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Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] secure assigned bitcoin address directory
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The idea was not to register profiles or any human identity, or associate it=
 with any other identity directly. Neither was it to have a massive BlockCha=
in, or use proof of work. In this case proof of work is detrimental to secur=
ity - you want as many people to know about your keys as quickly as possible=
. I want to add that this implies a shadow p2p network.

Also it's just a point if view, but I thought it better not to have any spec=
ific link to a person's identity, or their Bitcoin "identity" by which I mea=
n no connection to their public addresses. The device keys are not meant to b=
e a permanent identity or to store encrypted data either (think what happens=
 if the device changes hands), so the use case is only to establish secure c=
ommunications, and to verify signatures whilst still in use by the owner. A n=
ew owner would need to establish a new device key - again this is in the det=
ails and probably more specific to the project.

Regards

Chris D'Costa




> On 31 Mar 2014, at 13:46, Natanael <natanael.l@gmail.com> wrote:
>=20
> This sounds like Namecoin. You can already register profiles with it,
> including keypairs. onename.io is a web-based client you can use to
> register on the Namecoin blockchain.
>=20
>> On Mon, Mar 31, 2014 at 1:14 PM, Chris D'Costa <chris.dcosta@meek.io> wro=
te:
>> Security of transmission of person-to-person pay-to addresses is one of t=
he use cases that we are addressing on our hardware wallet.
>>=20
>> I have yet to finish the paper but in a nutshell it uses a decentralised l=
edger of, what we refer to as, "device keys".
>>=20
>> These keys are not related in any way to the Bitcoin keys, (which is why I=
'm hesitating about discussing it here) neither do they even attempt to iden=
tify the human owner if the device. But they do have a specific use case and=
 that is to provide "advanced knowledge" of a publickey that can be used for=
 encrypting a message to an intended recipient, without the requirement for a=
 third-party CA, and more importantly without prior dialogue. We think it is=
 this that would allow you to communicate a pay-to address to someone withou=
t seeing them in a secure way.
>>=20
>> As I understand it the BlockChain uses "time" bought through proof of wor=
k to establish a version of the truth, we are using time in the reverse sens=
e : advanced knowledge of all pubkeys. Indeed all devices could easily check=
 their own record to identify problems on the ledger.
>>=20
>> There is of course more to this, but I like to refer to the "distributed l=
edger of device keys" as the "Web-of-trust re-imagined" although that isn't s=
trictly true.
>>=20
>> Ok there you have it. The cat is out of the bag, feel free to give feedba=
ck, I have to finish the paper, apologies if it is not a topic for this list=
.
>>=20
>> Regards
>>=20
>> Chris D'Costa
>>=20
>>=20
>>> On 31 Mar 2014, at 12:21, vv01f <vv01f@riseup.net> wrote:
>>>=20
>>> Some users on bitcointalk[0] would like to have their vanity addresses
>>> available for others easily to find and verify the ownership over a kind=

>>> of WoT. Right now they sign their own addresses and quote them in the
>>> forums.
>>> As I pointed out there already the centralized storage in the forums is
>>> not secury anyhow and signed messages could be swapped easily with the
>>> next hack of the forums.
>>>=20
>>> Is that use case taken care of in any plans already?
>>>=20
>>> I thought about abusing pgp keyservers but that would suit for single
>>> vanity addresses only.
>>> It seems webfinger could be part of a solution where servers of a
>>> business can tell and proof you if a specific address is owned by them.
>>>=20
>>> [0] https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=3D502538
>>> [1] https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=3D505095
>>>=20
>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------=
------
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> Bitcoin-development mailing list
>>> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
>>> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>>=20
>> -------------------------------------------------------------------------=
-----
>> _______________________________________________
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>> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
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