's vote to say that one of the nVersion bits
> either votes for the blocksize to be increased, or decreased, by some
> fixed ratio (e.g 2x or 1/2x) the next interval. Then we can use a
> nVersion bit in transactions themselves, also voting for an increase or
> decrease. Transactions may only be included in blocks with an
> indentical vote, thus providing miners with a monetary incentive via
> fees to vote according to user wishes.
>
> Of course, to cast a "don't care" vote we can either define an
> additional bit, or sign the transaction with both versions. Equally we
> can even have different versions with different fees, broadcast via a
> mechanism such as replace-by-fee.
>
>
> See also John Dillon's proposal for proof-of-stake blocksize voting:
>
>
> https://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg02323.html
>
> --
> 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
> 0000000000000000127ab1d576dc851f374424f1269c4700ccaba2c42d97e778
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> _______________________________________________
> Bitcoin-development mailing list
> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>
>
--089e014953208dc86e0518752ada
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
<div dir=3D"ltr">Economic policy sounds like a dirty word in the context of=
Bitcoin, but as Jeff Garzik said, choosing a block size cap is unfortunate=
ly an economic policy that has to be chosen somehow.=C2=A0 Enabling users t=
o incentivise the voting process is an interesting tool to have in the tool=
box, but I think it would be sensible to first observe how the miner-only v=
oting system behaves on its own.<div><br></div><div>If, for example, the ha=
shing majority tended to favour a move towards centralization (big blocks),=
user preferences could potentially hasten this move by further punishing m=
arginal miners through reduced fees.=C2=A0 On the other hand, if user prefe=
rences tended to oppose the preferences of miners, then such a system might=
function well in keeping a balance between usability and security (althoug=
h it's not clear how this balance might change over time as the block s=
ubsidy drops).</div><div><br></div><div>In short, I think it's wise to =
keep it simple and implement one mechanism at a time.</div></div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Sat, Jun 13, 2015 at 4:1=
1 AM, Peter Todd <span dir=3D"ltr"><<a href=3D"mailto:pete@petertodd.org=
" target=3D"_blank">pete@petertodd.org</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote=
class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc soli=
d;padding-left:1ex">Jeff Garzik recently proposed that the upper blocksize =
limit be removed<br>
entirely, with a "soft" limit being enforced via miner vote, reco=
rded by<br>
hashing power.<br>
<br>
This mechanism within the protocol for users to have any influence over<br>
the miner vote. We can add that back by providing a way for transactions<br=
>
themselves to set a flag determining whether or not they can be included<br=
>
in a block casting a specific vote.<br>
<br>
We can simplify Garzik's vote to say that one of the nVersion bits<br>
either votes for the blocksize to be increased, or decreased, by some<br>
fixed ratio (e.g 2x or 1/2x) the next interval. Then we can use a<br>
nVersion bit in transactions themselves, also voting for an increase or<br>
decrease. Transactions may only be included in blocks with an<br>
indentical vote, thus providing miners with a monetary incentive via<br>
fees to vote according to user wishes.<br>
<br>
Of course, to cast a "don't care" vote we can either define a=
n<br>
additional bit, or sign the transaction with both versions. Equally we<br>
can even have different versions with different fees, broadcast via a<br>
mechanism such as replace-by-fee.<br>
<br>
<br>
See also John Dillon's proposal for proof-of-stake blocksize voting:<br=
>
<br>
<a href=3D"https://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourcefor=
ge.net/msg02323.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.mail=
-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg02323.html</a><br=
>
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
--<br>
'peter'[:-1]@<a href=3D"http://petertodd.org" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">petertodd.org</a><br>
0000000000000000127ab1d576dc851f374424f1269c4700ccaba2c42d97e778<br>
</font></span><br>---------------------------------------------------------=
---------------------<br>
<br>_______________________________________________<br>
Bitcoin-development mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net">Bitcoin-develo=
pment@lists.sourceforge.net</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development=
" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/=
listinfo/bitcoin-development</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>
--089e014953208dc86e0518752ada--
|
