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Cc: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Cold Signing Payment Requests
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--001a11c356f47b90f904db93c91e
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RE: Timo's proposal for protecting the refund address:
Seems to me there are two risks:
1) The risk that the merchant's web server will be compromised and the
attacker will redirect refunds
2) The risk that the merchant will miss payments because they miss a POST
to the payment_url (maybe the customer's machine crashes during the HTTPS
handshake)
If payments are a lot more common than refunds, then (2) will outweigh (1).
I also think an attacker who compromises the front-end web server would
probably just have it start generating plain-old pay-to-bitcoin-address
payment requests, and hope that lots of customers pay them directly before
the attack is discovered.
--
--
Gavin Andresen
--001a11c356f47b90f904db93c91e
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
<div>RE: Timo's proposal for protecting the refund address:</div><div><=
br></div><div>Seems to me there are two risks:</div><div><br></div><div>1) =
The risk that the merchant's web server will be compromised and the att=
acker will redirect refunds</div>
<div>2) The risk that the merchant will miss payments because they miss a P=
OST to the payment_url (maybe the customer's machine crashes during the=
HTTPS handshake)</div><div><br></div><div>If payments are a lot more commo=
n than refunds, then (2) will outweigh (1).</div>
<div><br></div><div>I also think an attacker who compromises the front-end =
web server would probably just have it start generating plain-old pay-to-bi=
tcoin-address payment requests, and hope that lots of customers pay them di=
rectly before the attack is discovered.</div>
<div><br></div><div>-- <br>--<br>Gavin Andresen<br>
</div>
--001a11c356f47b90f904db93c91e--
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