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From: Gino Pinuto <gino.pinuto@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 14 Jul 2022 13:42:56 +0200
Message-ID: <CAA3CggE4cJO_=8YR82qYOS=9PR34mSVsGznOuexTNpHbRuW6hw@mail.gmail.com>
To: Erik Aronesty <erik@q32.com>, 
 Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
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Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Security problems with relying on transaction
 fees for security
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This is not an argument in line with bitcoin values, on that scenario only
rich people will be able to mine and participate to the consensus process.
Like George Soros today, he use its financial reserves to monopolize ONG in
order to manipulate nation states. I would not define this a "tax",
moreover a cost to maintain control over the network.

Those rich holders could crate a cartel and without market dynamics all
game theory stop to work and the bitcoin network value drop.

We should think about how to maximise the network value instead of trying
to preserve it with corruptible practices outside of market dynamics
principles.

On Thu, 14 Jul 2022, 12:53 Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev, <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> Fees and miner rewards are not needed at all for security at all since
> long term holders can simply invest in mining to secure the value of thei=
r
> stake.
>
> Isn't it enough that the protocol has a mechanism to secure value?
>
> Sure fees *might* be enough.
>
> But in the event that they are not, large holders can burn a bit to make
> sure the hashrate stays high.
>
> I know, I know it's a tax on the rich and it's not fair because smaller
> holders are less likely to do it, but it's a miniscule tax even in the
> worst case
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Thu, Jul 14, 2022, 5:35 AM vjudeu via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
>> > This specific approach would obviously not work as most of those
>> outputs would be dust and the miner would need to waste an absurd amount=
 of
>> block space just to grab them, but maybe there's a smarter way to do it.
>>
>> There is a smarter way. Just send 0.01 BTC per block to the timelocked
>> outputs. Now, we have 6.25 BTC, so it means less than 0.2%. But that
>> percentage will grow over time, as basic block reward will shrink, and w=
e
>> will have mandatory 0.01 BTC endlessly moved, until it will wrap. And gu=
ess
>> what: if it will be 0.01 BTC per block, wrapped every 210,000 blocks, it
>> simply means you can lock 2,100 BTC in an endless circulation loop, and
>> avoid this "tail supply attack".
>>
>> So, fortunately, even if "tail supply attackers" will win, we will still
>> have a chance to counter-attack by burning those coins, or (even better)=
 by
>> locking them in an endless circulation loop, just to satisfy their
>> malicious soft-fork, whatever amount it will require. Because even if it
>> will be mandatory to timelock 0.01 BTC to the current block number plus
>> 210,000, then it is still perfectly valid to move that amount endlessly,
>> without taking it, just to resist this "tail supply attack".
>>
>>
>> On 2022-07-13 20:01:39 user Manuel Costa via bitcoin-dev <
>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>> > What about burning all fees and keep a block reward that will smooth
>> out while keeping the ~21M coins limit ?
>>
>> This would be a hard fork afaict as it would go against the rules of the
>> coinbase transaction following the usual halving schedule.
>>
>> However, if instead we added a rule that fees have to be sent to an
>> anyone can spend output with a timelock we might be able to achieve a
>> similar thing.
>>
>> Highly inefficient example:
>>
>> - Split blocks into 144 (about a day)
>> - A mined block takes all the fees and distributes them equally into 144
>> new outputs (anyone can spend) time locked to each of the 144 blocks of =
the
>> next day.
>> - Next day, for each block, we'd have available an amount equivalent to
>> the previous day total fees / 144. So we deliver previous day's fees
>> smoothed out.
>>
>> Notes:
>> 144 is arbitrary in the example.
>> This specific approach would obviously not work as most of those outputs
>> would be dust and the miner would need to waste an absurd amount of bloc=
k
>> space just to grab them, but maybe there's a smarter way to do it.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Gino Pinuto via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
>> escreveu no dia quarta, 13/07/2022 =C3=A0(s) 13:19:
>> What about burning all fees and keep a block reward that will smooth out
>> while keeping the ~21M coins limit ?
>>
>>
>> Benefits :
>> - Miners would still be incentivized to collect higher fees transaction
>> with the indirect perspective to generate more reward in future.
>> - Revenues are equally distributed over time to all participants and we
>> solve the overnight discrepancy.
>> - Increased velocity of money will reduce the immediate supply of bitcoi=
n
>> cooling down the economy.
>> - Reduction of velocity will have an impact on miners only if it
>> persevere in the long term but short term they will still perceive the
>> buffered reward.
>>
>>
>> I don't have ideas yet on how to elegantly implement this.
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, 13 Jul 2022, 12:08 John Tromp via bitcoin-dev, <
>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>> > The emission curve lasts over 100 years because Bitcoin success state
>> requires it to be entrenched globally.
>>
>> It effectively doesn't. The last 100 years from 2040-2140 only emits a
>> pittance of about 0.4 of all bitcoin.
>>
>> What matters for proper distribution is the shape of the emission
>> curve. If you emit 99% in the first year and 1% in the next 100 years,
>> your emission "lasts" over 100 years, and you achieve a super low
>> supply inflation rate immediately after 1 year, but it's obviously a
>> terrible form of distribution.
>>
>> This is easy to quantify as the expected time of emission which would
>> be 0.99 * 0.5yr + 0.01* 51yr =3D 2 years.
>> Bitcoin is not much better in that the expected time of emission of an
>> bitcoin satisfies x =3D 0.5*2yr + 0.5*(4+x) and thus equals 6 years.
>>
>> Monero appears much better since its tail emission yields an infinite
>> expected time of emission, but if we avoid infinities by looking at
>> just the soft total emission [1], which is all that is emitted before
>> a 1% yearly inflation, then Monero is seen to actually be a lot worse
>> than Bitcoin, due to emitting over 40% in its first year and halving
>> the reward much faster. Ethereum is much worse still with its huge
>> premine and PoS coins like Algorand are scraping the bottom with their
>> expected emission time of 0.
>>
>> There's only one coin whose expected (soft) emission time is larger
>> than bitcoin's, and it's about an order of magnitude larger, at 50
>> years.
>>
>> [1]
>> https://john-tromp.medium.com/a-case-for-using-soft-total-supply-1169a18=
8d153
>> _______________________________________________
>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>

--000000000000db8b2305e3c2672d
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"auto">This is not an argument in line with bitcoin values, on t=
hat scenario only rich people will be able to mine and participate to the c=
onsensus process.<div dir=3D"auto">Like George Soros today, he use its fina=
ncial reserves to monopolize ONG in order to manipulate nation states. I wo=
uld not define this a &quot;tax&quot;, moreover a cost to maintain control =
over the network.</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">Those =
rich holders could crate a cartel and without market dynamics all game theo=
ry stop to work and the bitcoin network value drop.</div><div dir=3D"auto">=
<br></div><div dir=3D"auto">We should think about how to maximise the netwo=
rk value instead of trying to preserve it with corruptible practices outsid=
e of market dynamics principles.</div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
<div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Thu, 14 Jul 2022, 12:53 Erik Arone=
sty via bitcoin-dev, &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundatio=
n.org">bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><block=
quote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc=
 solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"auto">Fees and miner rewards are not n=
eeded at all for security at all since long term holders can simply invest =
in mining to secure the value of their stake.<div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><d=
iv dir=3D"auto">Isn&#39;t it enough that the protocol has a mechanism to se=
cure value?</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">Sure fees *m=
ight* be enough.=C2=A0=C2=A0</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"a=
uto">But in the event that they are not, large holders can burn a bit to ma=
ke sure the hashrate stays high.</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=
=3D"auto">I know, I know it&#39;s a tax on the rich and it&#39;s not fair b=
ecause smaller holders are less likely to do it, but it&#39;s a miniscule t=
ax even in the worst case</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto=
"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div di=
r=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto"><br><div=
 dir=3D"auto"><br></div></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=
=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Thu, Jul 14, 2022, 5:35 AM vjudeu via bitc=
oin-dev &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org" target=
=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a>&gt=
; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .=
8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">&gt; This specific approac=
h would obviously not work as most of those outputs would be dust and the m=
iner would need to waste an absurd amount of block space just to grab them,=
 but maybe there&#39;s a smarter way to do it.<br>
<br>
There is a smarter way. Just send 0.01 BTC per block to the timelocked outp=
uts. Now, we have 6.25 BTC, so it means less than 0.2%. But that percentage=
 will grow over time, as basic block reward will shrink, and we will have m=
andatory 0.01 BTC endlessly moved, until it will wrap. And guess what: if i=
t will be 0.01 BTC per block, wrapped every 210,000 blocks, it simply means=
 you can lock 2,100 BTC in an endless circulation loop, and avoid this &quo=
t;tail supply attack&quot;.<br>
<br>
So, fortunately, even if &quot;tail supply attackers&quot; will win, we wil=
l still have a chance to counter-attack by burning those coins, or (even be=
tter) by locking them in an endless circulation loop, just to satisfy their=
 malicious soft-fork, whatever amount it will require. Because even if it w=
ill be mandatory to timelock 0.01 BTC to the current block number plus 210,=
000, then it is still perfectly valid to move that amount endlessly, withou=
t taking it, just to resist this &quot;tail supply attack&quot;.<br>
<br>
<br>
On 2022-07-13 20:01:39 user Manuel Costa via bitcoin-dev &lt;<a href=3D"mai=
lto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; What about burning all fees and keep a block reward that will smooth o=
ut while keeping the ~21M coins limit ?<br>
<br>
This would be a hard fork afaict as it would go against the rules of the co=
inbase transaction following the usual halving schedule.<br>
<br>
However, if instead we added a rule that fees have to be sent to an anyone =
can spend output with a timelock we might be able to achieve a similar thin=
g.<br>
<br>
Highly inefficient example:<br>
<br>
- Split blocks into 144 (about a day)<br>
- A mined block takes all the fees and distributes them equally into 144 ne=
w outputs (anyone can spend) time locked=C2=A0to each of the 144 blocks of =
the next day.<br>
- Next day, for each block, we&#39;d have available an amount equivalent to=
 the previous day total fees / 144. So we deliver previous day&#39;s fees s=
moothed out.<br>
<br>
Notes:<br>
144 is arbitrary in the example.<br>
This specific approach would obviously not work as=C2=A0most of those outpu=
ts would be dust and the miner would need to waste an absurd=C2=A0amount of=
 block space just to grab them, but maybe there&#39;s a smarter way to do i=
t.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
Gino Pinuto via bitcoin-dev &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfo=
undation.org" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">bitcoin-dev@l=
ists.linuxfoundation.org</a>&gt; escreveu no dia quarta, 13/07/2022 =C3=A0(=
s) 13:19:<br>
What about burning all fees and keep a block reward that will smooth out wh=
ile keeping the ~21M coins limit ?<br>
<br>
<br>
Benefits :<br>
- Miners would still be incentivized to collect higher fees transaction wit=
h the indirect perspective to generate more reward in future.<br>
- Revenues are equally distributed over time to all participants and we sol=
ve the overnight discrepancy.<br>
- Increased velocity of money will reduce the immediate supply of bitcoin c=
ooling down the economy.<br>
- Reduction of velocity will have an impact on miners only if it persevere =
in the long term but short term they will still perceive the buffered rewar=
d.<br>
<br>
<br>
I don&#39;t have ideas yet on how to elegantly implement this.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
On Wed, 13 Jul 2022, 12:08 John Tromp via bitcoin-dev, &lt;<a href=3D"mailt=
o:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer" targ=
et=3D"_blank">bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; The emission curve lasts over 100 years because Bitcoin success state =
requires it to be entrenched globally.<br>
<br>
It effectively doesn&#39;t. The last 100 years from 2040-2140 only emits a<=
br>
pittance of about 0.4 of all bitcoin.<br>
<br>
What matters for proper distribution is the shape of the emission<br>
curve. If you emit 99% in the first year and 1% in the next 100 years,<br>
your emission &quot;lasts&quot; over 100 years, and you achieve a super low=
<br>
supply inflation rate immediately after 1 year, but it&#39;s obviously a<br=
>
terrible form of distribution.<br>
<br>
This is easy to quantify as the expected time of emission which would<br>
be 0.99 * 0.5yr + 0.01* 51yr =3D 2 years.<br>
Bitcoin is not much better in that the expected time of emission of an<br>
bitcoin satisfies x =3D 0.5*2yr + 0.5*(4+x) and thus equals 6 years.<br>
<br>
Monero appears much better since its tail emission yields an infinite<br>
expected time of emission, but if we avoid infinities by looking at<br>
just the soft total emission [1], which is all that is emitted before<br>
a 1% yearly inflation, then Monero is seen to actually be a lot worse<br>
than Bitcoin, due to emitting over 40% in its first year and halving<br>
the reward much faster. Ethereum is much worse still with its huge<br>
premine and PoS coins like Algorand are scraping the bottom with their<br>
expected emission time of 0.<br>
<br>
There&#39;s only one coin whose expected (soft) emission time is larger<br>
than bitcoin&#39;s, and it&#39;s about an order of magnitude larger, at 50<=
br>
years.<br>
<br>
[1] <a href=3D"https://john-tromp.medium.com/a-case-for-using-soft-total-su=
pply-1169a188d153" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blan=
k">https://john-tromp.medium.com/a-case-for-using-soft-total-supply-1169a18=
8d153</a><br>
_______________________________________________<br>
bitcoin-dev mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org" rel=3D"noreferrer =
noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev" =
rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://lists.li=
nuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev</a><br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
bitcoin-dev mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org" rel=3D"noreferrer =
noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev" =
rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://lists.li=
nuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev</a><br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
bitcoin-dev mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org" rel=3D"noreferrer =
noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a><br>
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rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://lists.li=
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