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Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] SCRIPT_VERIFY_STRICTENC and CHECKSIG NOT
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On Thu, Nov 6, 2014 at 2:38 AM, Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org> wrote:
> However the implementation of the STRICTENC flag simply makes pubkey
> formats it doesn't recognize act as through the signature was invalid,
> rather than failing the transaction. Similar to the invalid due to too
> many sigops DoS attack I found before, this lets you fill up the mempool
> with garbage transactions that will never be mined. OTOH I don't see any
> way to exploit this in a v0.9.x IsStandard() transaction, so we haven't
> shipped code that actually has this vulnerability. (dunno about
> alt-implementations)
Yeah, there's even a comment in script/interpreter.h currently about
how STRICTENC is not softfork safe. I didn't realize that this would
lead to the mempool accepting invalid transactions (I thought there
was a second validity check with the actual consensus rules; if not,
maybe we need to add that).
> I suggest we either change STRICTENC to simply fail unrecognized pubkeys
> immediately - similar to how non-standard signatures are treated - or
> fail the script if the pubkey is non-standard and signature verification
> succeeds.
Sounds good to me, I disliked those semantics too.
--
Pieter
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