1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
|
Received: from sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.192]
helo=mx.sourceforge.net)
by sfs-ml-4.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76)
(envelope-from <paul@airbitz.co>) id 1YJXbB-0006Jz-3o
for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net;
Fri, 06 Feb 2015 01:20:45 +0000
Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of airbitz.co
designates 209.85.192.169 as permitted sender)
client-ip=209.85.192.169; envelope-from=paul@airbitz.co;
helo=mail-pd0-f169.google.com;
Received: from mail-pd0-f169.google.com ([209.85.192.169])
by sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128)
(Exim 4.76) id 1YJXb6-0004hE-GH
for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net;
Fri, 06 Feb 2015 01:20:45 +0000
Received: by pdiy13 with SMTP id y13so11245221pdi.8
for <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>;
Thu, 05 Feb 2015 17:20:34 -0800 (PST)
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed;
d=1e100.net; s=20130820;
h=x-gm-message-state:content-type:mime-version:subject:from
:in-reply-to:date:cc:content-transfer-encoding:message-id:references
:to; bh=8h7wSfe45hMzuqnOPr812+hyMF81aBaYx9woDFVmuok=;
b=Q1dENF9Mwtr9SaaIV3x++bHkdghTkF4e6DEhEFFu3FS5+8ywt/YMsTk4Ow1FrImRgr
0iTo+4aNiR0KUiLfLicma1RiB63VhaI3C+8vxRMs4TqIMCRc5mKrZOnD3UNJzu5FJyFz
Nhss4BOgJp2+uhaHXOUeZ64dfRMgL7ZyX/BMDMQk1vAzP7gLw1hLZEaLHnc9zcTCwHRv
mDAwOk1F14jhHEiH7RBKnvqZkxXIsgyv5k6DSypYfWMmCwHndyqdOqWd3NTL5u9/FAOT
B1M+GNUIunBQmWPBChBJtHFPKZ/HRR9otRAxz72BwGOWHAPz2AWqBkSawPQDQAN1i4Xe
1XpQ==
X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQknXnPGEn3KO1HiSOgMXalq+bJ5QlZrPzRLyP0ncNUr77Hs8lieURxpMI2TnYKueySgI+ey
X-Received: by 10.66.138.72 with SMTP id qo8mr1453940pab.84.1423183756748;
Thu, 05 Feb 2015 16:49:16 -0800 (PST)
Received: from [10.204.163.123] (mobile-166-171-251-007.mycingular.net.
[166.171.251.7])
by mx.google.com with ESMTPSA id f5sm6231559pdm.3.2015.02.05.16.49.14
(version=TLSv1 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA bits=128/128);
Thu, 05 Feb 2015 16:49:14 -0800 (PST)
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary=Apple-Mail-278FFE3E-4FC7-444B-B156-08D866B143A6
Mime-Version: 1.0 (1.0)
From: Paul Puey <paul@airbitz.co>
X-Mailer: iPhone Mail (12B411)
In-Reply-To: <54D400F0.9090406@voskuil.org>
Date: Thu, 5 Feb 2015 16:49:12 -0800
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Message-Id: <CEB250A3-9014-4AF3-AEB7-E78BE19BF2F5@airbitz.co>
References: <CABdy8DKS4arkkCLGC=66SUJm5Ugib1EWP7B6MkQRX1k-yd3WBw@mail.gmail.com>
<CANEZrP3v=ySS4gragaWuBMWi_swocRRRq_kw2edo6+9kifgrFQ@mail.gmail.com>
<54D3D636.1030308@voskuil.org>
<CANEZrP3ekWQWeV=Yw_E=n0grORBLHaXLUh3w0EFQdz=HsjWvZw@mail.gmail.com>
<279489A5-1E46-48A2-8F58-1A25821D4D96@gmail.com>
<CANEZrP3VAWajxE=mNxb6sLSQbhaQHD=2TgRKvYrEax2PAzCi2A@mail.gmail.com>
<6AEDF3C4-DEE0-4E31-83D0-4FD92B125452@voskuil.org>
<CABdy8DLRGyy5dvmVb_B3vao7Qwz-zdAC3-+2nJkg9rSsU6FLbw@mail.gmail.com>
<C28CD881-DAB8-4EDB-B239-7D45A825EAF0@voskuil.org>
<54D3FB4A.9010105@voskuil.org>
<CALkkCJammCvVd6_1SYRvnxsMVj_x1AvS1VsSa6_76d0NWMDs=Q@mail.gmail.com>
<54D400F0.9090406@voskuil.org>
To: Eric Voskuil <eric@voskuil.org>, William Swanson <william@airbitz.co>
X-Spam-Score: -0.3 (/)
X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net.
See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details.
-1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for
sender-domain
-0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record
1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message
0.3 HTML_FONT_FACE_BAD BODY: HTML font face is not a word
0.0 MIME_QP_LONG_LINE RAW: Quoted-printable line longer than 76 chars
-0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from
author's domain
0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature,
not necessarily valid
-0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature
0.0 T_REMOTE_IMAGE Message contains an external image
X-Headers-End: 1YJXb6-0004hE-GH
Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Proposal for P2P Wireless (Bluetooth LE)
transfer of Payment URI
X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: <bitcoin-development.lists.sourceforge.net>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development>,
<mailto:bitcoin-development-request@lists.sourceforge.net?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://sourceforge.net/mailarchive/forum.php?forum_name=bitcoin-development>
List-Post: <mailto:bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
List-Help: <mailto:bitcoin-development-request@lists.sourceforge.net?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development>,
<mailto:bitcoin-development-request@lists.sourceforge.net?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 06 Feb 2015 01:20:45 -0000
--Apple-Mail-278FFE3E-4FC7-444B-B156-08D866B143A6
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset=utf-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
The trust can be considered bootstrapped by visual verification of the addre=
ss prefix. If we are really concerned about someone jamming a Bluetooth sign=
al in a coffeeshop then the UI can encourage verification of the prefix. Muc=
h like how regular Bluetooth requires 'pairing' via entering a 4-6 digit cod=
e.
=20
Paul Puey CEO / Co-Founder, Airbitz Inc
619.850.8624 | http://airbitz.co | San Diego
=20
On Feb 5, 2015, at 3:46 PM, Eric Voskuil <eric@voskuil.org> wrote:
On 02/05/2015 03:36 PM, M=E2=92=B6rtin H=E2=92=B6bo=E2=93=8B=C5=A1tiak wrote=
:
>> A BIP-70 signed payment request in the initial broadcast can resolve the
>> integrity issues, but because of the public nature of the broadcast
>> coupled with strong public identity, the privacy compromise is much
>> worse. Now transactions are cryptographically tainted.
>>=20
>> This is also the problem with BIP-70 over the web. TLS and other
>> security precautions aside, an interloper on the communication, desktop,
>> datacenter, etc., can capture payment requests and strongly correlate
>> transactions to identities in an automated manner. The payment request
>> must be kept private between the parties, and that's hard to do.
>=20
> What about using encryption with forward secrecy? Merchant would
> generate signed request containing public ECDH part, buyer would send
> back transaction encrypted with ECDH and his public ECDH part. If
> receiving address/amount is meant to be private, use commit protocol
> (see ZRTP/RedPhone) and short authentication phrase (which is hard to
> spoof thanks to commit protocol - see RedPhone)?
Hi Martin,
The problem is that you need to verify the ownership of the public key.
A MITM can substitute the key. If you don't have verifiable identity
associated with the public key (PKI/WoT), you need a shared secret (such
as a secret phrase). But the problem is then establishing that secret
over a public channel.
You can bootstrap a private session over the untrusted network using a
trusted public key (PKI/WoT). But the presumption is that you are
already doing this over the web (using TLS). That process is subject to
attack at the CA. WoT is not subject to a CA attack, because it's
decentralized. But it's also not sufficiently deployed for some scenarios.
e
--Apple-Mail-278FFE3E-4FC7-444B-B156-08D866B143A6
Content-Type: text/html;
charset=utf-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"content-type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3D=
utf-8"></head><body dir=3D"auto"><div>The trust can be considered bootstrapp=
ed by visual verification of the address prefix. If we are really concerned a=
bout someone jamming a Bluetooth signal in a coffeeshop then the UI can enco=
urage verification of the prefix. Much like how regular Bluetooth requires '=
pairing' via entering a 4-6 digit code.<br><br><span style=3D"background-col=
or: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);"><br></span><table border=3D"0" style=3D"-webkit=
-text-size-adjust: auto; font-size: medium; font-family: Helvetica, Arial, s=
ans-serif;"><tbody><tr valign=3D"top"><td style=3D"width: auto; vertical-ali=
gn: top;"><font face=3D".HelveticaNeueInterface-M3"><span style=3D"font-size=
: 17px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: none; background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255=
, 0);"><img src=3D"https://s3.amazonaws.com/webapp.wisestamp.com/v7Zg7GfIQ9m=
F5xlHZrZA_airbitzlogo.png" alt=3D"logo" style=3D"border: none; border-top-le=
ft-radius: 4px; border-top-right-radius: 4px; border-bottom-right-radius: 4p=
x; border-bottom-left-radius: 4px;"> <br></span></font></td=
><td><font face=3D".HelveticaNeueInterface-M3"><span style=3D"font-size: 17p=
x; -webkit-text-size-adjust: none; background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);=
"><b>Paul Puey</b> CEO / Co-Founder, Airbitz Inc<br></span></font><div s=
tyle=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;"><font face=3D".HelveticaNeueIn=
terface-M3"><span style=3D"font-size: 17px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: none; b=
ackground-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);"><a style=3D"outline: none;"></a><a=
href=3D"tel:619.850.8624" x-apple-data-detectors=3D"true" x-apple-data-dete=
ctors-type=3D"telephone" x-apple-data-detectors-result=3D"0">6</a><a href=3D=
"tel:619.850.8624" x-apple-data-detectors=3D"true" x-apple-data-detectors-ty=
pe=3D"telephone" x-apple-data-detectors-result=3D"0">19.850.8624</a> |&=
nbsp;<a href=3D"http://airbitz.co/" target=3D"_blank" style=3D"outline: none=
;">http://airbitz.co</a> | San Diego</span></font></div><div style=
=3D"margin-top: 5px;"><font color=3D"#000000" face=3D".HelveticaNeueInterfac=
e-M3"><span style=3D"font-size: 17px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: none; backgr=
ound-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);"><a href=3D"http://facebook.com/airbitz"=
target=3D"_blank" style=3D"outline: none;"><img src=3D"http://images.wisest=
amp.com/facebook.png" width=3D"16" style=3D"border: none;"></a> <a href=
=3D"http://twitter.com/airbitz" target=3D"_blank" style=3D"outline: none;"><=
img src=3D"http://images.wisestamp.com/twitter.png" width=3D"16" alt=3D"" st=
yle=3D"border: none;"></a> <a href=3D"https://plus.google.com/118173667=
510609425617" target=3D"_blank" style=3D"outline: none;"><img src=3D"http://=
images.wisestamp.com/googleplus.png" width=3D"16" style=3D"border: none;"></=
a> <a href=3D"https://go.airbitz.co/comments/feed/" target=3D"_blank" s=
tyle=3D"outline: none;"><img src=3D"http://images.wisestamp.com/blogRSS.png"=
width=3D"16" style=3D"border: none;"></a> <a href=3D"http://linkedin.c=
om/in/paulpuey" target=3D"_blank" style=3D"outline: none;"><img src=3D"http:=
//images.wisestamp.com/linkedin.png" width=3D"16" alt=3D"" style=3D"border: n=
one;"></a> <a href=3D"https://angel.co/paul-puey" target=3D"_blank" sty=
le=3D"outline: none;"><img src=3D"http://images.wisestamp.com/angelList.png"=
width=3D"16" alt=3D"" style=3D"border: none;"></a></span></font></div></td>=
</tr></tbody></table><table border=3D"0" style=3D"-webkit-text-size-adjust: a=
uto; font-size: medium; font-family: Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif;"><tbody><=
tr valign=3D"top"><td style=3D"width: auto; vertical-align: top;"><br></td><=
td><br></td></tr></tbody></table></div><div><br>On Feb 5, 2015, at 3:46 PM, E=
ric Voskuil <<a href=3D"mailto:eric@voskuil.org">eric@voskuil.org</a>>=
wrote:<br><br></div><div><span>On 02/05/2015 03:36 PM, M=E2=92=B6rtin H=E2=92=
=B6bo=E2=93=8B=C5=A1tiak wrote:</span><br><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockqu=
ote type=3D"cite"><span>A BIP-70 signed payment request in the initial broad=
cast can resolve the</span><br></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=3D=
"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span>integrity issues, but because of the p=
ublic nature of the broadcast</span><br></blockquote></blockquote><blockquot=
e type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span>coupled with strong public i=
dentity, the privacy compromise is much</span><br></blockquote></blockquote>=
<blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span>worse. Now transac=
tions are cryptographically tainted.</span><br></blockquote></blockquote><bl=
ockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span></span><br></blockquo=
te></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span>Th=
is is also the problem with BIP-70 over the web. TLS and other</span><br></b=
lockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><=
span>security precautions aside, an interloper on the communication, desktop=
,</span><br></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote t=
ype=3D"cite"><span>datacenter, etc., can capture payment requests and strong=
ly correlate</span><br></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><=
blockquote type=3D"cite"><span>transactions to identities in an automated ma=
nner. The payment request</span><br></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote ty=
pe=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span>must be kept private between the=
parties, and that's hard to do.</span><br></blockquote></blockquote><blockq=
uote type=3D"cite"><span></span><br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><=
span>What about using encryption with forward secrecy? Merchant would</span>=
<br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span>generate signed request con=
taining public ECDH part, buyer would send</span><br></blockquote><blockquot=
e type=3D"cite"><span>back transaction encrypted with ECDH and his public EC=
DH part. If</span><br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span>receiving=
address/amount is meant to be private, use commit protocol</span><br></bloc=
kquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span>(see ZRTP/RedPhone) and short authent=
ication phrase (which is hard to</span><br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"=
cite"><span>spoof thanks to commit protocol - see RedPhone)?</span><br></blo=
ckquote><span></span><br><span>Hi Martin,</span><br><span></span><br><span>T=
he problem is that you need to verify the ownership of the public key.</span=
><br><span>A MITM can substitute the key. If you don't have verifiable ident=
ity</span><br><span>associated with the public key (PKI/WoT), you need a sha=
red secret (such</span><br><span>as a secret phrase). But the problem is the=
n establishing that secret</span><br><span>over a public channel.</span><br>=
<span></span><br><span>You can bootstrap a private session over the untruste=
d network using a</span><br><span>trusted public key (PKI/WoT). But the pres=
umption is that you are</span><br><span>already doing this over the web (usi=
ng TLS). That process is subject to</span><br><span>attack at the CA. WoT is=
not subject to a CA attack, because it's</span><br><span>decentralized. But=
it's also not sufficiently deployed for some scenarios.</span><br><span></s=
pan><br><span>e</span><br><span></span><br></div></body></html>=
--Apple-Mail-278FFE3E-4FC7-444B-B156-08D866B143A6--
|
