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Date: Wed, 25 Sep 2024 05:04:43 -0700 (PDT)
From: Hunter Beast <hunter@surmount.systems>
To: Bitcoin Development Mailing List <bitcoindev@googlegroups.com>
Message-Id: <5d43fbd6-723d-4d3d-bc35-427c36a4a06an@googlegroups.com>
In-Reply-To: <264e0340-ddfa-411c-a755-948399400b08n@googlegroups.com>
References: <62fd28ab-e8b5-4cfc-b5ae-0d5a033af057n@googlegroups.com>
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Subject: Re: [bitcoindev] Re: Proposing a P2QRH BIP towards a quantum
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Thanks for the response as always, Antoine, and I've made several=20
substantial updates to the BIP in case you'd like to give it another=20
once-over. I'm going to submit P2QRH to bips soon.

On Thursday, August 22, 2024 at 1:29:09=E2=80=AFAM UTC-6 Antoine Riard wrot=
e:

Hello Hunter,

> Well, it's also important to remember that for every qubit added, it=20
doubles the power of the system. A 2,000 qubit cryptographically-relevant=
=20
quantum computer (CRQC) is exponentially faster than a 1,000 qubit one.=20
There's also the > capability for cross-links for multiple chips to=20
communicate with each other, which IBM is also researching. The IBM Quantum=
=20
System Two can be upgraded to support 16,000 qubits according to their=20
marketing. Also consider that the ve> rification of the results from the=20
CRQC can be done via classical computer, so a high level of error=20
correction might not be as necessary so long as the program is run enough=
=20
times. It will take much longer, of course.

On performance, once again I think it all depends on the quantum computer=
=20
architecture considered and if we're talking about physical qubits /=20
logical qubits. As the paper "The impact of hardware specifications on=20
reaching quantum advantage in the fault tolerant regime" linked in your BIP=
=20
judiciously observe in its introduction that surface code (as used by IBM)=
=20
is only one of the error code correction technique.

About cross-links for multiple chips, even if each chip parallelize towards=
=20
a single classical logical unit, ordering computational units is a=20
notoriously hard issue in classical computer. I don't think there is any=20
certainty in quantum computer development that each set of qubits of=20
isolated chips can be arithmetically additioned without a coefficient loss=
=20
on the resulting sum (...there is always a bit of apprehension to have to=
=20
dissociate between marketing claims and academic claim duly=20
peer-reviewed...). And while indeed, the results can be evaluated via a=20
classical computer, this doesn't mean transitively that the evaluation will=
=20
be as efficient (in energy / computational cycles) rather than doing more=
=20
error correction on the quantum computer side.


After looking into it more, I believe you are correct. Qubit count=20
determines a lot of things, but not necessarily the "power", there's many,=
=20
many factors that go into that, which you've outlined.
=20

> I've decided in one of my more recent updates to the BIP to default to=20
the highest level of NIST security, NIST V, which provides 256 bits of=20
security. You can see my rationale for that in this PR:
> https://github.com/cryptoquick/bips/pull/7/files

Those are assumptions there is a security increase by scaling up the size=
=20
of the public key. In the Bitcoin world, we don't even make assumption on=
=20
the public key size
for ECDSA signature scheme as both compressed and uncompressed public keys=
=20
have been historically valid. Similarly, the public key size does not have=
=20
to be bundled with
the specification of the signature verification scheme itself (e.g see=20
BIP340 discussion on x-only public keys).


According to the spec, I was hoping to distinguish between post-quantum=20
algorithms by their key size. If there's a collision, a distinguishing byte=
=20
could be added for the new algorithm. Then they're identified by their=20
PUSHDATA opcode. That's the primary reason they're specified.
=20

> As such, you'll see FALCON is roughly 4x larger than SQIsign signatures.=
=20
Although supersingular elliptic curve quaternion isogeny-based algorithms=
=20
are newer and
> more experimental than lattice-based cryptography, I think the benefits=
=20
outweigh the risks, especially when transaction throughput is a principal=
=20
concern.
=20
There are no public key size in the security table so it's hard to compare=
=20
the overall on-chain space cost for each signature post-quantum algorithm=
=20
considered.
Neither actually, there is an estimation of the verification cost for an=20
average 200-bytes transactions, old good's Hamilton's quaternion and=20
relying on complex numbers, which can be hard to deal with for the hobbyist=
=20
CPUs can be a concern.


I've updated the table to reflect the key size concern. For verification=20
cost, I've found it's difficult to compare numbers provided by the=20
different papers. Some provide cycles, some provide durations. I do want to=
=20
include a benchmark in the test vectors once they're ready.
=20

> It's crucial that the signature and public key both receive the witness=
=20
discount. Can you go into more detail in how that might be accomplished?

The BIP341 taproot annex could be used for that, see=20
https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0341.mediawiki#cite_note-5


I've adjusted the BIP for this to integrate with Taproot. The primary=20
difference is that this will use a hash of the Taproot public keys in the=
=20
v3 spend script.
=20

> Although it's too early to talk about activation of a QuBit soft fork,=20
I've put some thought into how we can maintain the existing Bitcoin=20
throughput with a soft fork, and I think it might be prudent to, when the=
=20
time comes, introdu> ce a 4x additional QuBit witness discount, maybe we=20
call it the quitness, which is only available to valid P2QRH signatures.=20
This would preclude its abuse for things like inscriptions because the=20
signature data would need to corresp> ond to the key, and even if this were=
=20
possible, it's likely to result in only a burner address. This would=20
increase chain state growth from roughly 100GB/yr to possibly closer to=20
2-300GB, depending on adoption. As the state of the a> rt of SSD technology=
=20
advances, this should allow plebs to run their own node on a 4TB disk for=
=20
over a decade, even including existing chain size of ~600GB.

The annex could have typed fields for post-quantum signature and public key=
=20
further witness discount. However, I think it's a bit naive to assume that=
=20
SSD technology advances will stay linear and that it will be economically=
=20
accessible at the same pace to the tens of thousands of plebs actually=20
running full-nodes and constituting the skeleton of the base-relay network.=
=20
One could play out a posteriori the predictions on bandwidth technological=
=20
advances that have been made in BIP103 to see how well they held on the=20
last ~9 years.


According to the C program in BIP-101, it looks like the block size would=
=20
have increased by nearly 4x over the past ~9 years. I've specified in the=
=20
BIP a separate witness, I call the quitness, that will solely receive the=
=20
additional 4x discount. Schnorr signatures are still kept in the witness.
=20

(There is another caution with evaluating technological advances, namely=20
that some hardware components could be actually massively consumed by other=
=20
cryptocurrencies for their consensus algorithms...)

> If we were to use the same approach for FALCON signatures, a 16x discount=
=20
would be needed, and I think that's far too much for the community to=20
accept. As for pub key size and verification
> time, these are secondary considerations if the primary constraint is=20
maintaining present transaction throughput. That's what makes SQIsign so=20
promising.

Well, if there is something like the annex with typed fields each type of=
=20
post-quantum signature could get a wider discount, especially if there are=
=20
verification asymmetries favoring some scheme over another one, even if the=
=20
security properties are differing.


As you know, Bitcoin doesn't charge based on the complexity of how long it=
=20
takes to run script, so it would make sense to charge based only upon byte=
=20
count. If runtime is a major concern, and it is desired by the community,=
=20
it can be proposed as a separate BIP, and potentially included in a QuBit=
=20
soft fork.
=20

> The Impact paper seems to dismiss Grover's algorithm, but I think it's=20
important to err on the size of caution and instead use a 32-byte double=20
SHA-2 (HASH256) for additional security in the P2QRH output.

Performance-wise, this doesn't shock me to use a double SHA-2 (HASH256) as=
=20
it has been added for many domain separation tagged hash in taproot.
About Grover's algorithm, it's more the sample space and collision space=20
that should be more defined to be relevant, you can always downgrade the=20
performance of the Grover's algorithm by scaling up the sample space,=20
however it's not sure it's practical for bitcoin transaction generation.


That's good. Additionally, because Grover's algorithm scales so poorly=20
compared to Shor's, I think it's a safe security assumption that HASH256=20
will be more secure for use in the v3 spend script.
=20

> I'm not sure I understand what you mean by this...
> Is your coin scarcity comment related to what I call "satoshi's shield"=
=20
in the BIP?

Not at all the "satoshi's shield" as you're describing in the BIP.

This is just the observation that bitcoin coins are scarce in the sense=20
that you need to burn raw energy to acquire the rewards according to the=20
issuance schedule (or miners fees). Bitcoin script can be designed to=20
request that a sufficient number of bitcoin coins, or satoshis, are burned=
=20
before to unlock a coin locked under a quantum-frail scriptpubkey.

That means any quantum computer attacker, even if they have an efficient=20
quantum computer, might not be able to break the redeem script itself, only=
=20
the signatures composing the redeem script check sig operations.

Let's give a concrete example, let's say you have the following pseudo=20
script:

        <<OP_DEPTH> <OP_PUSHDATA2> <998> <OP_EQUALVERIFY> <pubkey>=20
<OP_CHECKSIG>>

Interpeted the following script should request from the spending party,=20
whatever it is to provide a witness stack of length 998 bytes, all dummy=20
elements.
Those dummy elements are putting the burden on the quantum computer=20
attacker to burn fees at the current sat per vbyte rate to realize a=20
quantum exploit.
(There could leverage SIGHASH_NONE to escape this "fee jail"... however it=
=20
sounds to expose them to be overrided by a miner).

So assuming this defensive scheme in face of quantum exploit is sound, I=20
think this put the burden of a quantum attacker to have hashrate=20
capabilities at the current level of difficulty, not solely an efficient=20
CRQC.


I'm not sure I understand the point you're making, but only valid public=20
key / signature pairs in the quitness will be considered valid.
=20

> Yes, this makes more sense. I'm not sure anything can be done with the=20
fraud proofs, but they could at least prove that a bad actor is present.=20
Ideally both approaches are combined for maximum security and=20
accountability.

No KYC is necessarily hurting mining pools as there is no single kyc=20
definition that you can implement that do not open the door for a kind of=
=20
DoS exploitation.

This is not an issue to build a practical fraud proofs systems on seen=20
transaction, the open question is more if the average bitcoin user would=20
pay to download fraud proofs demonstrating that a given miner is not=20
engaging in quantum exploit.


Makes sense.
=20

> I've taken Antoine's feedback to heart and added FALCON to the=20
specification, including a section that addresses the increased maintenance=
=20
burden of adding two distinct post-quantum cryptosystems.

Thanks you for the addition, for the maintenance burden there is always the=
=20
counter-argument to be made that you can secure a coins under multiple=20
post-quantun signature scheme, especially if they're from different=20
hardness assumptions breed. If one of the two scheme is secure, the coins=
=20
are still locked by the other half.


You'll see I've taken this feedback to heart and specified hybrid=20
cryptography in the BIP.
=20

I think it could be interesting to split the BIP in multiple ones, one for=
=20
the general consensus mechanism introducing a P2QRH with all quantum risks=
=20
considerations, and an individual one for each signature algorithm that=20
could be deployed udner this generic P2QRH. Kinda in the same way, that=20
BIP340 / BIP341 are split.


You might be right about that. I'd still like to specify FALCON for the=20
first one, but additional signature algorithms can get their own BIPs.
=20

Best,
Antoine
ots hash: b57e9fe0b3de603ca66be29b7f1ba04fa5b8bc516c1277114ab42ac9f8572e12


Let me know if there's any additional changes you would like me to make.=20
I'll be submitting the BIP upstream to the bips repo as a draft PR soon. Do=
=20
you mind if I credit you in the Acknowledgements section? Thanks for all=20
the great feedback so far.

Le jeudi 15 ao=C3=BBt 2024 =C3=A0 06:25:01 UTC+1, Hunter Beast a =C3=A9crit=
 :

I've taken Antoine's feedback to heart and added FALCON to the=20
specification, including a section that addresses the increased maintenance=
=20
burden of adding two distinct post-quantum cryptosystems.
Please review.
https://github.com/cryptoquick/bips/pull/9/files

On Tuesday, August 6, 2024 at 11:50:35=E2=80=AFAM UTC-6 Hunter Beast wrote:

That's alright, Antoine, it's been a busy month for me too.

> So I think it's good to stay cool minded and I think my observation about=
=20
talking of "super-exponential rate" as used in maaku old blog post does not
> hold a lot of rigor to describe the advances in the field of quantum=20
computing. Note, also how IMB is a commercial entity that can have a lot of=
=20
interests
> in "pumping" the state of "quantum computing" to gather fundings (there=
=20
is a historical anecdote among bitcoin OG circles about Vitalik trying to=
=20
do an
> ICO to build a quantum computer like 10 years ago, just to remember).

Well, it's also important to remember that for every qubit added, it=20
doubles the power of the system. A 2,000 qubit cryptographically-relevant=
=20
quantum computer (CRQC) is exponentially faster than a 1,000 qubit one.=20
There's also the capability for cross-links for multiple chips to=20
communicate with each other, which IBM is also researching. The IBM Quantum=
=20
System Two can be upgraded to support 16,000 qubits according to their=20
marketing. Also consider that the verification of the results from the CRQC=
=20
can be done via classical computer, so a high level of error correction=20
might not be as necessary so long as the program is run enough times. It=20
will take much longer, of course.

> I think FALCON is what has the smallest pubkey + sig size for=20
hash-and-sign lattice-based schemes. So I think it's worth reworking the=20
BIP to see what has the smallest generation / validation time and pubkey +=
=20
size space for the main post-quantum scheme. At least for dilthium, falcon,=
=20
sphincs+ and SQISign. For an hypothetical witness discount, a v2 P2QRH=20
could be always be moved in a very template annex tag / field.

I've decided in one of my more recent updates to the BIP to default to the=
=20
highest level of NIST security, NIST V, which provides 256 bits of=20
security. You can see my rationale for that in this PR:
https://github.com/cryptoquick/bips/pull/7/files
Then, referencing this table:
https://github.com/cryptoquick/bips/blob/p2qrh/bip-p2qrh.mediawiki#security
As such, you'll see FALCON is roughly 4x larger than SQIsign signatures.=20
Although supersingular elliptic curve quaternion isogeny-based algorithms=
=20
are newer and more experimental than lattice-based cryptography, I think=20
the benefits outweigh the risks, especially when transaction throughput is=
=20
a principal concern.

It's crucial that the signature and public key both receive the witness=20
discount. Can you go into more detail in how that might be accomplished?

Although it's too early to talk about activation of a QuBit soft fork, I've=
=20
put some thought into how we can maintain the existing Bitcoin throughput=
=20
with a soft fork, and I think it might be prudent to, when the time comes,=
=20
introduce a 4x additional QuBit witness discount, maybe we call it the=20
quitness, which is only available to valid P2QRH signatures. This would=20
preclude its abuse for things like inscriptions because the signature data=
=20
would need to correspond to the key, and even if this were possible, it's=
=20
likely to result in only a burner address. This would increase chain state=
=20
growth from roughly 100GB/yr to possibly closer to 2-300GB, depending on=20
adoption. As the state of the art of SSD technology advances, this should=
=20
allow plebs to run their own node on a 4TB disk for over a decade, even=20
including existing chain size of ~600GB.

If we were to use the same approach for FALCON signatures, a 16x discount=
=20
would be needed, and I think that's far too much for the community to=20
accept. As for pub key size and verification time, these are secondary=20
considerations if the primary constraint is maintaining present transaction=
=20
throughput. That's what makes SQIsign so promising.

> See literature on quantum attacks on bitcoin in the reference of the=20
paper you quote ("The impact of hardware specifications on reaching quantum=
=20
advantage in the fault tolerant regime") for a discussion on Grover's=20
search algorithm.

The Impact paper seems to dismiss Grover's algorithm, but I think it's=20
important to err on the size of caution and instead use a 32-byte double=20
SHA-2 (HASH256) for additional security in the P2QRH output.

> Namely you can introduce an artifical "witness-stack size scale ladder"=
=20
in pseudo-bitcoin script: OP_SIZE <1000> OP_EQUALVERIFY OP_DROP=20
...checksig...
> I have not verified it works well on bitcoin core though this script=20
should put the burden on the quantum attacker to have enough bitcoin amount=
=20
available to burn in on-chain fees in witness size to break a P2WPKH.

I'm not sure I understand what you mean by this...
Is your coin scarcity comment related to what I call "satoshi's shield" in=
=20
the BIP?

> The technical issue if you implement KYC for a mining pool you're=20
increasing your DoS surface and this could be exploited by competing=20
miners. A more reasonable security model can be to have miner coinbase=20
pubkeys being used to commit to the "seen-in-mempool" spends and from then=
=20
build "hand wawy" fraud proofs that a miner is quantum attacking you're=20
P2WSH spends at pubkey reveal time during transaction relay.

Yes, this makes more sense. I'm not sure anything can be done with the=20
fraud proofs, but they could at least prove that a bad actor is present.=20
Ideally both approaches are combined for maximum security and=20
accountability.

Thanks for your time!

On Friday, July 12, 2024 at 7:44:27=E2=80=AFPM UTC-6 Antoine Riard wrote:

Hi Hunter Beast,

Apologies for the delay in answer.

> I was thinking of focusing on the IBM Quantum System Two, mention how it=
=20
can be scaled, and that although it might be quite limited, if running=20
Shor's variant for a > sufficient amount of time, above a certain minimum=
=20
threshold of qubits, it might be capable of decrypting the key to an=20
address within one year. I base this on the estimate > provided in a study=
=20
by the Sussex Centre for Quantum Technologies, et. al [1]. They provide two=
=20
figures, 317M qubits to decrypt in one hour, 13M qubits to decrypt in one >=
=20
day. It would seem it scales roughly linearly, and so extrapolating it=20
further, 36,000 qubits would be needed to decrypt an address within one=20
year. However, the IBM Heron > QPU turned out to have a gate time 100x less=
=20
than was estimated in 2022, and so it might be possible to make do with=20
even fewer qubits still within that timeframe. With > only 360 qubits,=20
barring algorithmic overhead such as for circuit memory, it might be=20
possible to decrypt a single address within a year. That might sound like a=
=20
lot, but > being able to accomplish that at all would be significant,=20
almost like a Chicago Pile moment, proving something in practice that was=
=20
previously only thought theoretically > possible for the past 3 decades.=20
And it's only downhill from there...

Briefly surveying the paper "The impact of hardware specifications on=20
reaching quantum advantage in the fault tolerant regime", I think it's a=20
reasonble framework to evaluate
the practical efficiency of quantum attacks on bitcoin, it's self=20
consistent and there is a critical approach referencing the usual=20
litterature on quantum attacks on bitcoin. Just
note the caveat, one can find in usual quantum complexity litterature,=20
"particularly in regard to end-to-end physical resource estimation. There=
=20
are many other error correction
techniques available, and the best choice will likely depend on the=20
underlying architecture's characteristics, such as the available physical=
=20
qubit=E2=80=93qubit connectivity" (verbatim). Namely, evaluating quantum at=
tacks is=20
very dependent on the concrete physical architecture underpinning it.

All that said, I agree with you that if you see a quantum computer with the=
=20
range of 1000 physical qubits being able to break the DLP for ECC based=20
encryption like secp256k1, even if it takes a year it will be a Chicago=20
Pile moment, or whatever comparative experiments which were happening about=
=20
chain of nuclear reactions in 30s / 40s.

>  I think it's time to revisit these discussions given IBM's progress.=20
They've published a two videos in particular that are worth watching; their=
=20
keynote from December of last > year [2], and their roadmap update from=20
just last month [3]

I have looked on the roadmap as it's available on the IBM blog post:=20
https://www.ibm.com/quantum/blog/quantum-roadmap-2033#mark-roadmap-out-to-2=
033
They give only a target of 2000 logical qubit to be reach in 2033...which=
=20
is surprisingly not that strong...And one expect they might hit likely soli=
d
state issues in laying out in hardware the Heron processor architecture. As=
=20
a point of thinking, it took like 2 decades to advance on the state of art
of litography in traditional chips manufacturing.
=20
So I think it's good to stay cool minded and I think my observation about=
=20
talking of "super-exponential rate" as used in maaku old blog post does not
hold a lot of rigor to describe the advances in the field of quantum=20
computing. Note, also how IMB is a commercial entity that can have a lot of=
=20
interests
in "pumping" the state of "quantum computing" to gather fundings (there is=
=20
a historical anecdote among bitcoin OG circles about Vitalik trying to do a=
n
ICO to build a quantum computer like 10 years ago, just to remember).

> I'm supportive of this consideration. FALCON might be a good substitute,=
=20
and maybe it can be upgraded to HAWK for even better performance depending=
=20
on how much > time there is. According to the BIP, FALCON signatures are=20
~10x larger t> han Schnorr signatures, so this will of course make the=20
transaction more expensive, but we also > must remember, these signatures=
=20
will be going into the witness, which already receives a 4x discount.=20
Perhaps the discount could be incr> eased further someday to fit > more=20
transactions into blocks, but this will also likely result in more=20
inscriptions filling unused space also, which permanently increases the=20
burden of running an archive > node. Due to the controversy s> uch a change=
=20
could bring, I would rather any increases in the witness discount be=20
excluded from future activation discussions, so as to be > considered=20
separately, even if it pertains to an increase in P2QRH transaction size.
=20
> Do you think it's worth reworking the BIP to use FALCON signatures? I've=
=20
only done a deep dive into SQIsign and SPHINCS+, and I will acknowledge the=
=20
readiness levels between those two are presently worlds apart.

I think FALCON is what has the smallest pubkey + sig size for hash-and-sign=
=20
lattice-based schemes. So I think it's worth reworking the BIP to see what=
=20
has the smallest generation / validation time and pubkey + size space for=
=20
the main post-quantum scheme. At least for dilthium, falcon, sphincs+ and=
=20
SQISign. For an hypothetical witness discount, a v2 P2QRH could be always=
=20
be moved in a very template annex tag / field.

> Also, do you think it's of any concern to use HASH160 instead of HASH256=
=20
in the output script? I think it's fine for a cryptographic commitment=20
since it's simply a hash of a hash (MD160 of SHA-256).

See literature on quantum attacks on bitcoin in the reference of the paper=
=20
you quote ("The impact of hardware specifications on reaching quantum=20
advantage in the fault tolerant regime") for a discussion on Grover's=20
search algorithm.

> I'm not sure I fully understand this, but even more practically, as=20
mentioned in the BIP, value can simply be kept in P2WPKH outputs, ideally=
=20
with a value of fewer than 50
> coins per address, and when funds ever need to be spent, the>=20
 transaction is signed and submitted out of band to a trusted mining pool,=
=20
ideally one that does KYC, so it's
> known which individual miners get to see the public key before it's=20
mined. It's not perfect, since this relies on exogenou> s security=20
assumptions, which is why P2QRH is
> proposed.

Again, the paper you're referencing ("The impact of hardware specifications=
=20
on reaching quantum advantage...") is analyzing the performance of quantum=
=20
advantage under
2 dimensions, namely space and time. My observation is in Bitcoin we have=
=20
an additional dimension, "coin scarcity" that can be leveraged to build=20
defense of address
spends in face of quantum attacks.

Namely you can introduce an artifical "witness-stack size scale ladder" in=
=20
pseudo-bitcoin script: OP_SIZE <1000> OP_EQUALVERIFY OP_DROP ...checksig...
I have not verified it works well on bitcoin core though this script should=
=20
put the burden on the quantum attacker to have enough bitcoin amount=20
available to burn in on-chain fees in witness size to break a P2WPKH.


>  ideally with a value of fewer than 50 coins per address, and when funds=
=20
ever need to be spent, the transaction is signed and submitted out of band=
=20
to a trusted mining pool, ideally
> one that does KYC, so it's known which individual > miners get to see the=
=20
public key before it's mined. It's not perfect, since this relies on=20
exogenous security assumptions, which is
> why P2QRH is proposed.

The technical issue if you implement KYC for a mining pool you're=20
increasing your DoS surface and this could be exploited by competing=20
miners. A more reasonable security model can be to have miner coinbase=20
pubkeys being used to commit to the "seen-in-mempool" spends and from then=
=20
build "hand wawy" fraud proofs that a miner is quantum attacking you're=20
P2WSH spends at pubkey reveal time during transaction relay.

Best,
Antoine

ots hash: 1ad818955bbf0c5468847c00c2974ddb5cf609d630523622bfdb27f1f0dc0b30
Le lundi 17 juin 2024 =C3=A0 23:25:25 UTC+1, hunter a =C3=A9crit :


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----=20
Hash: SHA256=20

On 2024-06-16 19:31, Antoine Riard <antoin...@gmail.com> wrote:=20

>=20
> Hi Hunter Beast,I think any post-quantum upgrade signature algorithm=20
upgrade proposal would grandly benefit to haveShor's based practical=20
attacks far more defined in the Bitcoin context. As soon you start to talk=
=20
aboutquantum computers there is no such thing as a "quantum computer"=20
though a wide array of architecturesbased on a range of technologies to=20
encode qubits on nanoscale physical properties.=20
>=20
Good point. I can write a section in the BIP Motivation or Security section=
=20
about how an attack might take place practically, and the potential urgency=
=20
of such an attack.=20
 =20
I was thinking of focusing on the IBM Quantum System Two, mention how it=20
can be scaled, and that although it might be quite limited, if running=20
Shor's variant for a sufficient amount of time, above a certain minimum=20
threshold of qubits, it might be capable of decrypting the key to an=20
address within one year. I base this on the estimate provided in a study by=
=20
the Sussex Centre for Quantum Technologies, et. al [1]. They provide two=20
figures, 317M qubits to decrypt in one hour, 13M qubits to decrypt in one=
=20
day. It would seem it scales roughly linearly, and so extrapolating it=20
further, 36,000 qubits would be needed to decrypt an address within one=20
year. However, the IBM Heron QPU turned out to have a gate time 100x less=
=20
than was estimated in 2022, and so it might be possible to make do with=20
even fewer qubits still within that timeframe. With only 360 qubits,=20
barring algorithmic overhead such as for circuit memory, it might be=20
possible to decrypt a single address within a year. That might sound like a=
=20
lot, but being able to accomplish that at all would be significant, almost=
=20
like a Chicago Pile moment, proving something in practice that was=20
previously only thought theoretically possible for the past 3 decades. And=
=20
it's only downhill from there...=20
>=20
> This is not certain that any Shor's algorithm variant works smoothly=20
independently of the quantum computerarchitecture considered (e.g gate=20
frequency, gate infidelity, cooling energy consumption) and I think it'san=
=20
interesting open game-theory problem if you can concentrate a sufficiant=20
amount of energy before anycoin owner moves them in consequence (e.g seeing=
=20
a quantum break in the mempool and reacting with a counter-spend).=20
>=20
It should be noted that P2PK keys still hold millions of bitcoin, and those=
=20
encode the entire public key for everyone to see for all time. Thus, early=
=20
QC attacks won't need to consider the complexities of the mempool.=20
>=20
> In my opinion, one of the last time the subject was addressed on the=20
mailing list, the description of the state of the quantum computer field=20
was not realistic and get into risk characterization hyperbole talking=20
about "super-exponential rate" (when indeed there is no empirical=20
realization that distinct theoretical advance on quantum capabilities can=
=20
be combined with each other) [1].=20
>=20
I think it's time to revisit these discussions given IBM's progress.=20
They've published a two videos in particular that are worth watching; their=
=20
keynote from December of last year [2], and their roadmap update from just=
=20
last month [3].=20
>=20
> On your proposal, there is an immediate observation which comes to mind,=
=20
namely why not using one of the algorithm(dilthium, sphincs+, falcon) which=
=20
has been through the 3 rounds of NIST cryptanalysis. Apart of the signature=
=20
size,which sounds to be smaller, in a network of full-nodes any PQ=20
signature algorithm should have reasonable verificationperformances.=20
>=20
I'm supportive of this consideration. FALCON might be a good substitute,=20
and maybe it can be upgraded to HAWK for even better performance depending=
=20
on how much time there is. According to the BIP, FALCON signatures are ~10x=
=20
larger than Schnorr signatures, so this will of course make the transaction=
=20
more expensive, but we also must remember, these signatures will be going=
=20
into the witness, which already receives a 4x discount. Perhaps the=20
discount could be increased further someday to fit more transactions into=
=20
blocks, but this will also likely result in more inscriptions filling=20
unused space also, which permanently increases the burden of running an=20
archive node. Due to the controversy such a change could bring, I would=20
rather any increases in the witness discount be excluded from future=20
activation discussions, so as to be considered separately, even if it=20
pertains to an increase in P2QRH transaction size.=20
 =20
Do you think it's worth reworking the BIP to use FALCON signatures? I've=20
only done a deep dive into SQIsign and SPHINCS+, and I will acknowledge the=
=20
readiness levels between those two are presently worlds apart.=20
 =20
Also, do you think it's of any concern to use HASH160 instead of HASH256 in=
=20
the output script? I think it's fine for a cryptographic commitment since=
=20
it's simply a hash of a hash (MD160 of SHA-256).=20
>=20
> Lastly, there is a practical defensive technique that can be implemented=
=20
today by coin owners to protect in face ofhyptothetical quantum=20
adversaries. Namely setting spending scripts to request an artificially=20
inflated witness stack,as the cost has to be burden by the spender. I think=
=20
one can easily do that with OP_DUP and OP_GREATERTHAN and a bitof stack=20
shuffling. While the efficiency of this technique is limited by the max=20
consensus size of the script stack(`MAX_STACK_SIZE`) and the max consensus=
=20
size of stack element (`MAX_SCRIPT_ELEMENT_SIZE`), this adds an=20
additional"scarce coins" pre-requirement on the quantum adversarise to=20
succeed. Shor's algorithm is only defined under theclassic ressources of=20
computational complexity, time and space.=20
>=20
I'm not sure I fully understand this, but even more practically, as=20
mentioned in the BIP, value can simply be kept in P2WPKH outputs, ideally=
=20
with a value of fewer than 50 coins per address, and when funds ever need=
=20
to be spent, the transaction is signed and submitted out of band to a=20
trusted mining pool, ideally one that does KYC, so it's known which=20
individual miners get to see the public key before it's mined. It's not=20
perfect, since this relies on exogenous security assumptions, which is why=
=20
P2QRH is proposed.=20
>=20
> Best,Antoine=20
> [1] https://freicoin.substack.com/p/why-im-against-taproot=20
>=20
 =20
I'm grateful you took the time to review the BIP and offer your detailed=20
insights.=20
 =20
[1] =E2=80=9CThe impact of hardware specifications on reaching quantum adva=
ntage in=20
the fault tolerant regime,=E2=80=9D 2022 -=20
https://pubs.aip.org/avs/aqs/article/4/1/013801/2835275/The-impact-of-hardw=
are-specifications-on-reaching=20
[2] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DDe2IlWji8Ck=20
[3] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3Dd5aIx79OTps=20
 =20
>=20
>=20
> Le vendredi 14 juin 2024 =C3=A0 15:30:54 UTC+1, Hunter Beast a =C3=A9crit=
 :=20
>=20
> > Good points. I like your suggestion for a SPHINCS+, just due to how=20
mature it is in comparison to SQIsign. It's already in its third round and=
=20
has several standards-compliant implementations, and it has an actual=20
specification rather than just a research paper. One thing to consider is=
=20
that NIST-I round 3 signatures are 982 bytes in size, according to what I=
=20
was able to find in the documents hosted by the SPHINCS website.=20
> >=20
https://web.archive.org/web/20230711000109if_/http://sphincs.org/data/sphin=
cs+-round3-submission-nist.zip=20
> >  =20
> > One way to handle this is to introduce this as a separate address type=
=20
than SQIsign. That won't require OP_CAT, and I do want to keep this soft=20
fork limited in scope. If SQIsign does become significantly broken, in this=
=20
hopefully far future scenario, I might be supportive of an increase in the=
=20
witness discount.=20
> >  =20
> > Also, I've made some additional changes based on your feedback on X.=20
You can review them here if you so wish:=20
> >=20
https://github.com/cryptoquick/bips/pull/5/files?short_path=3D917a32a#diff-=
917a32a71b69bf62d7c85dfb13d520a0340a30a2889b015b82d36411ed45e754=20
> >=20
> >=20
> > On Friday, June 14, 2024 at 8:15:29=E2=80=AFAM UTC-6 Pierre-Luc Dallair=
e-Demers=20
wrote:=20
> > > SQIsign is blockchain friendly but also very new, I would recommend=
=20
adding a hash-based backup key in case an attack on SQIsign is found in the=
=20
future (recall that SIDH broke over the span of a weekend=20
https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/975.pdf).=20
> > > Backup keys can be added in the form of a Merkle tree where one=20
branch would contain the SQIsign public key and the other the public key of=
=20
the recovery hash-based scheme. For most transactions it would only add one=
=20
bit to specify the SQIsign branch.=20
> > > The hash-based method could be Sphincs+, which is standardized by=20
NIST but requires adding extra code, or Lamport, which is not standardized=
=20
but can be verified on-chain with OP-CAT.=20
> > >=20
> > > On Sunday, June 9, 2024 at 12:07:16=E2=80=AFp.m. UTC-4 Hunter Beast w=
rote:=20
> > > > The motivation for this BIP is to provide a concrete proposal for=
=20
adding quantum resistance to Bitcoin. We will need to pick a signature=20
algorithm, implement it, and have it ready in event of quantum emergency.=
=20
There will be time to adopt it. Importantly, this first step is a more=20
substantive answer to those with concerns beyond, "quantum computers may=20
pose a threat, but we likely don't have to worry about that for a long=20
time". Bitcoin development and activation is slow, so it's important that=
=20
those with low time preference start discussing this as a serious=20
possibility sooner rather than later. This is meant to be the first in a=20
series of BIPs regarding a hypothetical "QuBit" soft fork. The BIP is=20
intended to propose concrete solutions, even if they're early and=20
incomplete, so that Bitcoin developers are aware of the existence of these=
=20
solutions and their potential. This is just a rough draft and not the=20
finished BIP. I'd like to validate the approach and hear if I should=20
continue working on it, whether serious changes are needed, or if this=20
truly isn't a worthwhile endeavor right now.=20
> > > >  =20
> > > > The BIP can be found here:=20
> > > > https://github.com/cryptoquick/bips/blob/p2qrh/bip-p2qrh.mediawiki=
=20
> > > >  =20
> > > > Thank you for your time.=20
> > > >  =20
> > > >=20
> > >=20
> > >=20
> >=20
> >=20
>=20
>=20
> -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the=
=20
Google Groups "Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group. To unsubscribe from=
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this topic, visit=20
https://groups.google.com/d/topic/bitcoindev/Aee8xKuIC2s/unsubscribe. To=20
unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to=20
bitcoindev+...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit=
=20
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/87b4e402-39d8-46b0-8269-4f81fa=
501627n%40googlegroups.com.=20


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------=_Part_189169_163916722.1727265883481
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Thanks for the response as always, Antoine, and I've made several substanti=
al updates to the BIP in case you'd like to give it another once-over. I'm =
going to submit P2QRH to bips soon.<br /><br /><div><div dir=3D"auto">On Th=
ursday, August 22, 2024 at 1:29:09=E2=80=AFAM UTC-6 Antoine Riard wrote:<br=
 /></div><blockquote style=3D"margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border-left: 1px s=
olid rgb(204, 204, 204); padding-left: 1ex;">Hello Hunter,<br /><br />&gt; =
Well, it's also important to remember that for every qubit added, it double=
s the power of the system. A 2,000 qubit cryptographically-relevant quantum=
 computer (CRQC) is exponentially faster than a 1,000 qubit one. There's al=
so the &gt; capability for cross-links for multiple chips to communicate wi=
th each other, which IBM is also researching. The IBM Quantum System Two ca=
n be upgraded to support 16,000 qubits according to their marketing. Also c=
onsider that the ve&gt; rification of the results from the CRQC can be done=
 via classical computer, so a high level of error correction might not be a=
s necessary so long as the program is run enough times. It will take much l=
onger, of course.<br /><br />On performance, once again I think it all depe=
nds on the quantum computer architecture considered and if we're talking ab=
out physical qubits / logical qubits. As the paper "The impact of hardware =
specifications on reaching quantum advantage in the fault tolerant regime" =
linked in your BIP judiciously observe in its introduction that surface cod=
e (as used by IBM) is only one of the error code correction technique.<br /=
><br />About cross-links for multiple chips, even if each chip parallelize =
towards a single classical logical unit, ordering computational units is a =
notoriously hard issue in classical computer. I don't think there is any ce=
rtainty in quantum computer development that each set of qubits of isolated=
 chips can be arithmetically additioned without a coefficient loss on the r=
esulting sum (...there is always a bit of apprehension to have to dissociat=
e between marketing claims and academic claim duly peer-reviewed...). And w=
hile indeed, the results can be evaluated via a classical computer, this do=
esn't mean transitively that the evaluation will be as efficient (in energy=
 / computational cycles) rather than doing more error correction on the qua=
ntum computer side.<br /></blockquote><div><br /></div><div>After looking i=
nto it more, I believe you are correct. Qubit count determines a lot of thi=
ngs, but not necessarily the "power", there's many, many factors that go in=
to that, which you've outlined.</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote style=3D"=
margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); paddi=
ng-left: 1ex;">&gt; I've decided in one of my more recent updates to the BI=
P to default to the highest level of NIST security, NIST V, which provides =
256 bits of security. You can see my rationale for that in this PR:<br />&g=
t; <a href=3D"https://github.com/cryptoquick/bips/pull/7/files" target=3D"_=
blank" rel=3D"nofollow">https://github.com/cryptoquick/bips/pull/7/files</a=
><br /><br />Those are assumptions there is a security increase by scaling =
up the size of the public key. In the Bitcoin world, we don't even make ass=
umption on the public key size<br />for ECDSA signature scheme as both comp=
ressed and uncompressed public keys have been historically valid. Similarly=
, the public key size does not have to be bundled with<br />the specificati=
on of the signature verification scheme itself (e.g see BIP340 discussion o=
n x-only public keys).<br /></blockquote><div><br /></div><div>According to=
 the spec, I was hoping to distinguish between post-quantum algorithms by t=
heir key size. If there's a collision, a distinguishing byte could be added=
 for the new algorithm. Then they're identified by their PUSHDATA opcode. T=
hat's the primary reason they're specified.</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquo=
te style=3D"margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204,=
 204); padding-left: 1ex;">&gt; As such, you'll see FALCON is roughly 4x la=
rger than SQIsign signatures. Although supersingular elliptic curve quatern=
ion isogeny-based algorithms are newer and<br />&gt; more experimental than=
 lattice-based cryptography, I think the benefits outweigh the risks, espec=
ially when transaction throughput is a principal concern.<br />=C2=A0<br />=
There are no public key size in the security table so it's hard to compare =
the overall on-chain space cost for each signature post-quantum algorithm c=
onsidered.<br />Neither actually, there is an estimation of the verificatio=
n cost for an average 200-bytes transactions, old good's Hamilton's quatern=
ion and relying on complex numbers, which can be hard to deal with for the =
hobbyist CPUs can be a concern.<br /></blockquote><div><br /></div><div>I'v=
e updated the table to reflect the key size concern. For verification cost,=
 I've found it's difficult to compare numbers provided by the different pap=
ers. Some provide cycles, some provide durations. I do want to include a be=
nchmark in the test vectors once they're ready.</div><div>=C2=A0</div><bloc=
kquote style=3D"margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, =
204, 204); padding-left: 1ex;">&gt; It's crucial that the signature and pub=
lic key both receive the witness discount. Can you go into more detail in h=
ow that might be accomplished?<br /><br />The BIP341 taproot annex could be=
 used for that, see <a href=3D"https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/=
bip-0341.mediawiki#cite_note-5" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"nofollow">https://=
github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0341.mediawiki#cite_note-5</a></blo=
ckquote><div><br /></div><div>I've adjusted the BIP for this to integrate w=
ith Taproot. The primary difference is that this will use a hash of the Tap=
root public keys in the v3 spend script.</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote =
style=3D"margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 20=
4); padding-left: 1ex;">&gt; Although it's too early to talk about activati=
on of a QuBit soft fork, I've put some thought into how we can maintain the=
 existing Bitcoin throughput with a soft fork, and I think it might be prud=
ent to, when the time comes, introdu&gt; ce a 4x additional QuBit witness d=
iscount, maybe we call it the quitness, which is only available to valid P2=
QRH signatures. This would preclude its abuse for things like inscriptions =
because the signature data would need to corresp&gt; ond to the key, and ev=
en if this were possible, it's likely to result in only a burner address. T=
his would increase chain state growth from roughly 100GB/yr to possibly clo=
ser to 2-300GB, depending on adoption. As the state of the a&gt; rt of SSD =
technology advances, this should allow plebs to run their own node on a 4TB=
 disk for over a decade, even including existing chain size of ~600GB.<br /=
><br />The annex could have typed fields for post-quantum signature and pub=
lic key further witness discount. However, I think it's a bit naive to assu=
me that SSD technology advances will stay linear and that it will be econom=
ically accessible at the same pace to the tens of thousands of plebs actual=
ly running full-nodes and constituting the skeleton of the base-relay netwo=
rk. One could play out a posteriori the predictions on bandwidth technologi=
cal advances that have been made in BIP103 to see how well they held on the=
 last ~9 years.<br /></blockquote><div><br /></div><div>According to the C =
program in BIP-101, it looks like the block size would have increased by ne=
arly 4x over the past ~9 years. I've specified in the BIP a separate witnes=
s, I call the quitness, that will solely receive the additional 4x discount=
. Schnorr signatures are still kept in the witness.</div><div>=C2=A0</div><=
blockquote style=3D"margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border-left: 1px solid rgb(2=
04, 204, 204); padding-left: 1ex;">(There is another caution with evaluatin=
g technological advances, namely that some hardware components could be act=
ually massively consumed by other cryptocurrencies for their consensus algo=
rithms...)<br /><br />&gt; If we were to use the same approach for FALCON s=
ignatures, a 16x discount would be needed, and I think that's far too much =
for the community to accept. As for pub key size and verification<br />&gt;=
 time, these are secondary considerations if the primary constraint is main=
taining present transaction throughput. That's what makes SQIsign so promis=
ing.<br /><br />Well, if there is something like the annex with typed field=
s each type of post-quantum signature could get a wider discount, especiall=
y if there are verification asymmetries favoring some scheme over another o=
ne, even if the security properties are differing.<br /></blockquote><div><=
br /></div><div>As you know, Bitcoin doesn't charge based on the complexity=
 of how long it takes to run script, so it would make sense to charge based=
 only upon byte count. If runtime is a major concern, and it is desired by =
the community, it can be proposed as a separate BIP, and potentially includ=
ed in a QuBit soft fork.</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote style=3D"margin:=
 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); padding-left=
: 1ex;">&gt; The Impact paper seems to dismiss Grover's algorithm, but I th=
ink it's important to err on the size of caution and instead use a 32-byte =
double SHA-2 (HASH256) for additional security in the P2QRH output.<br /><b=
r />Performance-wise, this doesn't shock me to use a double SHA-2 (HASH256)=
 as it has been added for many domain separation tagged hash in taproot.<br=
 />About Grover's algorithm, it's more the sample space and collision space=
 that should be more defined to be relevant, you can always downgrade the p=
erformance of the Grover's algorithm by scaling up the sample space, howeve=
r it's not sure it's practical for bitcoin transaction generation.<br /></b=
lockquote><div><br /></div><div>That's good. Additionally, because Grover's=
 algorithm scales so poorly compared to Shor's, I think it's a safe securit=
y assumption that HASH256 will be more secure for use in the v3 spend scrip=
t.</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote style=3D"margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; bo=
rder-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); padding-left: 1ex;">&gt; I'm not s=
ure I understand what you mean by this...<br />&gt; Is your coin scarcity c=
omment related to what I call "satoshi's shield" in the BIP?<br /><br />Not=
 at all the "satoshi's shield" as you're describing in the BIP.<br /><br />=
This is just the observation that bitcoin coins are scarce in the sense tha=
t you need to burn raw energy to acquire the rewards according to the issua=
nce schedule (or miners fees). Bitcoin script can be designed to request th=
at a sufficient number of bitcoin coins, or satoshis, are burned before to =
unlock a coin locked under a quantum-frail scriptpubkey.<br /><br />That me=
ans any quantum computer attacker, even if they have an efficient quantum c=
omputer, might not be able to break the redeem script itself, only the sign=
atures composing the redeem script check sig operations.<br /><br />Let's g=
ive a concrete example, let's say you have the following pseudo script:<br =
/><br />=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 &lt;&lt;OP_DEPTH&gt; &lt;OP_PUSHDATA2&g=
t; &lt;998&gt; &lt;OP_EQUALVERIFY&gt; &lt;pubkey&gt; &lt;OP_CHECKSIG&gt;&gt=
;<br /><br />Interpeted the following script should request from the spendi=
ng party, whatever it is to provide a witness stack of length 998 bytes, al=
l dummy elements.<br />Those dummy elements are putting the burden on the q=
uantum computer attacker to burn fees at the current sat per vbyte rate to =
realize a quantum exploit.<br />(There could leverage SIGHASH_NONE to escap=
e this "fee jail"... however it sounds to expose them to be overrided by a =
miner).<br /><br />So assuming this defensive scheme in face of quantum exp=
loit is sound, I think this put the burden of a quantum attacker to have ha=
shrate capabilities at the current level of difficulty, not solely an effic=
ient CRQC.<br /></blockquote><div><br /></div><div>I'm not sure I understan=
d the point you're making, but only valid public key / signature pairs in t=
he quitness will be considered valid.</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote sty=
le=3D"margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204);=
 padding-left: 1ex;">&gt; Yes, this makes more sense. I'm not sure anything=
 can be done with the fraud proofs, but they could at least prove that a ba=
d actor is present. Ideally both approaches are combined for maximum securi=
ty and accountability.<br /><br />No KYC is necessarily hurting mining pool=
s as there is no single kyc definition that you can implement that do not o=
pen the door for a kind of DoS exploitation.<br /><br />This is not an issu=
e to build a practical fraud proofs systems on seen transaction, the open q=
uestion is more if the average bitcoin user would pay to download fraud pro=
ofs demonstrating that a given miner is not engaging in quantum exploit.<br=
 /></blockquote><div><br /></div><div>Makes sense.</div><div>=C2=A0</div><b=
lockquote style=3D"margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border-left: 1px solid rgb(20=
4, 204, 204); padding-left: 1ex;">&gt; I've taken Antoine's feedback to hea=
rt and added FALCON to the specification, including a section that addresse=
s the increased maintenance burden of adding two distinct post-quantum cryp=
tosystems.<br /><br />Thanks you for the addition, for the maintenance burd=
en there is always the counter-argument to be made that you can secure a co=
ins under multiple post-quantun signature scheme, especially if they're fro=
m different hardness assumptions breed. If one of the two scheme is secure,=
 the coins are still locked by the other half.<br /></blockquote><div><br /=
></div><div>You'll see I've taken this feedback to heart and specified hybr=
id cryptography in the BIP.</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote style=3D"marg=
in: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); padding-l=
eft: 1ex;">I think it could be interesting to split the BIP in multiple one=
s, one for the general consensus mechanism introducing a P2QRH with all qua=
ntum risks considerations, and an individual one for each signature algorit=
hm that could be deployed udner this generic P2QRH. Kinda in the same way, =
that BIP340 / BIP341 are split.<br /></blockquote><div><br /></div><div>You=
 might be right about that. I'd still like to specify FALCON for the first =
one, but additional signature algorithms can get their own BIPs.</div><div>=
=C2=A0</div><blockquote style=3D"margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border-left: 1p=
x solid rgb(204, 204, 204); padding-left: 1ex;">Best,<br />Antoine<br />ots=
 hash: b57e9fe0b3de603ca66be29b7f1ba04fa5b8bc516c1277114ab42ac9f8572e12<br =
/></blockquote><div><br /></div><div>Let me know if there's any additional =
changes you would like me to make. I'll be submitting the BIP upstream to t=
he bips repo as a draft PR soon. Do you mind if I credit you in the Acknowl=
edgements section? Thanks for all the great feedback so far.</div><div><br =
/></div><blockquote style=3D"margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border-left: 1px so=
lid rgb(204, 204, 204); padding-left: 1ex;"><div><div dir=3D"auto">Le jeudi=
 15 ao=C3=BBt 2024 =C3=A0 06:25:01 UTC+1, Hunter Beast a =C3=A9crit=C2=A0:<=
br /></div><blockquote style=3D"margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border-left: 1px=
 solid rgb(204, 204, 204); padding-left: 1ex;">I've taken Antoine's feedbac=
k to heart and added FALCON to the specification, including a section that =
addresses the increased maintenance burden of adding two distinct post-quan=
tum cryptosystems.<div>Please review.</div><div><a href=3D"https://github.c=
om/cryptoquick/bips/pull/9/files" rel=3D"nofollow" target=3D"_blank">https:=
//github.com/cryptoquick/bips/pull/9/files</a><br /><br /></div><div><div d=
ir=3D"auto">On Tuesday, August 6, 2024 at 11:50:35=E2=80=AFAM UTC-6 Hunter =
Beast wrote:<br /></div><blockquote style=3D"margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; bor=
der-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); padding-left: 1ex;">That's alright,=
 Antoine, it's been a busy month for me too.<div><br /></div><div>&gt; So I=
 think it's good to stay cool minded and I think my observation about talki=
ng of "super-exponential rate" as used in maaku old blog post does not<br /=
>&gt; hold a lot of rigor to describe the advances in the field of quantum =
computing. Note, also how IMB is a commercial entity that can have a lot of=
 interests<br />&gt; in "pumping" the state of "quantum computing" to gathe=
r fundings (there is a historical anecdote among bitcoin OG circles about V=
italik trying to do an<br />&gt; ICO to build a quantum computer like 10 ye=
ars ago, just to remember).</div><div><br /></div><div>Well, it's also impo=
rtant to remember that for every qubit added, it doubles the power of the s=
ystem. A 2,000 qubit cryptographically-relevant quantum computer (CRQC) is =
exponentially faster than a 1,000 qubit one. There's also the capability fo=
r cross-links for multiple chips to communicate with each other, which IBM =
is also researching. The IBM Quantum System Two can be upgraded to support =
16,000 qubits according to their marketing. Also consider that the verifica=
tion of the results from the CRQC can be done via classical computer, so a =
high level of error correction might not be as necessary so long as the pro=
gram is run enough times. It will take much longer, of course.</div><div><b=
r /></div><div>&gt; I think FALCON is what has the smallest pubkey + sig si=
ze for hash-and-sign lattice-based schemes. So I think it's worth reworking=
 the BIP to see what has the smallest generation / validation time and pubk=
ey + size space for the main post-quantum scheme. At least for dilthium, fa=
lcon, sphincs+ and SQISign. For an hypothetical witness discount, a v2 P2QR=
H could be always be moved in a very template annex tag / field.</div><div>=
<br /></div><div>I've decided in one of my more recent updates to the BIP t=
o default to the highest level of NIST security, NIST V, which provides 256=
 bits of security. You can see my rationale for that in this PR:</div><div>=
<a href=3D"https://github.com/cryptoquick/bips/pull/7/files" rel=3D"nofollo=
w" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/cryptoquick/bips/pull/7/files</a></=
div><div>Then, referencing this table:</div><div><a href=3D"https://github.=
com/cryptoquick/bips/blob/p2qrh/bip-p2qrh.mediawiki#security" rel=3D"nofoll=
ow" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/cryptoquick/bips/blob/p2qrh/bip-p2=
qrh.mediawiki#security</a><br /></div><div>As such, you'll see FALCON is ro=
ughly 4x larger than SQIsign signatures. Although supersingular elliptic cu=
rve quaternion isogeny-based algorithms are newer and more experimental tha=
n lattice-based cryptography, I think the benefits outweigh the risks, espe=
cially when transaction throughput is a principal concern.</div><div><br />=
</div><div>It's crucial that the signature and public key both receive the =
witness discount. Can you go into more detail in how that might be accompli=
shed?</div><div><br /></div><div>Although it's too early to talk about acti=
vation of a QuBit soft fork, I've put some thought into how we can maintain=
 the existing Bitcoin throughput with a soft fork, and I think it might be =
prudent to, when the time comes, introduce a 4x additional QuBit witness di=
scount, maybe we call it the quitness, which is only available to valid P2Q=
RH signatures. This would preclude its abuse for things like inscriptions b=
ecause the signature data would need to correspond to the key, and even if =
this were possible, it's likely to result in only a burner address. This wo=
uld increase chain state growth from roughly 100GB/yr to possibly closer to=
 2-300GB, depending on adoption. As the state of the art of SSD technology =
advances, this should allow plebs to run their own node on a 4TB disk for o=
ver a decade, even including existing chain size of ~600GB.</div><div><br /=
></div><div>If we were to use the same approach for FALCON signatures, a 16=
x discount would be needed, and I think that's far too much for the communi=
ty to accept. As for pub key size and verification time, these are secondar=
y considerations if the primary constraint is maintaining present transacti=
on throughput. That's what makes SQIsign so promising.</div><div><br /></di=
v><div>&gt; See literature on quantum attacks on bitcoin in the reference o=
f the paper you quote ("The impact of hardware specifications on reaching q=
uantum advantage in the fault tolerant regime") for a discussion on Grover'=
s search algorithm.</div><div><br /></div><div>The Impact paper seems to di=
smiss Grover's algorithm, but I think it's important to err on the size of =
caution and instead use a 32-byte double SHA-2 (HASH256) for additional sec=
urity in the P2QRH output.</div><div><br /></div><div>&gt; Namely you can i=
ntroduce an artifical "witness-stack size scale ladder" in pseudo-bitcoin s=
cript: OP_SIZE &lt;1000&gt; OP_EQUALVERIFY OP_DROP ...checksig...</div><div=
>&gt; I have not verified it works well on bitcoin core though this script =
should put the burden on the quantum attacker to have enough bitcoin amount=
 available to burn in on-chain fees in witness size to break a P2WPKH.</div=
><div><br /></div><div>I'm not sure I understand what you mean by this...</=
div><div>Is your coin scarcity comment related to what I call "satoshi's sh=
ield" in the BIP?</div><div><br /></div><div>&gt; The technical issue if yo=
u implement KYC for a mining pool you're increasing your DoS surface and th=
is could be exploited by competing miners. A more reasonable security model=
 can be to have miner coinbase pubkeys being used to commit to the "seen-in=
-mempool" spends and from then build "hand wawy" fraud proofs that a miner =
is quantum attacking you're P2WSH spends at pubkey reveal time during trans=
action relay.</div><div><br /></div><div>Yes, this makes more sense. I'm no=
t sure anything can be done with the fraud proofs, but they could at least =
prove that a bad actor is present. Ideally both approaches are combined for=
 maximum security and accountability.</div><div><br /></div><div>Thanks for=
 your time!</div><div><div><br /></div><div><div dir=3D"auto">On Friday, Ju=
ly 12, 2024 at 7:44:27=E2=80=AFPM UTC-6 Antoine Riard wrote:<br /></div><bl=
ockquote style=3D"margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border-left: 1px solid rgb(204=
, 204, 204); padding-left: 1ex;">Hi Hunter Beast,<br /><br />Apologies for =
the delay in answer.<br /><br />&gt; I was thinking of focusing on the IBM =
Quantum System Two, mention how it can be scaled, and that although it migh=
t be quite limited, if running Shor's variant for a &gt; sufficient amount =
of time, above a certain minimum threshold of qubits, it might be capable o=
f decrypting the key to an address within one year. I base this on the esti=
mate &gt; provided in a study by the Sussex Centre for Quantum Technologies=
, et. al [1]. They provide two figures, 317M qubits to decrypt in one hour,=
 13M qubits to decrypt in one &gt; day. It would seem it scales roughly lin=
early, and so extrapolating it further, 36,000 qubits would be needed to de=
crypt an address within one year. However, the IBM Heron &gt; QPU turned ou=
t to have a gate time 100x less than was estimated in 2022, and so it might=
 be possible to make do with even fewer qubits still within that timeframe.=
 With &gt; only 360 qubits, barring algorithmic overhead such as for circui=
t memory, it might be possible to decrypt a single address within a year. T=
hat might sound like a lot, but &gt; being able to accomplish that at all w=
ould be significant, almost like a Chicago Pile moment, proving something i=
n practice that was previously only thought theoretically &gt; possible for=
 the past 3 decades. And it's only downhill from there...<br /><br />Briefl=
y surveying the paper "The impact of hardware specifications on reaching qu=
antum advantage in the fault tolerant regime", I think it's a reasonble fra=
mework to evaluate<br />the practical efficiency of quantum attacks on bitc=
oin, it's self consistent and there is a critical approach referencing the =
usual litterature on quantum attacks on bitcoin. Just<br />note the caveat,=
 one can find in usual quantum complexity litterature, "particularly in reg=
ard to end-to-end physical resource estimation. There are many other error =
correction<br />techniques available, and the best choice will likely depen=
d on the underlying architecture's characteristics, such as the available p=
hysical qubit=E2=80=93qubit connectivity" (verbatim). Namely, evaluating qu=
antum attacks is very dependent on the concrete physical architecture under=
pinning it.<br /><br />All that said, I agree with you that if you see a qu=
antum computer with the range of 1000 physical qubits being able to break t=
he DLP for ECC based encryption like secp256k1, even if it takes a year it =
will be a Chicago Pile moment, or whatever comparative experiments which we=
re happening about chain of nuclear reactions in 30s / 40s.<br /><br />&gt;=
 =C2=A0I think it's time to revisit these discussions given IBM's progress.=
 They've published a two videos in particular that are worth watching; thei=
r keynote from December of last &gt; year [2], and their roadmap update fro=
m just last month [3]<br /><br />I have looked on the roadmap as it's avail=
able on the IBM blog post: <a href=3D"https://www.ibm.com/quantum/blog/quan=
tum-roadmap-2033#mark-roadmap-out-to-2033" rel=3D"nofollow" target=3D"_blan=
k">https://www.ibm.com/quantum/blog/quantum-roadmap-2033#mark-roadmap-out-t=
o-2033</a><br />They give only a target of 2000 logical qubit to be reach i=
n 2033...which is surprisingly not that strong...And one expect they might =
hit likely solid<br />state issues in laying out in hardware the Heron proc=
essor architecture. As a point of thinking, it took like 2 decades to advan=
ce on the state of art<br />of litography in traditional chips manufacturin=
g.<br />=C2=A0<br />So I think it's good to stay cool minded and I think my=
 observation about talking of "super-exponential rate" as used in maaku old=
 blog post does not<br />hold a lot of rigor to describe the advances in th=
e field of quantum computing. Note, also how IMB is a commercial entity tha=
t can have a lot of interests<br />in "pumping" the state of "quantum compu=
ting" to gather fundings (there is a historical anecdote among bitcoin OG c=
ircles about Vitalik trying to do an<br />ICO to build a quantum computer l=
ike 10 years ago, just to remember).<br /><br />&gt; I'm supportive of this=
 consideration. FALCON might be a good substitute, and maybe it can be upgr=
aded to HAWK for even better performance depending on how much &gt; time th=
ere is. According to the BIP, FALCON signatures are ~10x larger t&gt; han S=
chnorr signatures, so this will of course make the transaction more expensi=
ve, but we also &gt; must remember, these signatures will be going into the=
 witness, which already receives a 4x discount. Perhaps the discount could =
be incr&gt; eased further someday to fit &gt; more transactions into blocks=
, but this will also likely result in more inscriptions filling unused spac=
e also, which permanently increases the burden of running an archive &gt; n=
ode. Due to the controversy s&gt; uch a change could bring, I would rather =
any increases in the witness discount be excluded from future activation di=
scussions, so as to be &gt; considered separately, even if it pertains to a=
n increase in P2QRH transaction size.<br />=C2=A0<br />&gt; Do you think it=
's worth reworking the BIP to use FALCON signatures? I've only done a deep =
dive into SQIsign and SPHINCS+, and I will acknowledge the readiness levels=
 between those two are presently worlds apart.<br /><br />I think FALCON is=
 what has the smallest pubkey + sig size for hash-and-sign lattice-based sc=
hemes. So I think it's worth reworking the BIP to see what has the smallest=
 generation / validation time and pubkey + size space for the main post-qua=
ntum scheme. At least for dilthium, falcon, sphincs+ and SQISign. For an hy=
pothetical witness discount, a v2 P2QRH could be always be moved in a very =
template annex tag / field.<br /><br />&gt; Also, do you think it's of any =
concern to use HASH160 instead of HASH256 in the output script? I think it'=
s fine for a cryptographic commitment since it's simply a hash of a hash (M=
D160 of SHA-256).<br /><br />See literature on quantum attacks on bitcoin i=
n the reference of the paper you quote ("The impact of hardware specificati=
ons on reaching quantum advantage in the fault tolerant regime") for a disc=
ussion on Grover's search algorithm.<br /><br />&gt; I'm not sure I fully u=
nderstand this, but even more practically, as mentioned in the BIP, value c=
an simply be kept in P2WPKH outputs, ideally with a value of fewer than 50<=
div>&gt; coins per address, and when funds ever need to be spent, the&gt; =
=C2=A0transaction is signed and submitted out of band to a trusted mining p=
ool, ideally one that does KYC, so it's</div><div>&gt; known which individu=
al miners get to see the public key before it's mined. It's not perfect, si=
nce this relies on exogenou&gt; s security assumptions, which is why P2QRH =
is</div><div>&gt; proposed.<br /><br />Again, the paper you're referencing =
("The impact of hardware specifications on reaching quantum advantage...") =
is analyzing the performance of quantum advantage under<br />2 dimensions, =
namely space and time. My observation is in Bitcoin we have an additional d=
imension, "coin scarcity" that can be leveraged to build defense of address=
<br />spends in face of quantum attacks.<br /><br />Namely you can introduc=
e an artifical "witness-stack size scale ladder" in pseudo-bitcoin script: =
OP_SIZE &lt;1000&gt; OP_EQUALVERIFY OP_DROP ...checksig...<br />I have not =
verified it works well on bitcoin core though this script should put the bu=
rden on the quantum attacker to have enough bitcoin amount available to bur=
n in on-chain fees in witness size to break a P2WPKH.</div><div><br /><br /=
>&gt; =C2=A0ideally with a value of fewer than 50 coins per address, and wh=
en funds ever need to be spent, the transaction is signed and submitted out=
 of band to a trusted mining pool, ideally<br />&gt; one that does KYC, so =
it's known which individual &gt; miners get to see the public key before it=
's mined. It's not perfect, since this relies on exogenous security assumpt=
ions, which is<br />&gt; why P2QRH is proposed.<br /><br /></div><div>The t=
echnical issue if you implement KYC for a mining pool you're increasing you=
r DoS surface and this could be exploited by competing miners. A more reaso=
nable security model can be to have miner coinbase pubkeys being used to co=
mmit to the "seen-in-mempool" spends and from then build "hand wawy" fraud =
proofs that a miner is quantum attacking you're P2WSH spends at pubkey reve=
al time during transaction relay.<br /><br />Best,<br />Antoine</div><div><=
br /></div><div>ots hash:=C2=A01ad818955bbf0c5468847c00c2974ddb5cf609d63052=
3622bfdb27f1f0dc0b30</div><div><div dir=3D"auto">Le lundi 17 juin 2024 =C3=
=A0 23:25:25 UTC+1, hunter a =C3=A9crit=C2=A0:<br /></div><blockquote style=
=3D"margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); p=
adding-left: 1ex;">
<br />-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
<br />Hash: SHA256
<br />
<br />On 2024-06-16 19:31, Antoine Riard &lt;<a rel=3D"nofollow">antoin...@=
gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:
<br />
<br />&gt;
<br />&gt; Hi Hunter Beast,I think any post-quantum upgrade signature algor=
ithm upgrade proposal would grandly benefit to haveShor's based practical a=
ttacks far more defined in the Bitcoin context. As soon you start to talk a=
boutquantum computers there is no such thing as a "quantum computer" though=
 a wide array of architecturesbased on a range of technologies to encode qu=
bits on nanoscale physical properties.
<br />&gt;
<br />Good point. I can write a section in the BIP Motivation or Security s=
ection about how an attack might take place practically, and the potential =
urgency of such an attack.
<br />=C2=A0
<br />I was thinking of focusing on the IBM Quantum System Two, mention how=
 it can be scaled, and that although it might be quite limited, if running =
Shor's variant for a sufficient amount of time, above a certain minimum thr=
eshold of qubits, it might be capable of decrypting the key to an address w=
ithin one year. I base this on the estimate provided in a study by the Suss=
ex Centre for Quantum Technologies, et. al [1]. They provide two figures, 3=
17M qubits to decrypt in one hour, 13M qubits to decrypt in one day. It wou=
ld seem it scales roughly linearly, and so extrapolating it further, 36,000=
 qubits would be needed to decrypt an address within one year. However, the=
 IBM Heron QPU=C2=A0turned out to have a gate time 100x less than was estim=
ated in 2022, and so it might be possible to make do with even fewer qubits=
 still within that timeframe. With only 360 qubits, barring algorithmic ove=
rhead such as for circuit memory, it might be possible to=C2=A0decrypt a si=
ngle address within a year. That might sound like a lot, but being able to=
=C2=A0accomplish that=C2=A0at all would be significant, almost like a Chica=
go Pile moment, proving something in practice that was previously only thou=
ght theoretically possible for the past 3 decades. And it's only downhill f=
rom there...
<br />&gt;
<br />&gt; This is not certain that any Shor's algorithm variant works smoo=
thly independently of the quantum computerarchitecture considered (e.g gate=
 frequency, gate infidelity, cooling energy consumption) and I think it'san=
 interesting open game-theory problem if you can concentrate a sufficiant a=
mount of energy before anycoin owner moves them in consequence (e.g seeing =
a quantum break in the mempool and reacting with a counter-spend).
<br />&gt;
<br />It should be noted that P2PK keys still hold millions of bitcoin, and=
 those encode the entire public key for everyone to see for all time. Thus,=
 early QC attacks won't need to consider the=C2=A0complexities of the mempo=
ol.
<br />&gt;
<br />&gt; In my opinion, one of the last time the subject was addressed on=
 the mailing list, the description of the state of the quantum computer fie=
ld was not realistic and get into risk characterization hyperbole talking a=
bout "super-exponential rate" (when indeed there is no empirical realizatio=
n=C2=A0that distinct theoretical advance on quantum capabilities=C2=A0can b=
e combined with each other) [1].
<br />&gt;
<br />I think it's time to revisit these discussions given IBM's progress. =
They've published a two videos in particular that are worth watching; their=
 keynote from December of last year [2], and their roadmap update from just=
 last month [3].
<br />&gt;
<br />&gt; On your proposal, there is an immediate observation which comes =
to mind, namely why not using one of the algorithm(dilthium, sphincs+, falc=
on) which has been through the 3 rounds of NIST cryptanalysis. Apart of the=
 signature size,which sounds to be smaller, in a network of full-nodes any =
PQ signature algorithm should have reasonable verificationperformances.
<br />&gt;
<br />I'm supportive of this consideration. FALCON might be a good substitu=
te, and maybe it can be upgraded to HAWK for even better performance depend=
ing on how much time there is. According to the BIP, FALCON signatures are =
~10x larger than Schnorr signatures, so this will of course make the transa=
ction more expensive, but we also must remember, these signatures will be g=
oing into the witness, which already receives a 4x discount. Perhaps the di=
scount could be increased further someday to fit more transactions into blo=
cks, but this will also likely result in more inscriptions filling unused s=
pace also, which permanently increases the burden of running an archive nod=
e. Due to the controversy such a change could bring, I would rather any inc=
reases in the witness discount be excluded from future activation discussio=
ns, so as to be considered separately, even if it pertains to an increase i=
n P2QRH transaction size.
<br />=C2=A0
<br />Do you think it's worth reworking the BIP to use FALCON signatures? I=
've only done a deep dive into SQIsign and SPHINCS+, and I will acknowledge=
 the readiness levels between those two are presently worlds apart.
<br />=C2=A0
<br />Also, do you think it's of any concern to use HASH160 instead of HASH=
256 in the output script? I think it's fine for a cryptographic commitment =
since it's simply a hash of a hash (MD160 of SHA-256).
<br />&gt;
<br />&gt; Lastly, there is a practical defensive technique that can be imp=
lemented today by coin owners to protect in face ofhyptothetical quantum ad=
versaries. Namely setting spending scripts to request an artificially infla=
ted witness stack,as the cost has to be burden by the spender. I think one =
can easily do that with OP_DUP and OP_GREATERTHAN and a bitof stack shuffli=
ng. While the efficiency of this technique is limited by the max consensus =
size of the script stack(`MAX_STACK_SIZE`) and the max consensus size of st=
ack element (`MAX_SCRIPT_ELEMENT_SIZE`), this adds an additional"scarce coi=
ns" pre-requirement on the quantum adversarise to succeed. Shor's algorithm=
 is only defined under theclassic ressources of computational complexity, t=
ime and space.
<br />&gt;
<br />I'm not sure I fully understand this, but even more practically, as m=
entioned in the BIP, value can simply be kept in P2WPKH outputs, ideally wi=
th a value of fewer than 50 coins per address, and when funds ever need to =
be spent, the transaction is signed and submitted out of band to a trusted =
mining pool, ideally one that does KYC, so it's known which individual mine=
rs get to see the public key before it's mined. It's not perfect, since thi=
s relies on exogenous security assumptions, which is why P2QRH is proposed.
<br />&gt;
<br />&gt; Best,Antoine
<br />&gt; [1]=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://freicoin.substack.com/p/why-im-again=
st-taproot" rel=3D"nofollow" target=3D"_blank">https://freicoin.substack.co=
m/p/why-im-against-taproot</a>
<br />&gt;
<br />=C2=A0
<br />I'm grateful you took the time to review the BIP and offer your detai=
led insights.
<br />=C2=A0
<br />[1] =E2=80=9CThe impact of hardware specifications on reaching quantu=
m advantage in the fault tolerant regime,=E2=80=9D 2022=C2=A0-=C2=A0<a href=
=3D"https://pubs.aip.org/avs/aqs/article/4/1/013801/2835275/The-impact-of-h=
ardware-specifications-on-reaching" rel=3D"nofollow" target=3D"_blank">http=
s://pubs.aip.org/avs/aqs/article/4/1/013801/2835275/The-impact-of-hardware-=
specifications-on-reaching</a>
<br />[2]=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DDe2IlWji8Ck" re=
l=3D"nofollow" target=3D"_blank">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DDe2IlWji=
8Ck</a>
<br />[3]=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3Dd5aIx79OTps" re=
l=3D"nofollow" target=3D"_blank">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3Dd5aIx79O=
Tps</a>
<br />=C2=A0
<br />&gt;
<br />&gt;
<br />&gt; Le vendredi 14 juin 2024 =C3=A0 15:30:54 UTC+1, Hunter Beast a =
=C3=A9crit=C2=A0:
<br />&gt;
<br />&gt; &gt; Good points. I like your suggestion for a SPHINCS+, just du=
e to how mature it is in comparison to SQIsign. It's already in its third r=
ound and has several standards-compliant implementations, and it has an act=
ual specification rather than just a research paper. One thing to consider =
is that NIST-I round 3 signatures are 982 bytes in size, according to what =
I was able to find in the documents hosted by the SPHINCS website.
<br />&gt; &gt; <a href=3D"https://web.archive.org/web/20230711000109if_/ht=
tp://sphincs.org/data/sphincs+-round3-submission-nist.zip" rel=3D"nofollow"=
 target=3D"_blank">https://web.archive.org/web/20230711000109if_/http://sph=
incs.org/data/sphincs+-round3-submission-nist.zip</a>
<br />&gt; &gt; =C2=A0
<br />&gt; &gt; One way to handle this is to introduce this as a separate a=
ddress type than SQIsign. That won't require OP_CAT, and I do want to keep =
this soft fork limited in scope. If SQIsign does become significantly broke=
n, in this hopefully far future scenario, I might be supportive of an incre=
ase in the witness discount.
<br />&gt; &gt; =C2=A0
<br />&gt; &gt; Also, I've made some additional changes based on your feedb=
ack on X. You can review them here if you so wish:
<br />&gt; &gt; <a href=3D"https://github.com/cryptoquick/bips/pull/5/files=
?short_path=3D917a32a#diff-917a32a71b69bf62d7c85dfb13d520a0340a30a2889b015b=
82d36411ed45e754" rel=3D"nofollow" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/cry=
ptoquick/bips/pull/5/files?short_path=3D917a32a#diff-917a32a71b69bf62d7c85d=
fb13d520a0340a30a2889b015b82d36411ed45e754</a>
<br />&gt; &gt;
<br />&gt; &gt;
<br />&gt; &gt; On Friday, June 14, 2024 at 8:15:29=E2=80=AFAM UTC-6 Pierre=
-Luc Dallaire-Demers wrote:
<br />&gt; &gt; &gt; SQIsign is blockchain friendly but also very new, I wo=
uld recommend adding a hash-based backup key in case an attack on SQIsign i=
s found in the future (recall that SIDH broke over the span of a weekend=C2=
=A0<a href=3D"https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/975.pdf" rel=3D"nofollow" target=
=3D"_blank">https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/975.pdf</a>).
<br />&gt; &gt; &gt; Backup keys can be added in the form of a Merkle tree =
where one branch would contain the SQIsign public key and the other the pub=
lic key of the recovery hash-based scheme. For most transactions it would o=
nly add one bit to specify the SQIsign branch.
<br />&gt; &gt; &gt; The hash-based method could be Sphincs+, which is stan=
dardized by NIST but requires adding extra code, or Lamport, which is not s=
tandardized but can be verified on-chain with OP-CAT.
<br />&gt; &gt; &gt;
<br />&gt; &gt; &gt; On Sunday, June 9, 2024 at 12:07:16=E2=80=AFp.m. UTC-4=
 Hunter Beast wrote:
<br />&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; The motivation for this BIP is to provide a concr=
ete proposal for adding quantum resistance to Bitcoin. We will need to pick=
 a signature algorithm, implement it, and have it ready in event of quantum=
 emergency. There will be time to adopt it. Importantly, this first step is=
 a more substantive answer to those with concerns beyond, "quantum computer=
s may pose a threat, but we likely don't have to worry about that for a lon=
g time". Bitcoin development and activation is slow, so it's important that=
 those with low time preference start discussing this as a serious possibil=
ity sooner rather than later.  This is meant to be the first in a series of=
 BIPs regarding a hypothetical "QuBit" soft fork. The BIP is intended to pr=
opose concrete solutions, even if they're early and incomplete, so that Bit=
coin developers are aware of the existence of these solutions and their pot=
ential.  This is just a rough draft and not the finished BIP. I'd like to v=
alidate the approach and hear if I should continue working on it, whether s=
erious changes are needed, or if this truly isn't a worthwhile endeavor rig=
ht now.
<br />&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; =C2=A0
<br />&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; The BIP can be found here:
<br />&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; <a href=3D"https://github.com/cryptoquick/bips/bl=
ob/p2qrh/bip-p2qrh.mediawiki" rel=3D"nofollow" target=3D"_blank">https://gi=
thub.com/cryptoquick/bips/blob/p2qrh/bip-p2qrh.mediawiki</a>
<br />&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; =C2=A0
<br />&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; Thank you for your time.
<br />&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; =C2=A0
<br />&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;
<br />&gt; &gt; &gt;
<br />&gt; &gt; &gt;
<br />&gt; &gt;
<br />&gt; &gt;
<br />&gt;
<br />&gt;
<br />&gt; -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a top=
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