1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
|
Received: from sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.193]
helo=mx.sourceforge.net)
by sfs-ml-4.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76)
(envelope-from <rusty@ozlabs.org>) id 1Z4xkA-00055F-MA
for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net;
Tue, 16 Jun 2015 20:46:02 +0000
Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of ozlabs.org
designates 103.22.144.67 as permitted sender)
client-ip=103.22.144.67; envelope-from=rusty@ozlabs.org;
helo=ozlabs.org;
Received: from ozlabs.org ([103.22.144.67])
by sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:AES256-SHA:256)
(Exim 4.76) id 1Z4xk9-0001gZ-Dn
for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net;
Tue, 16 Jun 2015 20:46:02 +0000
Received: by ozlabs.org (Postfix, from userid 1011)
id 662D01402AA; Wed, 17 Jun 2015 06:45:53 +1000 (AEST)
From: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
To: Jorge =?utf-8?Q?Tim=C3=B3n?= <jtimon@jtimon.cc>
In-Reply-To: <CABm2gDpBn744G0AbWDYj5aXQ6XbRzfnLpS=3z6NoWosaseFAWQ@mail.gmail.com>
References: <87k2vhfnx9.fsf@rustcorp.com.au>
<CAAS2fgRgWZX_O_2O1bgdFd_04xVp5Lnpw4hf=v6RSTXmsbdzPQ@mail.gmail.com>
<87r3pdembs.fsf@rustcorp.com.au>
<CAAS2fgTY5cqwj5XuKtkD8Z8N1vF=PZMba8EtGkbWnEackOcN8Q@mail.gmail.com>
<CAOG=w-tJjzrR_REJOShULfSO=T3ueHko-oQHdhqMCdZD0G_BDA@mail.gmail.com>
<87eglcelf3.fsf@rustcorp.com.au>
<CABm2gDpBn744G0AbWDYj5aXQ6XbRzfnLpS=3z6NoWosaseFAWQ@mail.gmail.com>
User-Agent: Notmuch/0.17 (http://notmuchmail.org) Emacs/24.4.1
(x86_64-pc-linux-gnu)
Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2015 17:36:38 +0930
Message-ID: <87zj40cc1d.fsf@rustcorp.com.au>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
X-Spam-Score: -1.7 (-)
X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net.
See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details.
-1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for
sender-domain
-0.0 SPF_HELO_PASS SPF: HELO matches SPF record
0.8 DATE_IN_PAST_12_24 Date: is 12 to 24 hours before Received: date
-0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record
-0.6 RP_MATCHES_RCVD Envelope sender domain matches handover relay
domain
-0.3 AWL AWL: Adjusted score from AWL reputation of From: address
X-Headers-End: 1Z4xk9-0001gZ-Dn
Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] [RFC] Canonical input and output ordering
in transactions
X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: <bitcoin-development.lists.sourceforge.net>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development>,
<mailto:bitcoin-development-request@lists.sourceforge.net?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://sourceforge.net/mailarchive/forum.php?forum_name=bitcoin-development>
List-Post: <mailto:bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
List-Help: <mailto:bitcoin-development-request@lists.sourceforge.net?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development>,
<mailto:bitcoin-development-request@lists.sourceforge.net?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2015 20:46:02 -0000
Jorge Tim=C3=B3n <jtimon@jtimon.cc> writes:
> On Jun 15, 2015 11:43 PM, "Rusty Russell" <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> wrote:
>
>> Though Peter Todd's more general best-effort language might make more
>> sense. It's not like you can hide an OP_RETURN transaction to make it
>> look like something else, so that transaction not going to be
>> distinguished by non-canonical ordering.
>
> What about commitments that don't use op_return (ie pay2contract
> commitments)?
I have no idea what they are? :)
> In any case, if the motivation is ordering in multi-party transactions
> there should be ways to do it without any consequences for other
> transaction types' privacy. For example you could have a deterministic
> method that depends on a random seed all parties in the transaction
> previously share. That way the ordering is deterministic for all parties
> involved in the transaction (which can use whatever channel they're using
> to send the parts to also send this random seed) while at the same time t=
he
> order looks random (or at least not cannonical in a recognisable way) to
> everyone else.
Yes, my plan B would be an informational bip with simple code,
suggesting a way to permute a transaction based on some secret. No
point everyone reinventing the wheel, badly.
Cheers,
Rusty.
|
