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Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Proposals for improving Bitcoin mining
decentralization
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In this scenario how do you ensure the miner solving the block cannot
reapportion the subsidy to himself rather than the pool?
On Jun 17, 2014 2:09 AM, "Ra=C3=BAl Mart=C3=ADnez" <rme@i-rme.es> wrote:
> First of all I apologice due to the possible mistakes in my writing below=
,
> I am not a Bitcoin developer but I have some knowledge about it.
>
> ----
>
> We all know the recent news, Ghash pool controlling 51% of the hashrate.
> While some consider it a threat others think that is not harmful.
>
> The thing is that we have to do something to stop this from happening
> again.
>
> My proposal is to start thinking about miners that join a pool like
> independent miners and not slave miners, this includes creating a new
> mining protocol that does not rely on the pool sending the list of
> transactions to include in a block. Each individual miner has to collect
> transactions by his own and mine that, this can be achieved by running a
> full node or by running a SPV like node that ask other nodes for
> transactions.
>
> Once this protocol is developed and standarised we as a community could
> require all pools to use it (because its better, because is more
> trustless...), not by imposing it but by recommending it.
>
> Pool owners could send some instructions using this protocol to the miner
> about how many transactions to include per block (some pools want small
> blocks), how many 0 fee transactions to include, how much is the minimum
> fee per Kb to include transactions and some info about the Coinbase field
> in the block.
>
> This way is impossible to perform some of the possible 51% attacks:
>
> - A pool owner cant mine a new chain (selfish mining) (pool clients
> have a SPV or full node that has checkpoints and ask other peers about=
the
> length of the chain)
> - A pool owner can't perform double spends or reverse transactions
> (pool clients know all the transactions relayed to the network, they k=
now
> if they are already included on a block)
> - A pool owner cant decide which transactions not to include (but they
> can configure the minimum fee).
> - A pool owner cant get all the rewards by avoiding other pools from
> mining blocks (Because the pool client knows the last block independen=
tly
> that is from his pool or other).
>
>
> The only thing that a 51% pool owner can do is to shut down his pool and
> drop the hashrate by 51% because he does not control the miners.
>
> If the pool owner owns all the hardware in the pool my proposal is not
> valid, if the pool clients dont use this protocol my proposal is not vali=
d.
>
>
> I want to know if this is possible or its been developed or there is
> already a working protocol that works like this, also I want to read othe=
r
> people's ways to address this threat, thanks for reading.
>
>
> -------------------------------------------------------------------------=
-----
> HPCC Systems Open Source Big Data Platform from LexisNexis Risk Solutions
> Find What Matters Most in Your Big Data with HPCC Systems
> Open Source. Fast. Scalable. Simple. Ideal for Dirty Data.
> Leverages Graph Analysis for Fast Processing & Easy Data Exploration
> http://p.sf.net/sfu/hpccsystems
> _______________________________________________
> Bitcoin-development mailing list
> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>
>
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<p dir=3D"ltr">In this scenario how do you ensure the miner solving the blo=
ck cannot reapportion the subsidy to himself rather than the pool?</p>
<div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Jun 17, 2014 2:09 AM, "Ra=C3=BAl Mart=C3=
=ADnez" <<a href=3D"mailto:rme@i-rme.es">rme@i-rme.es</a>> wrote=
:<br type=3D"attribution"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin=
:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>First of all I apologice due to the possible mistakes=
in my writing below, I am not a Bitcoin developer but I have some knowledg=
e about it.</div><div><br></div><div>----</div><div><br></div>We all know t=
he recent news, Ghash pool controlling 51% of the hashrate. While some cons=
ider it a threat others think that is not harmful.<div>
<br></div><div>The thing is that we have to do something to stop this from =
happening again.</div><div><br></div><div>My proposal is to start thinking =
about miners that join a pool like independent miners and not slave miners,=
this includes creating a new mining protocol that does not rely on the poo=
l sending the list of transactions to include in a block. Each individual m=
iner has to collect transactions by his own and mine that, this can be achi=
eved by running a full node or by running a SPV like node that ask other no=
des for transactions.</div>
<div><br></div><div>Once this protocol is developed and standarised we as a=
community could require all pools to use it (because its better, because i=
s more trustless...), not by imposing it but by recommending it.</div>
<div>
<br></div><div>Pool owners could send some instructions using this protocol=
to the miner about how many transactions to include per block (some pools =
want small blocks), how many 0 fee transactions to include, how much is the=
minimum fee per Kb to include transactions and some info about the Coinbas=
e field in the block.</div>
<div><br></div><div>This way is impossible to perform some of the possible =
51% attacks:</div><div><ul><li>A pool owner cant mine a new chain (selfish =
mining) (pool clients have a SPV or full node that has checkpoints and ask =
other peers about the length of the chain)</li>
<li>A pool owner can't=C2=A0perform double spends or reverse transactio=
ns (pool clients know all the transactions relayed to the network, they kno=
w if they are already included on a block)</li><li>A pool owner cant decide=
which transactions not to include (but they can configure the minimum fee)=
.<br>
</li><li>A pool owner cant get all the rewards by avoiding other pools from=
mining blocks (Because the pool client knows the last block independently =
that is from his pool or other).</li></ul><div><br></div></div><div>The onl=
y thing that a 51% pool owner can do is to shut down his pool and drop the =
hashrate by 51% because he does not control the miners.</div>
<div><br></div><div>If the pool owner owns all the hardware in the pool my =
proposal is not valid, if the pool clients dont use this protocol my propos=
al is not valid.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>I want to know if =
this is possible or its been developed or there is already a working protoc=
ol that works like this, also I want to read other people's ways to add=
ress this threat, thanks for reading.</div>
</div>
<br>-----------------------------------------------------------------------=
-------<br>
HPCC Systems Open Source Big Data Platform from LexisNexis Risk Solutions<b=
r>
Find What Matters Most in Your Big Data with HPCC Systems<br>
Open Source. Fast. Scalable. Simple. Ideal for Dirty Data.<br>
Leverages Graph Analysis for Fast Processing & Easy Data Exploration<br=
>
<a href=3D"http://p.sf.net/sfu/hpccsystems" target=3D"_blank">http://p.sf.n=
et/sfu/hpccsystems</a><br>_______________________________________________<b=
r>
Bitcoin-development mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net">Bitcoin-develo=
pment@lists.sourceforge.net</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development=
" target=3D"_blank">https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-de=
velopment</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div>
--001a11c13692479e6b04fc088b18--
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